29 أكتوبر 2014

دائرة الإرهاب الملغومة واستراتيجية وتكتيكات وتشريعات المواجهة

د. محمد محفوظ .. يكتب : دائرة الإرهاب الملغومة وإستراتيجية وتكتيكات وتشريعات المواجهة
نشر بتاريخ 29 أكتوبر 2014

يضيف الحادث الإرهابى الذى وقع بسيناء يوم 24 أكتوبر 2014 ؛ تضحيات جديدة على طريق الحرب على الارهاب التى ستستمر مصر فى مواجهتها لفترة ليست بالقصيرة .
والواقع أن وصف المواجهة مع الإرهاب  بالحرب ليس من قبيل المبالغة أو التهويل لاستنهاض الهمم والعزم فى النفوس . وإنما هو وصف لمقتضى الحال فى مواجهة جماعات مسلحة تستهدف الجيش والشرطة والشعب ومؤسسات الدولة والمجتمع ؛ وتتلقى دعماً تمويلياً وتسليحياً وإعلامياً من دول ومنظمات خارجية ؛ وتعتنق أيدلوجية تكفيرية تسعى لتدمير النظام السياسى والاجتماعى والاقتصادى ـ الجاهلى من وجهة نظرهم ـ وإقامة إمارة متأسلمة تتبع دولة الخلافة الإسلامية العالمية المزعومة التى يسعون لإقامتها ؛ بعد أن أعلنت عن نفسها فى العراق وسوريا من خلال تنظيم داعش الإرهابى .
وبالتالى فإن منطق الحرب يقتضى التعامل مع معاركها المتتالية أوالمتباعدة ؛ المتوقعة أو المفاجئة بـ : ( إستراتيجية الأعصاب الباردة ) ؛ وعدم الانجرار لمنزلق ردود الأفعال الانفعالية التى قد تؤدى إلى تشتت الجهود وتفرق مساراتها وعدم بناء خبرات متراكمة ومؤثرة .
وتقتضى إستراتيجية الأعصاب الباردة الالتزام بالآتى :
ـ ضرورة تطبيق تكتيكات عسكرية وأمنية ملائمة على أرض المواجهة .
ـ وضرورة توفر تشريعات فاعلة ومستقرة تساند عمليات الرصد والتحرى أو جلسات التحقيقات والمحاكمات فيما بعد الضبط .
أولاً ـ تكتيكات المواجهة :
تمثل القاعدة المعلوماتية المتجددة وتقنيات الرصد المباشر الظهير الأمثل للنجاح فى إدارة إستراتيجية الأعصاب الباردة بكفاءة ؛ انطلاقاً من غزارة المعلومات التى تساهم فى تقديم صورة واضحة عن حدود مسرح العمليلت وقدرات المجموعات الإرهابية .
ولذلك يصبح من المهم الاعتماد ـ فى منطقة الشريط الحدودى مع غزة والمناطق المتاخمة له ـ على تقنيات الرصد الفضائى من خلال الأقمار الصناعية لمراقبة التحركات والأنشطة الإرهابية عن بعد وعلى مدار الساعة ؛ بما يضمن توفير خريطة واضحة لأوكار المجموعات الإرهابية . ويبرز فى هذا الشأن القمر الصناعى إيجيبت سات 2 الذى تم اطلاقه فى 16 ابريل 2014 بغرض القيام بمهام الاستشعار عن بعد ؛ والذى ينبغى أن يتم تخصيص جانباً من أنشطته للمهام العسكرية لرصد تلك المنطقة الملتهبة من أرض سيناء .
كما يصبح من المهم أيضاً الاعتماد على تقنية الطائرات بدون طيار ؛ للدفع بها لقصف المجموعات الإرهابية التى تم رصدها فضائياً ؛ بما يضمن عدم وقوع خسائر بشرية فى حال استهداف الطائرة بصواريخ مضادة .
ومن ثم فإن التزاوج ما بين الرصد الفضائى والقصف الجوى بالطائرات الموجهة هو أمر يوفر سيطرة جوية تسمح بالمواجهة غير المباشرة مع المجموعات الإرهابية ؛ ويقلص من الخسائر البشرية التى قد تقع عند الاعتماد على طائرات الأباتشى التى يمكن استهدافها صاروخياً ؛ أو الاعتماد على المواجهة بالقوات البرية .
أيضاً تقدم التكنولجيا الحلول التى يمكن من خلال الاعتماد عليها تأمين الكمائن والمنشأت المتواجدة على طول مسرح العمليات .
ولذلك لابد من الاعتماد على منظومة متكاملة من كاميرات المراقبة التى توفر رؤية بانورامية شاملة للنطاق المحيط بتلك الكمائن والمنشآت والوحدات العسكرية أو الشرطية . كما ينبغى توفير نطاق آمن حول تلك الأماكن المستهدفة من خلال إحاطتها بحواجز خرسانية تتحدد دائرتها وفقاً للقدرات التفجيرية المتوقعة ؛ والاعتماد على روبوتات وتجهيزات بدون أفراد لكشف المتفجرات توضع عند رأس النطاق الخارجي لتلك النطاقات الآمنة ؛ يتبعها ممر متعرج ( زجزاج ) لتعويق أى عمليات اقتحامية بسيارات مفخخة .
ولكن ينبغى أن يترافق مع الاعتماد على التكنولوجيا ؛ ضرورة وضع معايير فائقة الصرامة لاختيار العناصر البشرية القتالية التى تتواجد على أرض المواجهة . وربما يوضح حادث سيناء الأخير بأن الاعتماد الكبير على المجندين فى مناطق انتشار المجموعات الإرهابية ؛ هو أمر ينبغى مراجعته ؛ واستبداله بالاعتماد على عناصر مدربة على تكتيكات مكافحة الإرهاب ؛ من ضمن ضباط وأفراد القوات المسلحة والشرطة .
إذن فإن الرصد والاستطلاع الفضائى والطائرات بدون طيار فى الجو ؛ وشبكة الكاميرات والروبوتات وتجهيزات كشف المتفجرات والنطاقات الآمنة والحواجز المتعرجة على الأرض .. بالتزاوج مع ما تم الإعلان عنه من إمكانية إقامة منطقة عازلة على الحدود مع غزة وبناء سور عازل بعمق كبير فى الأرض ؛ كل تلك الإجراءات تمثل التكتيكات التى تدعم المهام القتالية على الأرض ؛ بشرط أن يتم الاعتماد على عناصر مدربة على تكتيكات مكافحة الارهاب من الضباط والأفراد دون غيرهم .
ثانياً ـ تشريعات المواجهة :
أصدر الرئيس عبد الفتاح السيسى ؛ عقب الحادث الارهابى الأخير بسيناء ؛ قراراً بقانون بشأن تأمين وحماية المنشآت العامة والحيوية ، يخول بموجبه للقوات المسلحة مشاركة جهاز الشرطة فى حماية وتأمين المنشآت العامة والحيوية بالدولة، ويسرى هذا القرار لمدة عامين ، وتحال الجرائم التى ترتكب ضد هذه المنشآت إلى النيابة العسكرية توطئةً لعرضها على القضاء العسكرى للبت فيها. والمقصود بالمنشآت العامة والحيوية للدولة ( محطات وشبكات وأبراج الكهرباء وخطوط الغاز وحقول البترول وخطوط السكك الحديدية وشبكات الطرق والكبارى، وغيرها من المنشآت الحيوية والمرافق والممتلكات العامة، وما فى حكمها ) . بحيث تصبح هذه المنشآت الحيوية فى حكم المنشآت العسكرية طوال فترة تأمينها وحمايتها بمشاركة القوات المسلحة، والتى ستمتد لمدة عامين من تاريخ إصدار القرار .
وربما تحتاج الفترة الراهنة بتداعياتها الإرهابية العصيبة إلى مساندة القوات المسلحة للشرطة فى مهمة حماية المنشآت والمرافق ؛ ولكن تصوير الأمر بأن الفيصل فى وأد الارهاب سيتحقق بمجرد إحالة جرائمه إلى القضاء العسكرى ؛ هو أمر قد يسئ للقضاء العسكرى من خلال تصويره باعتباره قضاء التنكيل والعقوبات المغلظة والمشددة ؛ وقضاء الفصل السريع فى القضايا بدون تدقيق أو تمحيص أو كفالة لحقوق المتهمين .
والواقع أن سرعة القضاء العسكرى فى الفصل فى القضايا نظراً لمحدودية عدد القضايا التى ينظرها قياساً بالقضاء المدنى هى مسألة نسبية ؛ لأن إثقال كاهل القضاء العسكرى بعشرات آلاف القضايا التى لم تكن تدخل فى اختصاصه أصلاً نتيجة القرار بقانون السابق الإشارة إليه ؛ سيؤدى به إلى الدخول فى نفس المتاهة الزمنية الممتدة التى يعانى منها القضاء المدنى المصرى .
علاوة على أن القضاء العسكرى لم يعد قضاء الدرجة الواحدة كما هو سائد لدى الرأى العام ؛ بل أصبح اعتباراً من التعديلات التى دخلت على قانونه عام 2007 قضاء الدرجتين . حيث تنص المادتين رقمى 43 و 43 مكرر من قانون القضاء العسكرى على إنشاء ( المحكمة العليا للطعون العسكرية ) التى تختص دون غيرها بنظر الطعون المقدمة من النيابة العسكرية أو من المحكوم عليه فى الأحكام النهائية التى تصدرها كافة المحاكم العسكرية فى جرائم القانون العام على العسكريين أو المدنيين ؛ وتسرى على هذه الطعون القواعد والإجراءات الخاصة بالطعن بالنقض فى المواد الجنائية المنصوص عليها فى القانون رقم 57 لسنة 1959 فى شأن حالات وإجراءات الطعن أمام محكمة النقض وذلك فيما لا يتعارض مع أحكام هذا القانون وتكون أحكامها باتة دون حاجة لأي إجراء . كما تختص هذه المحكمة دون غيرها بنظر طلبات إعادة النظر التى تقدم فى أحكام المحاكم العسكريةٌ الصادرة فى جرائم القانون العام وذلك طبقا للقواعد والإجراءات الخاصة بطلب إعادة النظر المنصوص عليها فى قانون الإجراءات الجنائية .
وبالتالى فإن السؤال المزمن الذى طال انتظار إجابته هو : لماذا مازالت يد الحكومة مربوطة فيما يتعلق بإصدار قانون لمكافحة الإرهاب ؟ وخصوصاً بعد أن حكمت المحكمة الدستورية العليا فى 2 يونيو 2013م بعدم دستورية ما تضمنه البند 1 من المادة رقم 3 من قانون الطوارئ ؛ من تخويل رئيس الجمهورية الترخيص بالقبض والاعتقال، وبتفتيش الأشخاص والأماكن دون التقيد بأحكام قانون الإجراءات الجنائية .
مما يوضح بأن المحكمة الدستورية العليا قد غلت يد الأجهزة الأمنية أثناء إعلان حالة الطوارئ عن القيام بأى عمليات اعتقال مطلقاً ؛ أو أى عميات قبض وتفتيش للأشخاص والأماكن دون التقيد بأحكام قانون الإجراءات الجنائية ؛ باعتبار أن ذلك يتناقض مع أحكام الدستور .
وبالتالى فإن إعلان حالة الطوارئ فى المربع الذى تم تحديده فى شمال سيناء لن يسمح للسلطات العسكرية أو الشرطية باعتقال أى مشتبه فيه بجرائم إرهابية ؛ أو بالقبض أو التفتيش للأشخاص والأماكن دون التقيد بضوابط قانون الإجراءات الجنائية . الأمر الذى يضع أجهزة الأمن والقوات المسلحة فى مأزق ؛ فكيف يمكنها مواجهة مجموعات إرهابية تعتنق عقيدة انتحارية بدون أن يوجد قانون يوفر لها إجراءات استثنائية تتيح لها القدرة على اتخاذ تدابير احترازية لمنع الجرائم الإرهابية قبل وقوعها . لاسيما وأن هذا الأمر معمول به فى كل الدول الديمقراطية ؛ حيث تمتلك أمريكا وروسيا والدول الأوربية وعدد كبير من دول العالم قوانين لمكافحة الإرهاب تتيح للأجهزة الأمنية سلطات إستثنائية خارج الإطار العادى لقوانين الإجراءات الجنائية .   
وللأسف ليس صحيحاً ما يردده بعض القانونيين من أن المادة رقم 86 من قانون العقوبات الخاصة بتعريف الجريمة الإرهابية وما يتلوها من مواد عقابية ؛ توفر حلاً قانونياً كافياً لمكافحة الإرهاب ؛ وذلك لأن المادة المشار إليها وما يرتبط بها من مواد ؛ اكتفت فقط بإنشاء إطار عقابي للجريمة الإرهابية ؛ بينما يخلو قانون الإجراءات الجنائية من أى إجراءات للاستدلال والتحقيق تتناسب مع الطبيعة الخاصة لتلك الجريمة ؛ بما يجعل السياسة التى تحكم مواجهة الإرهاب تقوم على رد الفعل تجاه الجرائم التى تقع ؛ وليس المواجهة الاستباقية لمنع الجرائم الإرهابية قبل وقوعها .
إذن وللمرة المليون ؛ نحن فى حاجة إلى قانون لمكافحة الإرهاب ؛ يعطى أجهزة الأمن القدرة على اتخاذ تدابير احترازية فى مجالات الاعتقال والمراقبة والتنصت والتفتيش دون التقيد بضوابط قانون الإجراءات الجنائية عند مواجهة الجرائم الارهابية . كما ينبغى أن ينظم هذا القانون كيفية إعلان الدولة لقوائم بالمنظمات الإرهابية والمنظمات والدول والشخصيات الراعية للإرهاب . كما ينص على منع كل المشتبه فيهم بالتورط فى الإرهاب من مباشرة كافة الحقوق السياسية .
ولقد تمكنت الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية وهى دولة عملاقة من حيث المساحة واتساع نطاق المصالح المستهدفة لها على مستوى الداخل والخارج ؛ من التصدى بقوة للمخاطر الإرهابية المحتملة عقب أحداث 11 سبتمبر 2001م ؛ نتيجة إصدار الكونجرس لقانون ( باتريوت ) لمكافحة الإرهاب ؛ ونتيجة إفتتاح معتقل أو معسكر احتجاز جوانتانامو ؛ ونتيجة الصلاحية التى يوفرها القانون لوزارة الخارجية فى إدراج المنظمات والدول والأفراد المشتبه فى علاقتهم بالإرهاب على قوائم المنظمات الارهابية أو الراعية للإرهاب لمدة سنتين قابلتين للتجديد ؛ على أن يقوم الكونجرس بمراجعة المبررات التى استندت لها الوزارة فى ذلك ؛ كما تقوم المحاكم بالرقابة القضائية على تلك القرارات لإلغائها أو إقرار نفاذها .
وبالتالى فإن المساندة التشريعية للحرب على الإرهاب لن تصبح ناجحة إلا بإصدار قانون خاص لمكافحة الإرهاب ؛ يقنن عمليات الرصد والتحرى والاعتقال وينظم إجراءات جلسات التحقيقات والمحاكمات فيما بعد الضبط .
الجانب الثانى من المواجهة التشريعية يتمثل فى ضرورة تفعيل بعض التشريعات القائمة ؛ لتجفيف منابع دعم الإرهاب تمويليا أو تسليحيا أو إعلامياً .
وبالتالى فإن الأسئلة الملحة التى تطرح نفسها فى هذا المجال تتمثل فى الآتى :
ـ لماذا لم يتم وقف بث قنوات الجزيرة على النايل سات ؛ رغم ارتكاب تلك القنوات لجرائم تحريضية واضحة ضد الشعب المصرى وكافة مؤسساته السيادية ( جيش وشرطة وقضاء ) ؟!
ـ ولماذا لم يتم طرد الدبلوماسيين الأتراك والقطريين المتورطين فى تقديم الدعم المالى والتسليحى لجماعات الإرهاب فى مصر ؟!
ـ ولماذا لم يتم حل الأحزاب التى تنتمى لأيدلوجية الإسلام السياسى ؛ باعتبارها خلايا نائمة تنتظر الوقت المناسب لترويع المجتمع بإرهابها ؟!
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إن إستراتيجية الأعصاب الباردة المعتمدة على التكتيكات القائمة على التكنولجيا الفائقة والتحصينات الحامية والكوادر المدربة ؛ والمستندة إلى ظهير تشريعى يوفر المواجهة الاستباقية للإرهاب والمحاكمات الناجزة لجرائمه ؛ هى القبة الحديدية التى يمكن أن تحاصر الإرهاب فى الأرض والجو ؛ ومن ثم تؤدى إلى تصفية كوادره وتجفيف منابعه .
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dr.mmahfouz64@gmail.com

