Police colonel, Dr. Muhammad Mahfouz (Honorable Police Officers Coalition)
Police colonel Muhammad Abdul-Rahman (Honorable Police Officers Coalition)
Dr Amr Al-Shalaqani (Faculty of Law, Cairo University)
Hussam Bahgat (Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights)
Magda Butrus (Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights)
Kareem Medhat Ennarah (Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights)
Huda Nasrallah (Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights)
Ghada Shahbandar (Human Rights activist)
Alaa Soueif (Information Systems expert)
Tamer Al-Saeed (movie director)
Ahmad Seif al-Islam, lawyer (Hisham Mubarak Law Center)
Ahmad Raghib, lawyer (Hisham Mubarak Law Center)
Malek Adly, lawyer (Hisham Mubarak Law Center)
Dr. Mina Khaleel (Hisham Mubarak Law Center)
Dr. Ahmad Ghabour (Director of the academic programme “Pleading in National Security Crimes”, University of Texas, USA
Kareem Shafe'i (businessman)
Muhammad Bakri (businessman)
Mohab Wahbi (businessman)
Dr. Kareem Hussein (information systems expert)

Acknowledgments

The working group would like to very much thank everyone who has supported this initiative, and in particular the following individuals and groups:

Judge Ashraf al-Baroudi
Dr. Amr Ali Nweigy
Engineer Maged al-Sawi
Mr Ahmad al-Kilani
Mr Mahmoud Qandil
Mrs Jalila Nawwar
Mr Muhammad Fahmi (Janzeer)
Mrs Bathna Hasan
Mosireen group

Introduction

Before the Interior Ministry’s physical collapse on 28th January 2011, it had already collapsed morally - over a period of many years - in the minds of most Egyptians, every one of whom was firmly convinced that the security apparatus in Egypt operated in the service of the regime, even at the expense of society and its citizens.

At the root of this physical and moral collapse is perhaps the dysfunctional structure of the Interior Ministry, which led to the development of a malignant relationship with the authorities under the auspices of what is described as the “police state” par excellence. It cannot go unnoticed that the national Day of the Police is the very day on which the 25th of January Revolution was launched, nor that the revolutionary fervour of 28th January led to the rout of the police force from the contested area of the city - the fall of the regime’s tyrannical arm signalling the beginning of its own downfall.

The continued absence of security following the revolution proves there is a dysfunctional aspect to the police force preventing it from operating within new circumstances governed by the rule of law and respect for human rights. This in turn confirms that maintaining the Interior Ministry’s present organization will be a major obstacle to democratic development in Egypt. Thus, there can be no place for discussion of “limited reforms” to the Interior Ministry; it must be reorganised through radical structural interventions that alter its face, its machinery, and its modus operandi within society.

Regrettably, the Interior Ministry has not adopted an integrated strategy for remedying this fault and establishing a healthy relationship between the Police Department and the people, governed by the principles of the rule of law and respect for human rights.

For this reason, a group of citizens and civil society rights organisations formed an independent working group to prepare an initiative for dealing with the problem of the absence of security and the restructuring of the police. The group’s point of departure was a paper presented to the First Egypt Conference (convened on 7th May 2011) under the title “Measures for the Reorganisation of the Interior Ministry”, prepared by the former police colonel Dr. Muhammad Mahfouz. Over many meetings, interviews, and working sessions, the group discussed this paper, and adopted it as a basis for development of an integrated initiative to restore security and restructure the police, within the framework of the principles of the rule of law and respect for human rights. The first edition of this Initiative was launched in July 2011.

Since then, the group has continued to work on the Initiative, and to discuss it at media, political, and popular gatherings, as well as at the parliamentary and executive levels. We are also continuously working on developing and updating it through discussion and cooperation with numerous national bodies and individuals, tracking and analysis of the latest security developments, and lessons learned from the experiences of other states in the field of security reform.

In the context of this continuous development, the second edition of the Initiative was released in October 2011, and the third in February 2012; this is the fourth edition.

This Initiative was founded on a set of principles that work towards a number of goals, at the head of which are:

Purification, accountability, and oversight: Purging the police force of those leaders and members who are implicated in crimes against the revolution and the people, and setting up technological, judicial, and popular mechanisms for oversight of security system performance. This will convey the message to security personnel that there will be no more impunity for anyone who fails to conform to the law or the principles of human rights; it will convey a message to the people that will help overcome their deep antipathy towards the police due to their perpetual impunity; and it will convey a message to the government making it clear that there is no contradiction between the prestige of the state on the one hand, and the application of the rule of law and respect for human rights on the other.

Demilitarisation of the police: Establishing a set of interventions and procedures that guarantee the civilian nature of the police force, and eliminating any military or paramilitary character it has acquired, as this has led to its separation from society, and its use in the hands of a corrupt regime as a tool for terrorising its citizens.

Decentralisation: Organising the police force according to a decentralised local policing model, which will help to combat security issues - which differ from region to region - and address communities’ long-neglected security needs.

Political administration: Making the necessary transition to a political programme in the executive administration, away from dependence on security personnel to lead the Interior Ministry. This will impart a broader political vision to the security administration, escaping the confines of a narrow careerism that is biased towards the security establishment, rather than society.

Moral responsibility: Empowering all members of the police force to organise themselves into unions, and consequently to demand a fair minimum wage and a limit to working hours, as well as the other occupational rights afforded to any professional group. This will help raise awareness among its members of the importance of setting personal moral and occupational standards, which foster a sense of personal responsibility towards society, with the proviso that the rights of security personnel - derived from the constitution and the law - are at the same time firmly linked to a set of constitutional and legal responsibilities aimed at the security of society, not that of the regime.

Change, not reform: Starting from the same premises upon which the revolution was launched when it announced that it wanted the downfall and not the reform of the regime. Consequently, all those elements of the security apparatus upon which the regime depended in maintaining its position must be dealt with through surgical interventions that subvert their structure and modus operandi, ensuring that their means and aims align with those of society at large.

The Interior Ministry has taken no serious steps to broadly restore security, nor to alter its oppressive methods of dealing with citizens. With the exception of laudable individual actions on the part of some respectable officers and individuals within the police, the Ministry’s efforts have - so far - been limited to partial measures, which can at best hope to return matters to the state they were in prior to 25th January, but which represent no change from a policy that the people have rejected, leading to the Ministry’s collapse on 28th January 2011.

This is clear from Egypt’s situation more than two years after the revolution: it suffers from an absence of security, as well as the continuation of the same repressive security practices that accompany any confrontation between the security forces and the public, whether in groups or as individuals.

The Ministry’s position on reform initiatives has ranged from disregard to rejection, claiming that the Ministry is capable of reforming itself from within - a process which has not occurred. This confirms the Ministry has chosen to wager that it can make a gradual comeback with the same face and programme as before; despite the fact that the experience of the revolution, with all its many developments, shows that this gamble will lead inevitably to a renewed outbreak of confrontation between the people and the police, the grave consequences of which will take many years to heal.

Therefore, the Presidency, the Cabinet, and the legislative councils should assume their constitutional responsibility and set the Interior Ministry on the path to reorganisation and restructuring. This represents the only reasonable step towards a quick restoration of police presence, in the context of a security system that respects the rule of law and human rights, and hence enjoys the respect and support of society.

What follows is a detailed presentation of the measures proposed in this Initiative.

Section One

Addressing past crimes and violations by the police: Purging and holding to account

The not-guilty verdicts handed down by the Egyptian judiciary in many cases of the killing or injury of demonstrators, based on weak investigations and destroyed evidence, have left Egyptians frustrated and disappointed for not holding the criminals of the previous regime to account. Indeed, these verdicts have encouraged those from the old regime who remain in power (or on its fringes) to continue committing crimes against Egyptians, whose blood flows once more in the streets, as though Mubarak hadn’t fallen and as though there was no revolution in Egypt.