07 سبتمبر 2014

The Egyptian Security Sector Between the questions of the revolution and their answers

The Egyptian Security Sector
 Between the questions of the revolution
 and their answers

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A report on developments in the security sector in Egypt during 2013

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Published : 22 january 2014

Col. Dr. Mohamed Mahfouz

Coordinator, National Initiative for Police Reform (A Police for the Egyptian People)
and Assistant Coordinator, Honourable Officers Coalition

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An introductory paper for the conference on
“Transforming the Arab security sector in the transitional period: working for change”
in Amman, Jordan, 22nd - 23rd January 2014

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Contents

Introduction


Section One: Policies and legislation

1. Policies and legislation in the period before 2013

2. Policies and legislation during 2013


Section Two: The redefinition of relationships between public actors in society

1. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces

2. Political Islam

3. Terrorist groups

4. Police coalitions

(a)                 The “Officers, but Honourable” Coalition (now the Honourable Officers Coalition)
(b)                The General Police Officers Coalition (now the General Police Officers’ Club)
(c)                 The General Police Agents and Personnel Coalition (now the General Policemen’s Club)
(d)                The Bearded Police Officers’ Coalition

5. State and Revolutionary institutions


Section Three: Obstacles on the road to reform


General review


Conclusion


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Introduction

The year 2013 seems ideally suited to a report on the development of the security sector in Egypt from the perspectives of policy, legislation, and the redefinition of relationships between public actors and society. In the first half of the year, the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood gave birth to a campaign of proselytising; in the second, the Brotherhood fell and power was transferred to a civilian movement following a popular revolution, with the help of the Egyptian Armed Forces.
Between the first and second halves of the year, therefore, events and transformations can be analysed and contrasted in their various interactions and interrelations. Of course, this period cannot be taken in isolation from the months preceding it, to which it is closely connected, a period whose natural beginning is the 30th June 2012, with the accession of the Muslim Brotherhood to the Presidency of Egypt. Nor can these events be viewed without taking into account all the upheavals that have occurred on the Egyptian stage, beginning from the date of the first outbreak of revolution on 25th January 2011.
The following is a presentation of developments in the Egyptian security sector during 2013 and before, taking in policies, legislation, and the redefinition of relationships between public actors and society, as well as an examination of the obstacles that lie in the way of reforming this sector and the cycle of development in its numerous institutions.


Section One: Policies and legislation

1. Policies and legislation before 2013

Examining the period between the “Revolution of the 25th” and the start of 2013, one may note a number of developments - albeit limited in number and scope - in the Egyptian security sector, which comprises five institutions: the Interior Ministry, General Intelligence, the Supervisory Authority, the Central Accounting Authority, and the Illegal Gains Authority. These developments have occurred within a context of frequent disturbances that have seen the appointment of four Prime Ministers, four Interior Ministers, and new heads of department for General Intelligence, the Supervisory Authority, and Illegal Gains. Legislative authority has also been redistributed during this period, remaining for approximately one year in the hands of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces; transferred for less than six months to the People’s Council, controlled by the Brotherhood majority and their Islamist allies; then transferred a second time, for a period of several months, to President Mohamed Morsi. Meanwhile, executive authority remained for a year and a half under the control of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, before being transferred on 30th June 2012 to the President of the Republic.
It is noteworthy, however, that the origin of the political and legislative developments which affected the Egyptian security sector during this period lies with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, while the legislative authority, controlled by the Islamist movement, was powerless to make any legislative intervention in this area; and the President, a member of that same movement, contented himself with a change of leadership to ensure loyalty to the new regime, without any accompanying change of policy. Even the Constitution of 2012, which could have been considered a foundational legislative document upon which to construct a sound process for reform in the security sector, contained no clear or explicit provisions that even remotely hinted at or encouraged such reform.
The developments in the Egyptian security sector during this period were as follows:

A. Abolishing the State Security Investigations Division, and establishing the National Security Division[1]

On 15th March 2011, Mansour el-Essawy, the Interior Minister, issued resolution no. 445/2011 (valid), regarding the creation of the National Security Division and the abolition of State Security Investigations[2]. Although this resolution may outwardly appear to be a qualitative shift, and a step on the path to reform within the Interior Ministry, it becomes clear upon objective examination that it is nothing more than a change of name, with no bearing on the institution itself. This is due to the fact that no law was brought in to clarify the principles according to which this Division should operate, or ways of monitoring its performance. Added to this is the fact that most of the crimes still investigated by this organisation fall under Section Two, Book Two of the Penal Code, pertaining to “Crimes and felonies harmful to the State from within”, and the text of the law in this section contains many overly-flexible phrases and vague formulations criminalising various acts, leading to a broad punitive framework that permits the creation of a state of fear, and the arbitrary use and interpretation of the law.