Even worse is the fact that the previous regime’s escape from punishment constitutes one of the main obstacles to establishing the desired Egyptian state after the first wave of the revolution, a state that is based on justice and human dignity; with the consequent failure of all previous attempts to reform the security apparatus, principally the police, as well as the judiciary and other organs of justice.

The proper approach to addressing past crimes and violations committed by the police requires an integrated strategy which provides for the mechanisms of transitional justice (investigative committees, trials, compensation funds, institutional reform, etc.) that aim to uncover the truth, compensate the victims, determine responsibility for crimes, and hold their perpetrators accountable, as well as establish processes and mechanisms to prevent future recurrence of similar incidents. It is such a system of transitional justice - more than any other - that would guarantee Egypt’s transition from the state of Mubarak to the state envisioned by the revolution.

There have been attempts to employ some of the mechanisms of transitional justice, such as fact-finding committees and compensation bodies, but these were rather haphazard measures, and lacked the political will of those in authority, both in the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the Muslim Brotherhood. In the past two years, two fact-finding committees have been formed: the first by decree of former Prime Minister, Ahmed Shafik, and the second by decree of President Mohamed Morsi; a “National Council for the Care of Martyrs’ Families and the Injured of the 25th of January Revolution” was also created. Despite the success of some of these mechanisms – particularly the Evidence-Gathering and Fact-Finding Committee - in confirming the involvement of the police and the army in the killing and injuring of demonstrators between 25th January 2011 and 30th June 2012, as well as their implication in the destruction and concealment of evidence for their crimes during the same period, no steps have been taken to reform these forces, or to hold them accountable.

The Fact-Finding Committee formed by Presidential decree 10/2012 also made a number of recommendations for legislative amendments in connection with the police and transitional justice. These recommendations have been ignored by state authorities, in particular the President of the Republic. As a result, Mubarak’s state apparatus, especially the police, continues to serve those at the helm of power and to commit crimes against the Egyptian people, while security continues to be absent from the streets.

Therefore, the Police for the Egyptian People Initiative is adopting two complementary and integrated “tracks” as a minimum requirement for addressing past crimes and violations committed by the police: the first track addresses the criminal side, where we adopt a number of transitional justice measures, some of which appear in the proposed Revolutionary Transitional Justice Law, recommended by the Fact-Finding Committee formed by Presidential decree 10/2012. The second track deals with the establishment of a mechanism for vetting of police officers, and issuing administrative orders regarding each officer’s continuation, transfer or termination of service.

1. Criminal track: Mechanisms of revolutionary transitional justice

By revolutionary transitional justice we mean justice founded on the defence of the Egyptian Revolution and the guarantee of Egypt’s transition to a state founded on freedom, human dignity, and social justice, as well as the right of the remnants of the previous regime to a fair and unbiased trial - a right which for so long was lacking under the justice system of that regime - within criminal justice mechanisms unrelated to the current system. Hence, revolutionary justice is a natural judicial system concerned with the crimes of the previous regime.

The victims of the old regime:

The term victims refers to all those who suffered personal or collective damage, including bodily harm, psychological suffering, and economic damage, or who were seriously deprived of their fundamental rights, by actions or by neglect, even if these are not criminalized within national criminal law but constitute violations of international human rights norms.

Any person may be considered a victim, regardless of whether the perpetrator has been identified, arrested, prosecuted, or convicted. The term victim also includes the immediate family of the original victim, those who provide for them directly, as well as those who were injured while intervening to help victims or to prevent harm.

Criminals of the old regime

This term refers to any natural person who held an executive or supervisory position in any state institution (within the legislative, judicial, or executive authorities), and who committed - personally or through the agency of another - any of the crimes laid out in this law, from 1981 up to the date of the President-Elect’s inauguration after the Egyptian Revolution.

How the revolutionary justice system works

The revolutionary justice system depends on three bodies: the first is the Accountability, Justice, and Complaints Commission, the second is the Compensation Commission, and the third is the Revolutionary Criminal Court. These three bodies work in successive stages, according to the following scheme:

1. Accountability and Justice Commission

This Commission is empowered to gather reports and complaints in connection with the previous political regime from 1981 until the date of the President-Elect’s inauguration after the Egyptian Revolution. It should have offices in the capital and the provinces, and its contact details should be publicly announced. It consists of current and former judges, as well as a number of public figures chosen by community consensus, on the condition that they have not held executive positions in the old regime, or be known for their affiliation to it.

The Commission collects reports and complaints in connection with the crimes of the old political regime, in particular:

the embezzlement of public funds
torture, extra-judicial killing, and detention
other offences, whether economic or criminal

The Commission also prepares files on individuals of the former regime who are suspected of involvement in crimes, through investigations and information gathering according to the legal procedural principles laid out in the law. It is guided in its work by international human rights agreements and conventions, and by consultation with relevant Egyptian and international human rights organisations. Finally, the Commission turns these files over to the investigating magistrates (delegated from the Supreme Council of Judges) to carry out such investigatory procedures as may be required, then the case is committed to the Revolutionary Criminal Court.

In particular, the Commission shall investigate and prepare files on the following:

Members of the Supreme Council of the Police in the period from 25th January to the end of the Commission’s period of responsibility (the date of the President-Elect’s inauguration).
Deputy security chiefs, assistant chiefs for Public Security, regional directors of criminal investigation departments, directors of Central Security departments, directors of the security forces, and directors of State Security Investigations departments and branches in all governorates where fatalities or casualties occurred during confrontations with security forces, from the beginning of the revolution to the end of the Commission’s period of responsibility.
Those security chiefs, officers, and individuals implicated in the killing or injury of peaceful demonstrators during the incidents on Muhammad Mahmoud Street, around the Interior Ministry, and other confrontations.
Officers and individuals who violated citizens’ rights, or who were involved in any form of corruption, between 1981 and the end of the Commission’s period of responsibility.

The Commission guarantees a secure system for the protection of witnesses, informants, and victims, and will not disclose their identities other than through legal channels.

2. Commission for Compensation of Martyrs, Wounded, and Victims of the Old Regime

This Commission is tasked with identifying those who were martyred, wounded, or otherwise harmed by the old regime between 1981 and the handover of power on 30th June 2012, and who are entitled to compensation.

All fines and confiscations imposed on the elements of the old regime by the various courts shall go to this Commission, to be distributed as compensation according to an open and transparent public process.

This Commission takes over from the “National Council for the Care of Martyrs’ Families and the Injured of the 25th of January Revolution”, which shall turn over all files on martyrs and injured persons to the aforementioned Commission, as well as all its funds.

The Commission’s work is founded on three principles: compensation, redress, and aid.

3. Revolutionary Criminal Court

This Court is concerned with the prosecution of officials from the old regime who are referred to it by the investigating magistrates, who have pursued inquiries into the files provided to them by the above-mentioned Accountability and Justice Commission.

The Court is composed of natural judges appointed by order of the Supreme Council of Judges, after their selection from the general body of appellate court judges. The Court shall refer to Egyptian legislation and international conventions, particularly those on gross human rights violations, forced disappearance, torture, and other international agreements.

The foundational law of the Court stipulates that there shall be an appellate level for verdicts, composed of judges appointed by the Supreme Council of Judges.

The Court shall refer in its work to the general law, the Egyptian Penal Code, natural special laws, as well as international conventions and agreements relevant to gaps in Egyptian law, particularly the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, which Egypt ratified in 2004.

Those who are accused before the Court, referred to it for trial, or convicted, shall receive humane treatment that preserves their dignity and protects them from torture or forced confession, and they shall be guaranteed a fair and impartial trial as laid out in Egyptian law and in relevant international conventions and declarations.