B. Depriving the Interior Ministry of its electoral powers, and limiting them to the guaranteeing of elections

Article 39 of the constitutional declaration issued on 30th March 2011 stipulated that the Supreme Electoral Commission should be given the power to supervise all aspects of the election process, from voter registration to the announcement of the results. On 20th May 2011, the constitutional text was implemented through the promulgation of law no. 46/2011 as an amendment to the Law on the Exercise of Political Rights 73/1956, limiting the Interior Ministry’s relationship to the election process to the guaranteeing of elections only, and charging the Supreme Electoral Commission with the supervision of all stages of elections and referenda.

C. Publishing a Code of Conduct for Police Work[3]

On 22nd October 2011, the Interior Ministry announced the publication of a Code of Conduct for Police Work. The reader of this document is struck by the prevalence of slogans and stylised phrases, but the most eye-catching part is the regulation in Part Four that reads: “All members of the police body are bound by the rules on military discipline as stipulated in the Police Law.” In reality, the Police Law is entirely devoid of references to any “rules on military discipline”, meaning that the Code of Conduct for Police Work, in contravening the Police Law, is itself the first to violate the rules of good conduct, conferring military characteristics on policemen and officers in spite of their membership in a civilian organisation. This is to say nothing of the fact that the publication of this Code of Conduct by the Interior Ministry, an organ of the executive, robs it of any worth: codes of conduct or ethical covenants are not issued, drawn up, or announced from within the circles of power, but only by the self-organising bodies that represent a particular profession.

D. Ending the State of Emergency

On 31st May 2012, the State of Emergency was cancelled, pursuant to public resolution 126/2010, the first article of which stipulated that this State of Emergency should last for a period of two years beginning on 1st June 2010 and ending on 31st May 2012, to make way for an unprecedented period that would see the Egyptian security sector return to work within the provisions of the Criminal Procedural Law, a far cry from the exceptional measures that were the result of the constant declaration of States of Emergency.

E. Amending the Police Law

On 20th June 2012, the Military Council issued, following the transfer to it of legislative authority and the dissolution of the People’s Assembly by a ruling of the Supreme Constitutional Court, a resolution on law no. 25/2012 amending several provisions of the Police Law[4].
The amendments included the introduction of a new rank, “officer of honour”, awarded to police officers after attaining the rank of “officer of distinction”; as well as the abolition of the military courts to which police personnel had been subject in all professional matters, and their replacement with disciplinary courts; the approval of a new timetable for raising police salaries; and the removal of the provision making the President of the Republic the ultimate head of the police force[5].
Although these amendments were aimed at improving the working conditions of the police, which is one of the prerequisites for a serious process of restructuring and reorganisation within the Interior Ministry, modifying the Police Law to address only the issue of working conditions while ignoring all the other elements required for a comprehensive reorganisation leads to the conclusion that these amendments were merely privileges directed at police officers and personnel for the sake of renewing and securing their loyalty to the regime.

F. Judicial policing authority for the members of the Central Investigations Authority

On 10th October 2012, Justice Ministerial Decree no. 8937/2012 was issued, conferring on technical members of the Central Investigations Authority the status of agents of the judicial police in relation to documents under investigation or confiscated property, as well as the power of arrest over suspects caught in the act of committing crimes that constitute resistance or insult to those in power whenever these occur within their jurisdiction, in the course of carrying out their duties or because of them.

G. Issuing the 2012 Constitution[6]

On 26th October 2012 the Constitution was issued, containing no provisions that might have brought about a substantive shift in favour of development within the Egyptian security sector, with the exception of the provision in Article 204 concerning the formation of a national anti-corruption agency (which did not see the light of day for six months after the release of the Constitution); a token reference in Article 205 to the Central Investigations Authority; and the provision in Article 202 stipulating that the consent of the Shura Council must be obtained for the President’s appointments to the heads of the oversight authorities, and that those heads cannot be dismissed without the agreement of a majority of the Shura Council’s members. However, the reality of the political climate at that time - the overlap between the “secret organisation” and the state, and the lack of attention paid to the principle of the separation of powers, the result of a parliamentary majority composed entirely of yes-men - meant that these provisions were nothing more than ink on paper, with no bearing on reality whatsoever.
This is confirmed by the Constitution’s other articles, such as Article 199 on the police, which includes no stipulations that accord with the goals of the Revolution that first began on National Police Day 2011; as well as by methods used in attempts to get around Article 55, dealing with the right to vote and stand in elections: when on 25th May 2013, the Supreme Constitutional Court made use of its prior constitutional oversight of the Law on the Exercise of Political Rights, returning it to the Shura Council on account of its violating Article 1 of the Constitution in prohibiting members of the police and the Armed Forces from voting in elections, the authorities sought to circumvent the Court’s ruling by issuing a law banning these personnel from exercising that right for a period of between five and ten years, for reasons of national security. The same thing occurred in the case of Article 52, concerning the freedom to establish unions: the Interior Ministry got around this by insisting on the sufficiency of elections for personnel associations, a complete and unconstitutional denial of the right to establish unions.


2. Policies and legislation during 2013

Year 2013 can be divided into two periods, the first part being the second half of President Mohamed Morsi’s first and only year in office: the early part of that year saw the appointment of the fifth Interior Minister, and the transfer of legislative authority to the Shura Council controlled by the Brotherhood majority and their Islamist allies, according to the provisions of the 2012 Constitution. However, this Council, like its predecessor (the People’s Council), failed to issue a single piece of legislation relating to the reform of the security sector in Egypt. The policies of the President and his government, too, were concerned solely with buying the loyalties of the police force, in the service of the new regime’s own purposes.
The second part of this year, meanwhile, begins with the mass public demonstrations on and after 30th June in response to the Tamarrod campaign, which called for the withdrawal of support from President Mohamed Morsi and the holding of early elections; an intervention by the Armed Forces in order to remove the President and abrogate the 2012 Constitution; the appointment of the head of the Supreme Constitutional Court as the country’s interim President; the dissolution of the Shura Council; and the appointment of new heads of Intelligence, the Supervisory Authority, and Illegal Gains.
The developments in the security sector, during this period of two eras or regimes, were as follows:

A. Declaring a State of Emergency in the cities along the Suez Canal

On 27th January 2013, a State of Emergency and curfew were imposed on the cities along the Suez Canal, on account of the bloody events outside Port Said prison that claimed the lives of 46 citizens, shortly after the referral to the mufti of death sentences given to 21 suspects in the killing of 74 supporters of Al Ahly football club in the Stade Port Said on 1st February 2012.

B. Responding to the needs of police personnel: arms, occupational rights, health- and social care

On 16th February 2013, the Interior Ministry approved the provision of funds necessary for 100,000 pistols with which to arm police personnel, so that they may carry out their duties in combating highly dangerous criminal elements. This followed a series of strikes, protests, and demonstrations on the part of policemen demanding proper equipment and an improvement in working conditions as well as in health- and social care, prompting the Interior Ministry to issue circular no. 10/2013, which contained responses to nineteen of these demands[7].

C. The Public Prosecutor requests that citizens carry out arrests

On 13th March 2013, the Public Prosecutor called on citizens to exercise their right of citizen’s arrest, as provided for in Article 37 of the Criminal Process Law[8], indicating a lack of confidence in the police’s performance of their role in confronting the growing number of protests by numerous social groups and revolutionary movements. Question marks surrounded the reason why the Public Prosecutor was engaging in an activity not covered by its duties, namely, the raising of legal awareness.

D. President Mohamed Morsi courts the police

On 15th March 2013, President Mohamed Morsi visited the Presidency of the Central Security Forces at the Central Security Training Camp, in an attempt to assuage the anger of police officers and conscripts resulting from reports in media and political circles that the Muslim Brotherhood was attempting to 'Brotherhoodise' the Interior Ministry, as well as the regime’s placement of the police in renewed confrontation with the people. The President gave a speech from inside the camp, broadcast live on television, in which he said: “This is our third transition: the first, of which the police were a part, was the transition of October 1973; the second, of which the police were also at the very heart, was the transition of 25th January 2011; and God - praised and exalted be He - has so willed it that 25th January is also the National Day of the Police, and a monument to the sacrifices made by the police against colonialism and against the occupier...[9]

E. Holding elections for the Police Officers’ and Policemen’s Clubs

During March 2013, the Interior Ministry issued circular no. 370/2013, regarding the holding of elections for the General Police Officers’ Club and branch clubs in the various governorates. The elections were held on the 23rd and 24th April 2013[10]. As a result of increased pressure from policemen below the rank of officer, the Interior Ministry issued a similar decision regarding elections to the General Policemen’s Club and its branches, as well as the Club for civilian personnel within the Ministry[11]. It is noteworthy that the initially high standard of the demand - calling for the establishment of a union for the police - should eventually be reduced to merely calling for the holding of elections for police clubs. Some people have attempted to justify this capitulation or display of powerlessness by pointing to the experience of the Judges’ Club of Egypt, which plays a significant role in defending the rights of judges. However, the reality of the situation permits no comparison between the working conditions of judges and those of police personnel: according to the letter of the Constitution, judges are independent and cannot be dismissed, so an elected club may be perfectly adequate for carrying out their wishes, but police employees form part of the executive authority, and consequently are not independent and can be dismissed. A constitutionally-protected labour organisation - and not an elected club - is the only entity capable of defending the rights of police personnel and organising their activities.

F. Removing powers of detention, arrest, and investigation from the Emergency Law

On 2nd June 2013, the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled Article 3, Section 1 of the Emergency Law unconstitutional, stripping that law completely of the power of detention, as well as the powers of arrest or investigation beyond the guidelines specified in the Criminal Process Law. Thus, the Egyptian Interior Ministry and all elements of the security sector too were completely deprived of the power of detention, and the powers of arrest and investigation beyond the guidelines specified in the Criminal Process Law[12].

G. Establishing the Ministry of Transitional Justice and National Reconciliation

On 16th July 2013, the formation of the Transitional Government was announced, under the leadership of Dr. Hazem al-Beblawi; this government included for the first time a new ministry under the name of the Ministry of Transitional Justice and National Reconciliation.

H. Declaring a National State of Emergency

On 14th August 2013, the Acting President of the Republic - following the approval of the Cabinet - issued a resolution declaring a state of emergency in all parts of the Republic for a period of one month, and the imposition of a curfew at night, following acts of violence which broke out as police were dispersing the occupations of Rabia Square and al-Nahda Square. On 12th September 2013, the State of Emergency was extended for two additional months, ending on 14th November 2013.*

I. Issuing a law regulating the right to protests

On 24th November, Acting President Adly Mansour issued a resolution on Law no. 107/2013, concerning the regulation of the right to public gatherings, marches, and peaceful demonstrations[13].
Articles 12 and 13 of this Law contained new rules of engagement for the break-up of demonstrations. This brought about the cancellation of Article 102, Section 3 of the Police Law, which permitted the break-up, through the use of weapons, of demonstrations that pose a threat to public safety[14].
The law contained a number of gradual steps that must be followed in order to disperse illegal demonstrations, namely: issuing a verbal warning to disperse; using water cannons; using tear gas; using batons; using warning shots; using noise or smoke grenades; using rubber cartridges; and using non-rubber cartridges. The main addition resulting from the creation of this law is the introduction of broad and progressive rules of engagement, as opposed to the general rules on the use of weaponry laid out in Article 102 of the Police Law, granting the Interior Minister the right to regulate procedures by ministerial decree. The law also acknowledged the right to a “public pulpit” in Article 15, through each governorate’s designation of an area in which public gatherings, marches, and peaceful demonstrations to express a view without posing a threat to the authorities are permitted.