4. Principles governing the bodies of the revolutionary justice system

No person who held an executive position in the old regime may in any way participate as a member in these commissions or courts.
These commissions and courts work to implement justice and accountability concerning the period from 1981 to the President-Elect’s assumption of power; however, this period shall be divided up chronologically, with preference being given to more recent crimes.
These commissions and courts shall refer to international norms regarding fair and impartial trials, including the right to a defence, a public trial, the right of appeal, and other guarantees of a fair and impartial trial.
The investigating magistrates or Revolutionary Criminal Court may issue orders for the temporary suspension from work of accused individuals, to prevent tampering with witnesses or evidence. Those subject to such orders have the right of appeal.

Duties of state institutions towards the bodies of the revolutionary justice system

The state institutions, particularly the executive and the security apparatus, must:

make all information and documents connected with the violations that may be found in the various institutions, as well as all information preserved by employees and officials of the state, available to the Commissions upon request
not interfere in the work of the Commissions, and guarantee their administrative and financial independence
guarantee the implementation of resolutions passed by these Commissions.

Pending cases

The Public Prosecutor shall turn over all cases and investigations which are currently before it or any other body, and which relate to the crimes of the former regime - whether the embezzlement of public funds and economic corruption or crimes against the rights of Egyptians - to the commissions and courts described in this law. The latter may add further charges, or reopen inquiries into matters that were ignored during previous investigations; they may also take precautionary or preventative measures to ensure that no witnesses are pressured and no evidence is tampered with.

2. Administrative Track: Vetting of Police Officers:

Legislation should be promptly developed to establisha mechanism for vetting of police officers: reviewing their files and their professional records, and accordingly issuing resolutions regarding the continuation, termination, change, or transfer of their service. This legislation must provide for the creation of a full-time independent committee to conduct reviews of those working within the security service for a specific period of time. This body should include judges, specialists in law, police work, and other relevant fields. The Committee shall determine the priorities of such reviews, and the kinds of resolution that may result from them.

Jurisdiction, objectives, and priorities of vetting

The goal of the vetting process is to evaluate the performance of members of the security apparatus against two main criteria, capability (education, experience, and personal abilities) and integrity (conduct, competence, commitment to human rights, and financial probity), as well as the adoption of resolutions regarding the reorganisation of the police force based on this assessment.
Priorities for vetting (functionally and geographically) shall be determined based on the political and social context, as well as a practical assessment of the situation within the security apparatus. In the Egyptian context, the Committee may find that the highest priority is the vetting of officers in the Criminal Investigations, State Security Investigations, and Central Security departments. The Committee may also find that high-ranking officers and those in leadership positions are the priority.
The Committee shall establish a Subcommittee to assume the task of conducting a “survey” of the security services, giving the most accurate picture of the structure of the security apparatus that is subject to checking, its size, the precise job description of personnel in the different departments, the departments’ relationship to one another, and the decision-making process and division of tasks among the departments. The Subcommittee shall perform its task before the Committee begins reviewing personnel files. This task may take some time, but it is necessary, as it helps formulate a new conception of the organisational structure of the services, as well as a new functional definition for their personnel, which would raise the service’s professional level. This survey must also produce a conception of the needs, replacement process, and training of recruits, and of requalification mechanisms for continuing employees. It is possible, for example, that - based on the survey, the Committee will decide that a certain department needs to reduce its head-count (or increase it). These matters must be taken into account during the decision-making process after the evaluation of personnel, and they may also help to determine priorities, as mentioned above.