J. Finishing the drafting of the 2014 Constitution[15]

On 2nd December 2013, the Committee of Fifty concluded their process of making amendments to the 2012 Constitution. On 14th December, Acting President Adly Mansour issued a decree designating the 14th and 15th of January 2014 as days for a referendum on the Constitution and an examination of its text. It became clear that although the 2014 Constitution introduced Article 241 obliging the Council of Deputies to bring in a law on transitional justice guaranteeing national truth, justice, and reconciliation, and the compensation of victims according to international standards - which heralds, however belatedly, the possibility of taking the first steps in a process of reforming the security sector, particularly given the presence of the Ministry of Transitional Justice in the current Cabinet - the remaining articles of the Constitution relating to the security sector are responding to growing fears resulting from the sharp religious and political polarisation in society: it limits the rights of police personnel and members of the Supervisory Authority and General Intelligence to vote in elections and form unions, since Article 76 on the formation of unions prohibits elements of the regime from establishing such organisations, closing the door to the creation of unions for personnel working in the security sector.
Furthermore, Article 87 on candidacy and voting in elections permits exemption from this duty in certain cases specified by law, granting constitutional legitimacy to the final paragraph of Article 1 of the Law on the Exercise of Political Rights which exempts personnel in the police and Armed Forces from voting in elections.
Two articles in the new Constitution are dedicated to the police: Article 206 is broad and traditional in its description of the role of the police within society, while Article 207 gives constitutional status to the Supreme Police Council and provides for its cooperation with the Interior Minister, as well as requiring consent to be sought from the Council on proposed laws concerning the police.
Responding to the danger posed by armed terrorist groups, Article 237 on confronting terrorism was introduced, containing provisions on the law’s regulation of rules and procedures for the fight against terrorism.
The National Anti-Corruption Commission brought in by the 2012 Constitution was abolished, and Article 218 lays out the state’s commitment to fighting corruption by means of a national strategy overseen by the regulatory authorities.
Article 215 further states that both the Central Investigations Department and the Supervisory Authority are considered part of the regulatory authorities, and Article 219 limits the role of the Central Investigations Department to overseeing the public finances of the State and legal persons, as well as reviewing the implementation of the State budget and independent budgets.

K. The Cabinet declares the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist group*

The suicide bombing in front of the Dakahlya Security Directorate building in the early hours of 24th December 2012 brought about the deaths of sixteen martyrs and the injury of over one hundred and thirty people, most of them policemen and the remainder civilians; the Director of Security was seriously injured in the incident and two bureau directors were themselves martyred. The explosion also led to the partial destruction of the Security Directorate and neighbouring buildings. Following this incident, on 25th December 2013, the Cabinet issued a resolution declaring the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist group and organisation following Article 86 of the Penal Code**, with all the consequences this entails, the most important of them being: passing the sentences legally prescribed for terrorist offences on anyone who participates in the activities of the Brotherhood or its organisation, or who promotes them in speech, in writing, or in any other manner, and on anyone who funds its activities; passing legally-prescribed sentences on anyone who joins either the Brotherhood or its organisation or who continues to be a member of either following the publication of this announcement; notifying other Arab states which are party to the 1998 Agreement on Combating Terrorism of this resolution; and charging the police and armed forces with the defence of public institutions, on condition that the police assume the task of defending universities and protecting students from the group’s terrorist activities.
The reality is that this belated resolution could engender legal problems if it is not transformed into a comprehensive anti-terror law, as there may be attempts to strike it down before the courts of the State Assembly. It is necessary therefore to make use of the experiences of developed nations in the fight against terror, by passing a law that allows the construction of a list of terrorist organisations, and a list of states and organisations that sponsor it, and that permits the security forces to take measures to thwart terrorist acts before they occur. Although Article 86 of the Penal Code defines “terrorist crime” and specifies appropriate penalties, this punitive framework does not correspond to the investigatory and evidence-gathering process appropriate to the special nature of this crime, basing the policy that governs the fight against terrorism on a reaction to crimes that occur, rather than pre-emptive confrontation to stop terrorist acts before they happen.


Section Two: Redefining relationships between actors in society

The distinguishing feature of 2013 was its union of two “eras” or regimes, with a popular revolution between them, justified and motivated by the melting-down of all of society’s actors in a continuous process of redefining their relationships towards each other and towards society, starting from the assumption that the rules which governed those relationships had become confused and dysfunctional under the pressure of the revolutionary act and needed to be rearranged according to the new balance of power.
In the following paragraphs we shall review this process of redefining relationships among a number of actors in society, and its effects on relationships in the security sector in detail or more generally.


1. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces

The Military Council lacked the political or moral will - during the year in which it held both legislative and executive authority, or the additional half-year in which it held only executive authority - to acknowledge the necessity of reorganising and restructuring the security sector in Egypt. The Council, being one of the pillars of the old regime, took a sycophantic approach to the Revolution of 25th January, anxiously insisting that the revolutionaries rebuild and reorganise all the institutions upon which the former regime depended in maintaining its hold on power; at the heart of which, of course, were the security and military institutions themselves. Thus, the Military Council kept the security sector as it was to protect it from the hormones of change which, had they taken hold, would have spread to the other institutions, with the military establishment first among them.
The presidential term of Mohamed Morsi, which lasted for one year, led to a redefinition of the relationship between the military and security establishments, as they both found themselves fighting in the same trench to preserve the institutions of the State from being subverted in the interests of the Muslim Brotherhood to which the President belonged, or those of the rest of the Islamist movement, chief among them the Salafists. With the outbreak of the Revolution of 30th June 2013, in which the two institutions fought in the same trench as the majority of the people, the fear was once again confirmed that any radical changes in the security establishment or the security sector would necessarily extend to the military establishment, which lives in fear of a foreign conspiracy to break up the Egyptian army following the collapse suffered by the Iraqi army, and the splintering that has weakened the Syrian army. This fear will remain a scarecrow that contributes to the increased resistance on the part of the military establishment to any radical changes that may affect the security sector in Egypt, seeing it as a partner who must be depended on now and in the near future to overcome likely regional dangers.

2. Political Islam

The coming of the Islamist movement to power in Egypt within the executive and legislative authorities presented it with a true test of its ability or desire to carry out due reforms within the security sector. The movement’s sycophantic policies and non-existent legislation confirmed the extent of its lack of political and moral will to carry out any reforms in the security forces; starting from its intellectual point of reference, the attempt to reshape the identity of society according to extreme and radical Islamising policies that conflict with the moderate nature of the Egyptian situation, which guaranteed a confrontation with the majority of society, and seeking to impose those policies either through oppressive use of the security apparatus, or through a reliance on the terror practised by the armed groups that form part of this movement.
Therefore, the Islamist movement initially cooperated with the police, including the oppressive creed and methods it had inherited, seeing it as the ideal force with which to implement its goal of oppressing the people in preparation for the Islamisation of society; but the involvement of the police in new confrontations with the people, while the ashes of the previous series (after 28th January 2011) were still hot, led first to unrest and then rebellion within the ranks of the police, which the Islamist movement interpreted as evidence of a continued loyalty to the previous regime that would require the force’s subversion, splintering, and weakening.
Hence, it is clear that the redefinition of the relationship between the Islamist movement and the security sector in Egypt, in the light of the terrorist acts directed against the institutions and personnel of the security forces by armed groups affiliated with that movement, can best be described - now and in the future - as one of “strategic hostility”, a rupture in the mentality of that movement that makes it unlikely to accept the idea of carrying out any reforms to the police force, preferring instead to purge and damage it through subversion and splintering, in preparation for constructing a new force from loyal elements in the event of a return to power, after the pattern of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.

3. Terrorist groups

The security climate following the collapse of the police on 28th January 2011 was permissive to an unprecedented degree, leaving the door wide open to a flourishing of trade through the tunnels along the border region between Egypt and Gaza, through which both people and goods could pass in both directions under the nose of the state. Then the Libyan revolution, and its military ramifications, led to the birth of a busy trade in heavy weaponry which found an ideal playing-field in the absence of policing and the stockpiling of arms; all it needed was players. Ironically, it was the Military Council who were the first to furnish those players from the prison supply through a series of unexpected and incomprehensible amnesties, raising a series of questions that may remain unanswered.
The series of amnesties began on 1st March 2011, less than three weeks after the fall of the Mubarak regime, when the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces issued a decree releasing the Brotherhood leader Khairat al-Shater on health grounds, alongside another Brotherhood leader, the businessman Hassan Malik, the two of them having served almost four and a quarter years of their seven-year sentence for military crimes in case no. 2/2007, known in the media as the “al-Azhar militias” case.
On 11th March 2011, the Military Council issued a decree releasing Abbud al-Zumar and his cousin Tariq al-Zumar, who were serving a heavy prison sentence, following their conviction by the Supreme Military Court and the “emergency” State Security Criminal Court in the assassination of the late president Sadat. The term of the sentence handed down on Abbud al-Zumar was 65 years, and on Tariq al-Zumar 47 years.
On 17th March 2011, 60 political prisoners were released, among them Muhammad al-Zawahiri, sentenced to death in absentia; he is the brother of Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the al-Qaida second-in-command.
On 2nd November 2011, the Military Council granted an amnesty to 334 people who had been sentenced by absolute decree of the military judiciary; the decree was published with no names on the Military Council’s Facebook page, no. 77 of the Council’s communications to the people[16].
President Mohamed Morsi, unsurprisingly, continued the series of amnesties in order to populate the field with players, issuing over the course of his term presidential decrees granting amnesty to 755 prisoners, among them eight members of the Muslim Brotherhood leadership who were suspects in the “International Muslim Brotherhood Organisation” case, and 55 members of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah and Islamic Jihad, of whom three had been convicted of the assassination of the late President of Egypt Anwar Sadat.
The presidential amnesties also included 16 prisoners who had been arrested between 2010 and 2012 on suspicion of smuggling heavy weaponry from Libya into the Sinai.[17]
A situation riddled with security holes; the ready availability of weaponry; the release of extremist leaders; the large number of gaps in security along borders with regimes or political movements belonging to the Islamist tendency to the east, south, and west; as well as political and financial support from Turkey and Qatar for the International Muslim Brotherhood Organisation; all these indicate that the redefinition of the relationship between terrorist groups and actors in society has taken a course which shows those groups to be engaging in terrorism on behalf of others, to the benefit of the Islamist movement’s political wings, in order to dissolve the political structure, cripple the state, and sow discord among the governing institutions, leading to the neutralisation or marginalisation of those institutions, and opening the way for upstarts with guns, funding, and power to reorder that structure and render it utterly subservient.
The confrontation between the police and terrorist groups in the Egyptian context will not be resolved any time soon, but rather will drag on for years; perhaps not in the same bloody fashion as in Iraq, but most probably in an interrupted and discontinuous manner, like a virus that flares up and recedes, to burden the state and obstruct its work - but it will not, God willing, cause it to fall.

4. Police coalitions

It is perhaps too early to be completely sure which groups or individuals were responsible for the idea of forming police coalitions, which emerged onto the scene in the weeks following the Revolution of 25th January. The spontaneous urge to self-organise in times of crisis is a natural human instinct that cannot be ignored for the sake of conspiracy theory. However, the concerted effort to exploit this instinct by an apparatus with power, expertise, and training may not be entirely free of behind-the-scenes activity, and this cannot be ignored either.
The reality is that the Egyptian police, which had been suffering from severe occupational difficulties prior to the Revolution of 25th January as a result of the forced militarisation of its modus operandi, its alienation from international norms on working hours, and its acceptance of military justice for its personnel, was completely overcome at the first sign of revolution and lost all professional discipline, leading to its collapse. The police leadership, which had previously ruled with an iron fist, ceased to be obeyed, and anyone who is not obeyed has no effective authority.
During this period, a number of police coalitions emerged, the most important of them in terms of longevity and influence being the four we shall explore in greater detail below.

A. The “Officers, but Honourable” Coalition (now the Honourable Officers Coalition)[18]

This coalition came into existence in Tahrir Square; on the 1st February 2011, to be precise, when its founder Col. Muhammad Abdulrahman Yusuf, officer in the Dakhalya Security Directorate, announced its creation during his time in the Square. The pivotal idea on which the Coalition has been based since its founding has been the question of how to rebuild and restructure the Egyptian Interior Ministry and police force, responding to the aims of the Revolution of 25th January, which chose the annual National Police Day celebrations to confront the police state, in which the security forces worked hand-in-hand with the regime.
The Coalition’s interest in popularising the idea of a project to reorganise and reconstruct the Interior took precedence over any concern for the structure of the Coalition or the number of its members, starting from the belief that any essential change to the structure of the police in Egypt is a matter that requires political will at the very top of the pyramid of authority. Readiness to promote and embark on this project in an atmosphere of revolution, therefore, may be a matter of exerting pressure on that political will in order to make it submit to the direction of popular will.
The Coalition set up its page on the social networking site Facebook on 7th March 2011, and began by writing about its project to reorganise and restructure the Interior Ministry; then on 7th May 2011, it presented a paper detailing its vision under the title “Reorganising the Interior Ministry”[19] at the First Egypt Conference (“The People Defend Their Revolution”) organised by the Egyptian National Council under the leadership of the revolutionary activist Dr. Mamduh Hamza.
The value of this conference was that a number of human rights organisations were brought into the project as a result of the paper: the Egyptian Human Rights Organisation, the Egyptian Personal Rights Initiative, the Hisham Mubarak Law Centre, as well as a number of independent figures in the Revolution. A serious and fruitful workshop was held, and on 24th October 2011, the National Police Reconstruction Initiative (“A Police for the Egyptian People”) was announced during a press conference at the Leadership and Management Development Centre.[20]
Copies of the Initiative were sent to all relevant parties, including the Military Council, the People’s Assembly, the Shura Council, the Prime Minister’s office, the Interior Ministry, the Ministry of Justice, governmental research centres, etc.
Requests for discussion with members of the Defence and National Security Committee in the People’s Assembly, the office of the Political Affairs Adviser to the President of the Republic, and the Consultant Minister for Justice Ahmed Makki were also met.
The Initiative also received attention from the United States Institute of Peace, which used it as the basis for a study published on the Institute’s website on 1st October 2012 entitled “The Politics of Security Sector Reform in Egypt”, considering it “the most comprehensive of the initiatives” and saying that it “raised the level of the discussion around security sector reform”.[21]
The Shura Council’s Human Rights Committee also took an interest in the Initiative, dedicating a whole section to it under the heading of “Proposed social initiatives and solutions” in its report of 8th November 2012, entitled “Strategies for Developing Security Performance following the Revolution of 25th January”.[22]
The members of the Initiative made a commitment to develop it in response to changes to the security situation in Egypt; the fourth edition of the Initiative contained additions relating to transitional justice programmes as a working guide for the Ministry of Transitional Justice which was established following the Revolution of 30th June 2013.
On 13th July 2013, the members of the “Police for the Egyptian People” Initiative requested a meeting with Dr. Hazem al-Beblawi, the Prime Minister tasked with the formation of the interim government; the meeting revolved around a presentation of the Initiative’s ideas for the reorganisation of the Interior Ministry, as well as the need to begin implementing transitional justice programmes that allow the uncovering of facts and compensation of victims.[23]
The Coalition changed its name following the Revolution of 30th June, becoming the Honourable Officers Coalition, without the word “but”, in recognition of the patriotic role played by all Egyptian police personnel during the events of that revolution.
The Coalition believes that the Egyptian Revolution will not be able to satisfy the aims of Egyptian citizens unless the first steps towards change are targeted at reform of the Egyptian police, which has belatedly sided with the people, but which still lacks much that would make it a modern, professional police force with a modern foundation, structure, and methods that would prevent it from once again becoming ensnared in an alliance with the regime.

B. The General Police Officers’ Coalition (now the General Police Officers’ Club)[24]

The formation of the General Police Officers’ Coalition, which emerged from a general meeting at the Police Officers’ Club in Nasser City, was announced on 4th March 2011. It became clear that the Coalition, which from its inception held its meetings in important police locations under the supervision of high-ranking figures in the Interior Ministry, was not independent to the degree required of such organisations. Of course, it is not possible to probe the intentions of the officers who founded the Coalition in order to assess the extent of their independence, but one can be sure that the majority of them aspired to create an independent entity to represent police officers, away from any interference by the Interior Ministry, but that Ministry’s experience in penetrating organisations and subverting some of their elements may have allowed it to put a foot in the Coalition’s door. Moreover, weak administrative control of officers following the Revolution of 25th January has led the Ministry to try and replace administrative authority with moral authority, by making a show of allowing officers to represent themselves while using this façade to achieve its own goals, which necessarily conflict with the choices of a broad section of officers.
A click of the button on an Internet search for “General Police Officers’ Coalition” may help clear up the conflicting positions that lead the Coalition to convene shared conferences[25], or to allow its views to accord with those of the Ministry to such an extent that it was dissolved on 24th May 2011 on account of its success in “achieving a sufficient number of the aims it had hoped for, and [its] work to extend bridges of trust to the different civil society organisations and the revolutionaries of 25th January, rebuilding confidence between the people and the police.”[26] This position was then reversed when the Interior Minister suspended the Coalition’s press spokesman and another of its officers for inciting police personnel to rebel against the Ministry[27], and again when the Coalition became trusted partners of the government, to the extent that on 26th November 2011 Prime Minister Kamal al-Ganzouri met with members of the Coalition and charged them with nominating a new Interior Minister to replace Major General Mansour Issawy.[28] Relations between the Coalition and the Ministry once again grew frosty when the latter made accusations of a conspiracy to rig the elections for the Police Officers’ Club, which replaced the Coalition as soon as the results were announced on 26th April 2012.[29]
The reality is that the Coalition’s muddled and dubious history, which raises questions as to whether it is really independent enough to honestly represent officers, or is just another of the Ministry’s tools to control them, can be summarised as showing that it always operated in the belief that the Interior Ministry alone can carry out the necessary process of restructuring itself, without any partners, and that in consequence it saw any intervention by civil society or human rights organisations to evaluate or appraise this process as an attack on Egyptian national security.
On the other hand, this Coalition did provide a unifying voice for various tendencies within the body of officers, something which became clearly apparent during the general meeting of the Police Officers’ Club (the Coalition’s successor) on 15th June 2013, when it was announced that no party or political headquarters would receive police guards, and that there would be no opposition to peaceful demonstrations during the events of 30th June, and calls were repeatedly issued to society at large to bring the rule of the Brotherhood leader to an end.[30]
But the future of the coalition that became a club, having aspired to be a union, still vacillates between independence from and dependence on the Interior Ministry. This is perhaps confirmed by the statements published on the Facebook page of the General Police Officers’ Club on 17th June 2013, among which were the following:
“As a result of the obstinate refusal on the part of some elements within the Ministry to cooperate with the Club as an elected body representing all officers; the obstinacy of some of those with whom we were working to draw up the constitution of the Club, which we have now finished; the express refusal of much of the leadership to acknowledge the idea of the Club at all; and the fact that all of the Club’s demands on behalf of the Ministry and the body of officers have been met with delays and procrastination, leading to feelings of disappointment in view of the many legal and disciplinary channels we have tried; we make no secret of the fact that there are those who would benefit from the destruction of elected clubs and the expulsion of ourselves and our colleagues, and we have arrived at the question “what's the club for, exactly?”[31]
In sum, it appears that the Police Officers’ Club, the successor to the General Coalition, was penetrated by the Interior Ministry in its earliest stages, clearly making it an enticing morsel to the extent that it has ended up issuing this sort of statement, and showing that entities which are not born independent will be weaker in their future confrontations with subterfuge.