Review mechanism and decision-making

After the Subcommittee completes its survey, the Vetting Committee will decide on the details of the review process and identify the possible types of resulting actions (dismissal, transfer of post or location, retraining, promotion, demotion). The Committee’s decisions may also include outright dismissal from public service, not only from the police force, on condition that these decisions be taken with complete transparency, and that the Committee engages with citizens through periodic announcements and through parliamentary follow-up of the Committee’s work.
The Committee’s evaluation shall be based on personnel files at the Interior Ministry, information provided by different state institutions, court records, and reports by non-governmental organisations and the media, in addition to the reports of Fact-Finding Committees. It shall also refer to the testimony of citizens, particularly the victims of violations and their families. This necessitates the engagement of the Committee with citizens, whether those who were exposed to violations by the persons under evaluation, or those in possession of information based on their experiences with the person under evaluation in the context of police work. The Committee shall also hear the testimony of the persons under evaluation, who shall be given ample time to present their cases and all evidence supporting their positions.
The Committee must also study the possibilities and mechanisms for reintegration into society of those officers who are dismissed from the force after the vetting process. A person who is dismissed from work in the police or from public service retains all rights accorded to them by law in the case of termination of employment, in addition to any assistance or otherwise that the Committee approves as part of the reintegration process.

Administrative nature of the Committee’s decisions

The decisions of the Committee relate only to a person’s eligibility to continue working in the police force, and do not conflict with criminal investigations or any other mechanisms of transitional or criminal justice.
The Committee’s decisions are administrative decisions, and the vetting process does not usually permit appeals. This is because the decisions do not concern criminal investigation, but rather fitness and suitability, and are not intended to punish but rather to completely rehabilitate the police force, and thus help it transition to a new era. Furthermore, the Committee’s work is of an exceptional nature, and ends after its mandate expires. Nevertheless, it is possible to set up a mechanism to allow appeals in cases of perceived violation or misapplication of the basic law of the Committee, or any infringement on the procedures governing the Committee’s work. Such objections shall be investigated by a committee separate from the one which issued the decision.
Regardless of the legal criteria applied in criminal procedures, and in view of the administrative nature of the Vetting Committee’s decisions (whether they result in dismissal or other measures), the principle of the “balance of probabilities” is considered appropriate for establishing proof and taking decisions.

Section Two

Institutional Reform

In this Initiative, we present a package of proposals for institutional reforms and structural changes to the Interior Ministry, and attempt to establish an effective public dialogue around them. One of the mechanisms of this public dialogue may be to hold academic conferences to discuss all aspects of this issue, especially since we have - in Egypt - a number of relevant centres, such as the National Centre for Social and Criminological Research, the Centre for Judicial Studies, the Information and Decision Support Centre, the Police Academy, and faculties of law in all Egyptian universities. The objective is to discuss these proposed structural adjustments and arrive at a public consensus, thereby establishing an approved policy for any government that assumes responsibility. The proposed measures are divided into three parts: structural measures and adjustments for internal institutional development; measures to implement transparency, oversight, and accountability; and finally, programmes to alter public perception. The following are the main elements of the proposed developments.

Part One: Institutional development and structural measures

1. Redefining the role of the police within society

We advocate a radical correction of the grave defects in the specification of the police’s role within society (their job description), defects that have led to the police’s inflated obsession with “preventative security”, and a deterioration and distortion of their performance in the field of “law enforcement” – apprehending convicted fugitives, gathering evidence relating to crimes, and arresting those suspected of committing them. We therefore call for the adoption of a package of broad legislative amendments that will clarify the limits of the “preventative” and “law enforcement” roles of Police in society; specify “red lines” that security personnel must not violate, and lay out penalties for their violation.

With regard to the “preventative” role of the police, preventing crimes before they occur through guarding and securing neighbourhoods, as well as street patrols, we believe that the greatest problem is their obsession with preventative security, which leads to practices that exceed the definition of “security” and “guarding”, and even further to the expansion of the circle of suspicion to include a large number of people without any logical security justification. The residents of popular areas in the different governorates of Egypt have an intimate knowledge of this “obsession with preventative security” to which we refer, represented by practices such as investigating officers and detectives arresting citizens on suspicion of crimes simply because they are not carrying identity cards, are found late at night in a public street, or were previously suspected of involvement in a case despite not being convicted. Every member of the opposition is familiar with political interference due to “preventative security concerns”, to the extent of illegal surveillance of telephones, movements, meetings, etc.; regular citizens, too, know this phenomenon well as one of the ugly faces of the security apparatus, as it leads to the terrorising of citizens for no reason and the development of a sense of fear - not security - among the people at the presence of the security forces in the streets, where common sense would suggest it is their absence which should inspire fear.