C. The General Policemen’s Coalition (now the General Policemen’s Club)

The formation of the General Policemen’s Coalition was announced during March 2011, and its Facebook page appeared on 22nd March 2011. The relative strength of this Coalition indicates a high degree of influence, far higher than that of the General Police Officers’ Coalition, by virtue of the number of policemen - some 380,000 - compared to the number of police officers, which does not exceed 40,000.
The Coalition has been able to muster policemen together in order to express their occupational demands through strikes, demonstrations, occupations, chaining up police departments, disrupting operations at ports and airports, and of course gathering in front of the Ministry and hanging a sign on the entrance reading Closed for cleaning, as well as protesting to members of the leadership, in a few cases going as far as verbal or physical assault.
In truth, the same features that accompanied the establishment of the Officers’ Coalition were also evident from the moment of the creation of the Policemen’s Coalition. One might say that the Ministry’s power to infiltrate the Policemen’s Coalition was even greater, beginning by exploiting the limited income of most policemen to subvert some of its elements and using them to penetrate the Coalition, influence its direction, or at the very least to try and take control of it.
Although the Coalition has fulfilled some of the occupational goals set out in Law 25/2012 issued on 20th June 2012, hopes of establishing a union to defend the rights of policemen and regulate their activities have foundered as a result of the Ministry’s power to infiltrate the Coalition and reduce it to merely a club, for which elections could not be agreed before the step of announcing elections for the Officers’ Club had been taken at the beginning of April 2013, motivating policemen to ask that they be treated in the same way. The notion of establishing a union was abandoned in a rush to succeed with this club.
Even circular no. 10/2013 concerned with responding to the occupational, healthcare, and social demands of policemen, which was issued in February 2013, remains for the most part nothing more than ink on paper, with none of its provisions having been implemented in reality according to clear and precise procedures that would make it a guaranteed right, rather than simply a grant that can be concealed from policemen who are not ill.
In fact, the General Policemen’s Coalition was generally Revolutionary in its make-up, much more so than the General Officers’ Union, perhaps by virtue of its influential membership numbers, and also perhaps of the fact that policemen had no occupational privileges or high-ranking positions to lose compared with police officers. As a consequence, their movements were freer and unencumbered by the dread of losing particular perks.
In spite of all that, the Coalition, for all its strength, has not been able to exert pressure on the Interior Ministry, which succeeded in passing a phrase in Article 76 of the 2014 Constitution granting constitutional legitimacy to the refusal to allow the establishment of unions in government institutions, to the extent that on 1st December 2013, the Coalition called on the families of policemen to vote “no” to the Constitution.*

D. The Bearded Officers’ Coalition

The issue of “bearded police officers” first came into the spotlight at the beginning of 2012, when a number of these officers were referred to the Disciplinary Council for growing their beards in contravention of police disciplinary rules on cleanliness. Although the Disciplinary Council was due to hold its first session on 22nd April 2012, the Interior Ministry took the decision before that date to refer the officers elsewhere before that date as a precaution in the public interest, leading it to bring a total of 26 lawsuits before the State Council’s Courts of Administrative Justice, which in a number of cases ruled that the Ministry had acted unjustly in referring the officers before the publication of Disciplinary Council findings. The officers themselves, however, deceived the public by asserting that these rulings granted them the right to return to work still wearing their beards, in spite of the fact that the rulings did not touch on the original matter, but rather were limited to the question of the validity of precautionary referral in tandem with referral to the Disciplinary Council.
Meanwhile, a page was created on Facebook on 4th February 2012 entitled “I am a bearded police officer”[32]. Another page named “Bearded army and police officers of Egypt” was created on 15th February 2012.
While this issue was brewing, the Interior Ministry had sought a fatwa from the Egyptian Ifta Court on 14th February 2012, on the question of whether a government body like the police was justified in requiring police officers or personnel not to wear beards, as this conflicts with governmental standards of living, as well as the necessity of requiring them to abide by orders issued by their superiors in accordance with the law. The Ifta Court confirmed that it had for hundreds of years been the custom of those serving in the police and army to shave their beards, and that whoever wished to enter a police college had to respect the choices of the police administration in this matter, on account of the jurisprudential value of custom. The choice of the police administration here was “permitted” according to Islamic law because it is a matter over which there is a difference of opinion, and anyone who changes his opinion is free to move to an authority other than the police. On this basis, the Ministry issued circular no. 3 on 25th February 2012, stating the following:
“In order that the Ministry can ensure its employees maintain the standards of hygiene and appearance required by police work, officers and personnel are obliged to conform to decisions and rulings issued in this matter and take care over their personal appearance, by cutting their hair and shaving their beards in keeping with standards of official dress, thereby preserving hygiene and neatness, as well as the respect of the public for the police force.”[33]
In spite of this, the issue of bearded officers received a great deal of public attention, as a result of constant and increasingly forceful attempts to push the story to centre-stage: the Coalition held public conferences in the governorates of Suez, Ismailiyyah, Port Said, Qalyubia, Faiyum, Qena, Minya, Asyut, Kafr el-Sheikh, and Sohag, as well as demonstrations in front of the President’s al-Ittihadiyah Palace and the Abidine Palace and a sit-in outside the offices of the Interior Ministry that began on 26th February 2013 and continued for more than one hundred days[34].
On 25th May 2013, the Presidency’s Administrative Court in the State Council issued its ruling in a lawsuit brought by twelve bearded officers, in which it upheld the Interior Ministry’s decision to refer the officers as a precaution in the public interest, basing itself on a fatwa from the Egyptian Ifta Court on the matter, and decided that the precautionary referral did not in this case constitute a disciplinary action, and that it could therefore be combined with any other disciplinary action[35].
On 29th July 2013, the Interior Ministry’s media department published on Facebook news of the return of four of the bearded officers to work after having shaved off their beards; this was confirmed by the Bearded Officers’ Coalition[36].
In fact, the issue of bearded policemen and officers is the subject of fierce contention between the Salafist movement and the Muslim Brotherhood, in terms of the attempt to control the Egyptian State termed “the Islamist project”.
Consequently, one might call bearded policemen and officers a Salafist “Trojan Horse”, which the movement wishes to introduce into the body of the Interior Ministry to spread Salafist ideas among the ranks of the police and establish a Salafist front within the police force to compete with the Muslim Brotherhood for control, in preparation for extending it to the other parts of the security apparatus and the armed forces[37].
There need be no contradiction between affirming the right of policemen and officers to conduct their personal lives in any way that does not conflict with the nature of their work, and the necessity of rejecting attempts to deceive public opinion and convey the impression that beards are symbols of the good character of the policemen who wear them, when the facts indicate that there are many irreligious acts often committed by beard-wearers. As a result, a belief in personal freedoms and their defence need not prevent us from casting doubt on the motives of the Bearded Police Officers’ Coalition, starting with the considerable support it receives from the Salafist movement, affording it the opportunity to hold numerous public conferences in many Egyptian provinces, in spite of the fact that the question of growing a beard in emulation of the Prophet (peace be upon him) has been addressed by both the Azhar and the Ifta Court, which both agree that growing a beard is neither an act of belief (aqida) nor of worship (ibada) but is instead one of the customs that are left to the freedom of the individual, making it a matter of politics rather than religion.
The policy of shuffling paper to conceal the true political aims behind the issue of bearded policemen and officers, part of the public and private struggle between the Salafist movement and the Muslim Brotherhood for control of the institutions of the Egyptian State, including the police, confirms the importance of confronting these attempts to infiltrate State institutions and twist their loyalties towards rival political groups, leading to their break-up or collapse, or to transform them into sectarian militias that neglect the national interest and prefer instead to serve narrow sectarian or party-political goals.

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It is clear from the redefinition of relationships between police coalitions and other actors in society that the freedom of movement afforded to regime elements by the Revolution was far from collaborative; it provided an opportunity to form pressure groups and allowed light to be shone on many dark spots in the Egyptian security sector, particularly the police, on account of its numerical strength and distribution throughout all parts of the country. One cannot be sure of exactly how spontaneous and unprompted by government interference the establishment of most of these coalitions were, nor can it be ignored that most of them have by their very existence provided the Interior Ministry with moral control to compensate for the weakening of its administrative control following the Revolution; nevertheless, they have constituted a chronic headache for this stubborn Ministry, which had grown used to dysfunctional working principles based on yeasaying and merely “following orders”, and they have been able to force it to accept new working relationships of which negotiation is one of the constituent elements, and whose new modus operandi may well be rivalry between the highest authorities and the broader base.
However, it could also be said that those police coalitions which wagered on the possibility that change could be effected by the base through applying pressure at the top have achieved institutional goals that contribute to an improvement in working conditions, but that they will not be able to put an end to the chronic festering problems and negative aspects that have distorted policing and placed it in the service of power, influence, or money; whereas the police coalition that bet on the necessity of confronting the root of the disease through the construction of a programme guaranteeing reorganisation and restructuring within the police force, although it has suffered through a galling lack of political will on the part of government after government and regime after regime, will persevere in its quest to build a modern and professional police force until its projects and programs are implemented, challenging political apathy, governmental idiocy, and the vested interests of those in power.

5. State and Revolutionary institutions

Blockade of the Supreme Constitutional Court, Blockade of the Judges’ Club, Blockade of Media City, Assault on the al-Azhar sheikhs, Attack on Saint Mark’s Cathedral, the “seat of the Papacy”, in Abbassia, Assassination of Egyptian soldiers, Police in new confrontations with the people...
These were some of the broad headlines referring to events that occupied the spotlight in 2013 and before, during the term of President Mohamed Morsi. All these events opened cracks between the Presidency, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Islamist movement on the one hand, and State authorities and institutions on the other. These institutions began to feel they were being targeted and infiltrated or undermined by the Presidency and the government, or threatened with invasion, arson, and destruction by the President’s allies and political followers.
As for the people, the Revolution - which rapidly sobered up from the intoxication of having its first elected civilian president following the shock of the dictatorial constitutional declaration on 21st November 2012 - had to create its own institutions, establishing the National Salvation Front as an umbrella organisation for the civilian movement on 22nd November 2012, offering a political reaction, in defence of the goals of the revolution, to the paranoia of the Islamist movement.
But the persistent acts of violence committed by the militias and allies of the authorities: blockading the Constitutional Court on 2nd December 2012, breaking up the occupation of al-Ittihadiyyah on 5th December 2012, then blockading the Media City from 7th to 24th December 2012 - all this indicated that the Revolution should establish another institution to react to this organised and savage violence; this time using not politics but the same weapon: violence.
Thus, on 25th January 2013, the second anniversary of the outbreak of revolution, the Black Bloc group appeared, masked and clad in black, threatening the Islamist movement with its own tools: weapons.
However, the indifference to bloodshed that pushed the public prosecutor on 13th March 2013 to call on citizens to exercise their right to perform arrests as stipulated in Article 37 of the Criminal Process Law; the attempt by allies of the President to assault the sheikhs of al-Azhar on 3rd April 2013; the attack on Saint Mark’s Orthodox Cathedral, the seat of the papacy, in Abbassia on 7th April 2013; then the “million march” on 19th April 2013 to demand the purification of the judiciary; all this roused the Revolution to establish an institution that would not react politically or through force of arms, but instead would use political action fortified by the will of the people. Before long, there appeared in the heart of the Square on 26th April 2013 a popular campaign to withdraw support from President Morsi, the Tamarrod campaign.
This campaign was based on a simple idea, the collection of signatures from citizens on a form in which they agreed to become members of an Egyptian popular collective for the withdrawal of support from the President. This institution of a peaceful, popular revolution spread like wildfire, taking hold of official party-political and State institutions. The sight of policemen and officers being continuously filmed by the media as they signed the Tamarrod form demonstrated a redefinition of the relationship between the security sector and revolutionary actors in society. The circulation of the forms in the offices of official State institutions, too, was a kind of redefinition of the relationship between these institutions and the Revolutionary forces.
The Tamarrod campaign was a revolutionary group that embraced the majority of people opposed to the rule of political Islam, and around which all the State institutions who sensed danger then gathered: the military, the police, the judiciary, the media, cultural institutions, al-Azhar, and the Church all rallied around the majority of the people openly on 30th June 2013, a year to the day after the President’s rule began.

*

Section Three: Obstacles on the path to reform

Although the Egyptian Revolution contributed to a redefinition of the relationships among actors in society, and their relationship to society itself, there remain various stumbling-blocks on the path that could present obstacle to reform in the security sector.
Four of the issues which have surfaced, and which could hinder or prevent any steps towards a process of rebuilding the security sector that is accepted by the authorities and by the people, are the following:

1. Heightened internal resistance to institutional reform within the police establishment, as a result of fears over fragmentation and disunity at work

Veiled internal resistance constitutes one of the most serious phenomena confronting any institutional reform process, and contributing to a rise in the level of this internal resistance are fears brought about by the attempts of the former regime to disrupt the police force and subvert it in the service of the Brotherhood’s own political ends, or those of the Salafist movement to do the same, as well as attempts to fragment or bring down institutions under the influence of the armed terrorist wings of Islamist movements.

Regrettably, the security leadership - seeking to avoid its responsibilities or halt reform - has translated these fears into the language of “chronic margins”, increasing the degree of veiled internal resistance to any change within the security establishment, even if demanded by society, under the phobia-like justification of defending national security or the ruling institutions.

2. Lack of interest in police reform on the part of societal administration as a result of despair and disappointment, and acceptance of the logic of security accompanied by repression and humiliation as better than the total absence of security

The security vacuum following 25th January 2011, resulting from a failure of police discipline as an automatic reaction to the collapse of the “fear barrier” among citizens; from the inability of the police to work in any climate other than one of disrespect for human rights and the rule of law; and from the outbreak of bloody armed confrontations in neighbouring countries that resulted in an influx of weapons on the streets, all led to a frightening decline in security, and in this state the public were faced with a dilemma: either accept a long-term absence of security, or submit to its quick return accompanied by the same incidents of repression and humiliation as before.

The continued decline in policing leads therefore to reluctance on the part of the societal administration, which is generally supportive of security reform, stemming from growing feelings of despair and disappointment, and this in turn leads to a pressing need for security which takes precedence over police performance and the extent of its commitment to human rights and the rule of law.

3. Dilemma of police reform in the light of sacrifices made by police to combat terrorism

The Islamist movement relied, during its term in power, on the movements of its armed wings to sow terror within society and its institutions, as well as among political opponents. This led to a wave of terrorist incidents, which grew in severity with the collapse of the Islamist project under the marching of the citizenry in the Egyptian street; the police were thrown into wild confrontation with these terrorist groups and obliged to make tremendous sacrifices, represented by the growing column of martyrs that even now shows no sign of reaching an end. Unfortunately, this bitter confrontation with terrorism brought to the surface a number of mistaken justifications for delaying the issue of police reorganisation at that time, so as not to hinder the efforts and sacrifices made in the confrontation with terrorism.

In light of this dilemma, arising from the heavy burden of sacrifices made by the police in the fight against terror, it becomes difficult to promote a number of essential principles that acknowledge the construction of a police force according to standards that adhere to human rights and the rule of law to be the most significant first step towards success in any current or future confrontation with terrorism; in that such a confrontation should not embrace any illegal practices or measures that might lead to lasting animosity between the police and any of the factions accused of supporting terrorism, incubating generations of terrorists. It is important therefore to legislate for any confrontation with terrorist groups, or states and organisations that sponsor terror, through a comprehensive anti-terror law that would represent a legitimate tool in this confrontation.

4. The double bias – siding with the public, and “establishment fanaticism”

The experience of the Egyptian revolution presents us with a clear model against which this double bias may be explained. For while the police took the side of the citizenry during the “rectifying wave” of the 25th January revolution on 30th June 2013 and steered it to victory over the regime, leading to the formation of new bridges of trust between society and the police that could have been capitalised upon to move towards the creation of a modern, professional police force, responding to the values and challenges of the age, the mentality of “establishment fanaticism”, in a negative sense, treated this newly-acquired confidence either as an invitation to drop the subject of reorganising and restructuring the police, or to single out the police force as bearing sole responsibility for reforming the security apparatus without any participation from society.

The plague of “establishment fanaticism” has therefore led to an inability to make good use of the confidence gained by the police as a result of their support for the people, and the waste of an opportunity to begin the process of reforming the security apparatus at the lowest possible cost. It has led also to the security establishment’s turning in upon itself and engaging with society as a kind of faction concerned primarily with preserving its interests and the interests of its members, rather than as a state apparatus owned by the people and charged with carrying out specific functions within the framework of a strict commitment to the law.

*

General Review

The Arab Spring in Egypt led not only to a blossoming of flowers, but also to the emergence of a number of evil forces from their lairs.
The country awaited a fierce summer that would scorch everyone with the fires of revolution, and expose faces leprously scarred by extremism and fundamentalism, while those more moderate would grow as tanned as the soil of Egypt herself.
Though the prison doors swing shut on two Presidents, tens of ministers, and hundreds of regime supporters ground beneath the boot-heels of the people, Egypt is as it was: its institutions have not changed, nor have its leaders, and the mood of most of its people has changed dramatically.
Egypt never knew the agricultural feudal system in its European guise, but rather that of the Mamluks and Ottomans; Egyptian bureaucratic feudalism, however, was entirely of its own making. For many centuries, since even the time of King Menes of Upper and Lower Egypt, state institutions were grounded in the land, and although they always served the ruler, they were stronger by virtue of their longevity: rulers are fleeting, while institutions endure. They took on their own culture and traditions, and loyalty was always and only to the culture and traditions of these institutions.
The term deep state in its positive sense alone applies to the Egyptian State and its institutions, for the ancient origins of this State allowed the institutions to extend, entwine, and deepen their own roots.
On the other hand, the term institutional culture in its negative sense is the right one to describe the resistance encountered by any attempt at reform in Egypt.
If we apply this vision to the Egyptian security sector, three years in the life of the Revolution have honed the state’s ability to effect change in this sector only in the interests of those who work in it. One of the contradictions over the weeks and months of the Revolution is that those who benefited most from it in terms of wages, salaries, and occupational rights were those who work in the security sector, particularly the police. The revolution of the people against the government on National Police Day 2011 has failed to grant the state the determination to carry out any reforms to its security forces, while the revolution of police personnel for the sake of rights of which they had long been deprived obliged the state to spread its arms and rummage in its pockets.
Even the judiciary, one of the institutions of the state, has not succeeded in proving its suspicion - in the vast majority of cases - that the police had murdered demonstrators. “Since 2011, the courts have convicted or sent to prison no more than three low-ranking policemen. Three years after the removal of Mubarak, only two police officers are serving prison sentences for the killing of no fewer than 846 demonstrators in January 2011. One policeman is serving a prison term of three years for opening fire on demonstrators during the Muhammad Mahmoud protests in November 2011.”[38]
This issue also affects the fact-finding committees which have been set up by three different regimes. The first was established in February 2011 by Commander Ahmed Shafik, the last head of government in the Mubarak era, and two delegates were appointed to investigate the killing of protesters in January 2011. The Committee published a summary of its findings and recommendations in April 2011, disclosing that it was the police force which had carried out the killings, and calling for reforms in the security sector, but it never published the full report. The second committee was set up by President Mohamed Morsi in July 2012 to investigate violence against demonstrators from January 2011 until June 2012; Morsi’s decree ordered all state bodies to comply with the Committee’s requests for information and granted it the authority to review the measures taken by the executive, the extent of its cooperation with the judiciary, and any failings it discovered, as well as the power to cooperate with the police, which had earlier refused access to key information. When the Committee completed its report and presented it to Morsi at the end of December 2012, the President declined to publish it. However, in April 2012, the newspaper el-Shorouk and the Guardian in Britain published drafts of leaked chapters from the report concerned with the illegal use of live rounds by police, and the torture of protesters detained by the military[39].
Last - but unfortunately by no means least - “Acting President Adly Mansour issued a national decree on 22nd December 2013 ordering the formation of an independent national information-gathering and fact-finding committee to document and analyse the events of 30th June 2013 and subsequent incidents, headed by Dr. Fuad Abd al-Mun‘im Riyadh, former international judge and professor of law. The decree mandated that the Committee take over the collection and processing of documents and evidence; holding meetings and interviews; hearing from witnesses; conducting any discussions it finds necessary; analysing and characterising the course of events, who was responsible for them, and their effects if any; reviewing investigations which have been carried out; and releasing findings, information, and evidence pertaining to crimes that may have been committed in violation of the rights of demonstrators and which have not previously been investigated. The decree confirmed the role of state institutions and relevant bodies in cooperating with the Committee and providing it with all pertinent information, data, documents, and evidence that it requests in the course of carrying out the tasks assigned to it.”[40]
The truth is that it is not possible to bypass court rulings, as these are the arbiters of truth; that is, the Egyptian police do not have the blood of demonstrators on their hands until the contrary is demonstrated by the courts in their rulings.
However, it is also true that the principle of a fair trial requires that they must be impartial, and the reliance of the courts on investigations by the police, who of course are not going to convict themselves, is a perversion of the course of justice. In cases such as this, where suspicion falls upon the police, an independent body must carry out the investigation. Until this happens, the truth is what the court says it is.
The same applies to the fact-finding committees, whose conclusions remain a reference for the public prosecutor, which may accept or reject their reports. Thus the final say once again goes to (biased) investigations and reasoning.
In spite of all that, the Egyptian police, which remains resistant to change in confronting the executive, the legislature, or even the judiciary, all of a sudden turned its back on the regime - of its own accord - and joined the majority of the people on 30th June 2013.
Some have seen this as a revolution in the outlook of the police, which has finally sided with the people after a long alliance (or even entanglement) with the regime. Others see it as a desire to go back to the previous regime, under whose patronage the police might regain its lost influence.
Between one of these things and the other, Egypt continues to live each day as it comes.
The allies of the former regime wish to dupe people into believing that it was the Muslim Brotherhood which carried out the Revolution of 25th January.
The Muslim Brotherhood wishes to dupe people into believing that the Revolution of 30th June was carried out by allies of the former regime.
Between one and the other, the people are left searching for the goals of their Revolution, whose loss they dread in a struggle between corrupt men and terrorists.
Perhaps administrative feudalism in a negative sense is responsible for all of Egypt’s chronic catastrophes, but in a positive sense it is also responsible for the decision by state institutions to side with the people in the confrontation with political Islam. Thus the police force took the side of the people on 30th June 2013, in what looked like an act of repentance for all its sins and errors.
The coming days alone will uncover whether this force is prepared to submit to reform at its very heart, or continues to push the limits of resistance; the coming days alone will show whether it sided with the people out of love for the Revolution, or hatred for the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies.

*

Conclusion

After three years of continuous revolution, Egypt’s moderate climate seems clouded-over and threatened by violent storms.
Although the issues of social justice and civil and political rights and freedoms may be the most significant challenges to the successful building of a democratic society, transitional justice and confronting terrorism are the base on which this social construction must take place.
Hence, if this base remains unstable, troubled, and volatile, issues such as rights, freedoms, and social justice will be blown away by the wind, and it will not be possible to gather up the pieces in a society in which criminals can escape justice and weapons can be raised in the face of the state and society itself.
There seems to be an awareness of the danger inherent in these issues, seen clearly in the new constitution, whose articles refer to both transitional justice and the fight against terror. But however important this awareness may be, it remains an idea drifting in the void if it is not combined with the will to act, and will never become a reality.
The confrontation with terror must not obstruct transitional justice programmes indefinitely, allowing criminals to walk free.
Transitional justice programmes must not undermine efforts to combat terror, allowing terrorists to triumph.
The question of reform in the Egyptian security sector, therefore, remains very much on the Revolutionary stage, awaiting an answer. If it stubbornly remains a question, the answers which now lie shackled will soon lose their patience; and the questions of the Revolution will not be able to hold back their answers for long...

*****
References :




[1]Al-Masri al-Youm online, “Special Report: From State Security to National Security, Names and Concepts Have Changed, and the Law is in Control”, link: http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/128155

[2]Article 2 of the resolution is as follows: “A new division is established, to be known as the ‘National Security Division’, whose function is to preserve national security and cooperate with relevant state organs to defend and secure the domestic front, gather information, and combat terrorism, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, the law, and the principles of human rights and liberties. Its operations shall be directed by officers selected on the basis of internal candidacy.”

[3]See the text of the Code at the following link: http://egyptwindow.net/ar_print.aspx?print_ID=15030

[5]Note: this provision was reintroduced in the 2012 Constitution, which stated that “The President of the Republic is the ultimate head of the police force”, but was abrogated again in the 2014 Constitution.

[6]See the text of the 2012 Constitution at the following link: http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/255182

[7]See the text of circular no. 10/2013 at the following link: www.elyoum7.net/News.asp?NewsID=948352&#.UqJCdtIW29Q

[8]Article 37 of the Criminal Process Law states the following: “Anyone who witnesses a criminal in the act of committing a crime or felony is legally permitted to carry out a precautionary detainment and deliver him to the nearest member of the public authority, without the need to call for his arrest.”

[9]See President Morsi’s speech from the Central Security Training Camp at the following link: http://youtu.be/nOdRgAKPLWo?t=6m44s

[10]El-Fagr online, “Full map of the national elections to the General Police Club”, 28th March 2013, at the following link: http://new.elfagr.org/Detail.aspx?secid=0&vid=0&nwsId=310662

[11]Al-Bedaiah online, “Coalition of Policemen calls for strike outside the Interior Ministry on Monday to call for the dismissal of the Minister”, 15th April 2013, at the following link: http://www.albedaiah.com/node/29421

[12]See the text of the Court’s ruling at the following link: https://www.facebook.com/tamerelrashedy2/posts/559188880802483

* See also Section F concerning the Supreme Constitutional Court’s abolition of Article 3, Section 1 of the Emergency Law, stripping the police force, during states of emergency, of the power of detention, and of the powers of arrest and investigation beyond the regulations set out in the Criminal Process Law.

[13]See the text of the Law on the Regulation of Protests at the following link: http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/346065

[14]Article 102, Section 3 of the Police Law is as follows: “A police officer may use necessary force in the execution of his duty, if it is the only way in which that duty may be executed. The use of weaponry is limited to the following cases: 1st […] 2nd […] 3rd: To break up demonstrations or gatherings consisting of at least five people if they constitute a threat to public safety, after warning those gathered to disperse, and if the order to use weaponry is issued by a chief with the necessary authority. In all three preceding cases, care must be taken to ensure that opening fire is the only means by which the foregoing aims may be achieved, that the policeman gives a verbal warning that he is going to open fire before resorting to opening fire, and that the Interior Minister issues a resolution defining the procedures to be followed in all cases as well as those for giving warnings and opening fire.

[15]See the text of the 2014 Constitution on the official page of the Council of Fifty at the following link: http://dostour.eg/

* See al-Ahram Gate, “al-Ahram Gate publishes the full text of the Cabinet resolution declaring the Brotherhood a terroist group”, 25th December 2013, at the following link: http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/435113.aspx

**Article 86 of the Penal Code is as follows: “In applying the provisions of this law, ‘terrorism’ designates any use of force, violence, threat, or intimidation resorted to by a perpetrator in order to prosecute an individual or collective criminal enterprise whose aim is to damage the public order or to place the safety and security of society in danger; if it causes harm to or spreads fear among people, or places their lives, freedom, or security in danger; causes damage to the environment, communications, transport, assets, buildings, public or private property, or occupies or confiscates them; prevents or hinders the work of the public authorities, houses of worship, or scientific facilities; or obstructs the application of the Constitution or the Law.” Articles 86 bis, 86 bis (a), 86 bis (b), 86 bis (c), and 86 bis (d) are concerned with the penalties particular to crimes of terrorism.

[16]The Voice of Egyptian Copts online, 25th November 2013. Hamdi Rizk, “What about the military decrees granting freedom to terrorists?”, available at the following link: http://www.egyptian-copts.com/article.php?id=24911


[19]Dr. Mohamed Mahfouz, “Reorganising the Interior Ministry”, paper presented to the First Egypt Conference (“The People Defend Their Revolution”) organised by the Egyptian National Council, 7th May 2011. See the text of the paper at the following link: http://www.almaglesalwatany.org/Comments/safety.aspx

[20]The Initiative’s website is available at the following link: http://www.policeforegypt.org/; and its Facebook page at https://www.facebook.com/policeforegypt/info

[21]Daniel Brumberg, Hesham Sellam, “The Politics of Security Sector Reform in Egypt”, United States Institute of Peace, 1st October 2012. See the study at the following link: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR318_0.pdf

[22]See el-Youm el-Sabe' online, “The ‘Shura’ discusses a report on developing security performace following the Revolution of 25th January”, available at the following link: http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=843927#.UrXkvtIW29Q

[23]See al-Bedaiah online, “Police Reconstruction Initiative meets al-Beblawi to request a restructuring of the Interior and the application of transitional justice to accused officers”, 16th July 2013, at the following link: http://www.albedaiah.com/node/43805


[25]See “Report on the second meeting of the General Police Officers’ Coalition with Interior Minister Major General Mansour Issawy”, 2nd May 2011, at the following link: https://www.facebook.com/notes/146057485462484/

[26]See el-Youm el-Sabe' online, “General Police Officers’ Coalition dissolved in all parts of the country”, 24th May 2011, at the following link: http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=419535#.UrHXXtIW29Q

[27]See el-Youm el-Sabe' online, “Issawy summons the official Police Coalition spokesman and another member to his office and suspends them...threatening to dismiss them and vowing to purge the Coalition”, 9th September 2011, at the following link: http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=502615&#.UrXzy9IW29Q

[28]See el-Wasat online, “al-Ganzouri asks members of the Police Officers’ Coalition to nominate a new Interior Minister”, 26th November 2011, at the following link: http://www.el-wasat.com/portal/Artical-55643956.html

[29]See el-Fagr online, “Police Major discovers Officers’ Club election rigging...and sends a memo to the Minister”, 6th April 2013, at the following link: http://new.elfagr.org/Detail.aspx?secid=0&vid=0&nwsId=317160

[30]See the video extract from the general meeting of the Police Officers’ Club, 15th June 2013, at the following link: http://youtu.be/M45NmK3G_Zk?t=51s

See also Elaph, “The police rebel against Morsi, refuse to protect the Brotherhood, and threaten to kill officers who resist”, 27th June 2013, at the following link: http://www.elaph.com/Web/news/2013/6/820627.html

[31]See the official page of the General Police Officers’ Club of Egypt, 17th November 2013, at the following link: https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=691192250898845&set=a.591009127583825.1073741828.590142011003870&type=1&theater

*El-Watan online, “General Policemen’s Club calls on families of employees in the Egyptian Interior Ministry to reject the new Constitution”, 1st December 2013, at the following link: http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/364459

[32]See the “I am a bearded police officer” page at the following link: https://www.facebook.com/police.officer.moltahe?fref=ts

[33]See el-Youm el-Sabe' online, “Administrative Courts in Cairo rule on the issue of bearded officers...the court asks advice from al-Qaradawi, Shaltut, and Atiya Saqr, seeking to prevent police officers from growing beards...and confirms there is a difference of opinion among the Imams, causing a stir amongst officers”, 5th July 2012, at the following link: http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=724080#.UrIkA9IW29Q

[34]See Masrawy online, “100 days of officers’ sit-in – the nation divided”, 4th June 2013, at the following link: http://www.masrawy.com/news/cases/general/2013/june/4/5635393.aspx

[35]See el-Shorouk online, “el-Shorouk publishes Administrative Court opinions supporting precautionary referral of bearded officers”, 25th May 2013, at the following link: http://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=25052013&id=5c022c42-4e3c-4a3b-a05f-bd06e7ad23a8

[36]See el-Mogaz online, “Shock: bearded police officers return to work after having voluntarily shaved off their beards”, 29th July 2013, at the following link: http://www.elmogaz.com/node/101792#sthash.zr4hqUbC.miWOTzdS.dpbs

[37]See el-Watan online, “Officers but Honourable: Beard-wearers ‘are a tool of the Salafists for competition with the Brotherhood over the Interior”, 3rd March 2013, at the following link: http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/140512

[38]See the website of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, a report signed by 13 human rights organisations entitled “No acknowledgement of what happened and no justice after four months; mass killings of protesters must be investigated and those responsible prosecuted; a fact-finding committee must be established as a first step”, 10th December 2013, at the following link: http://www.cihrs.org/?p=7667
The organisations that signed the report were the Egyptian Economic Rights Centre, Human Rights Watch, the Warrakum campaign for the “Human Rights and the Law” report, Amnesty International, the Egyptian Personal Rights Initiative, the Karama Institute for Human Rights, the Egyptian Women’s Issue Centre, the Nadim Centre for the Compensation of Victims of Violence and Torture, the Arab Human Rights Information Network, the Institute for the Freedom of Thought and Expression, the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, Nazra for Feminist Studies, and the International Human Rights Federation
.
[39]Ibid
.
[40]See el-Youm el-Sabe‘ online, “30th June Fact-finding Committee holds its first meeting today at the Shura Council”, 25th December 2013, at the following link: http://www1.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=1416652&SecID=65&IssueID=0#.UrrfItIW29Q

*****