As for the “law enforcement role”, which refers to apprehending fugitive convicts, gathering evidence relating to crimes, and arresting suspects: security performance in this area has deteriorated to the extent that verdicts are handed down against individuals who are visibly at large in society. Performance has also been distorted as a result of the Police confusing their own role with that of the Public Prosecutor, who alone is empowered to investigate crimes. From this derives the police practice of forcing suspects to submit to interrogation, detaining a large number of people after a major robbery or a murder, and exerting physical and psychological pressure upon them to extract information, even though this exceeds the jurisdiction of the police. According to the letter of the law, the police are not an investigative authority; rather, they are an evidence-gathering authority who deal with suspects, not those who have been charged, while the public prosecutor is the investigative and indicting authority that lays charges against suspects, and either decides on their release or refers them to the judiciary as accused persons.

Thus there is a clear dysfunction in the definition of the “preventative” and “law enforcement” roles of the police within society, which can only be confronted through legislative amendments that explicitly define the limits of these roles, set out the “red lines” that must not be violated, and establish penalties to deter security personnel who would overstep either their preventative or law enforcement roles.

2. The office of Interior Minister

We call for the office of Interior Minister to be assigned to a politician from outside the police body, so that security issues might be dealt with according to a social and political vision that binds the Interior Ministry to society’s agenda and society’s security priorities, rather than allowing the Ministry to impose its own vision and priorities on society. The Egyptian state has tended to assign the position of Interior Minister to a member of the security forces, and the time has come to overturn this tradition that emerged from the passageways of the police state, and to assign the post of Interior Minister to a political figure to implement a security agenda.

Implementing this proposal would ease the tense relationship in Egypt between the police and the people as the “political minister” will be able to adopt the citizen’s perspective, perceiving the faults and negative elements in the security apparatus, and will implement solutions guaranteeing its reform; this in contrast to the “security minister” who, by virtue of his upbringing within that apparatus, will not pay attention to many of these negative elements, as they have become a familiar part of its working routine. The “political minister” will also bring a broad political vision to the administration of security work, escaping the confines of a narrow careerism that is biased more towards the security apparatus than towards society.

What we are suggesting here is no innovation: the history of Egypt before 23rd July 1952 is replete with Interior Ministers drawn from outside the security apparatus; moreover, it is politicians, and not security personnel, who occupy the position of Security or Interior Minister in most democratic states.

3. The local policing system

We advocate transforming the security apparatus from a highly centralised system into a localised one, such that each governorate has its own police force, over which executive authority belongs to the governor, and technical and administrative authority to the Interior Ministry. This should be implemented alongside a system of elected governors, so that “improving the security services” becomes a campaign issue for gubernatorial candidates, which will encourage governors to ensure that the security apparatus works in the service of citizens, rather than the central authority. A single force may be permitted to exist with authority at the national level, to pursue criminal matters that exceed the capabilities of local police forces.

We have all seen how heavy centralisation in the security administration led to the police being subverted and used to preserve the regime that ruled in the capital until 28th January 2011, and then to a breakdown in security and the complete disappearance of the police from the Egyptian streets and at the national level during the first weeks of the revolution. This confirms that a shift in the Egyptian security apparatus from heavy centralisation to localised decision-making and investigation will raise the capabilities of the police and improve its relationship with citizens, as each force will dedicate itself to local security issues. Every governorate may then set its agenda based on its specific security problems; rather than the Interior Ministry imposing its own agenda on the republic as a whole, despite the variation in security issues from one place to another.

Furthermore, we believe that heavy centralisation lies at the root of a complaint common to all Egyptian governorates, that of the decreased police presence on the streets. The lack of residential stability caused by the transfer of officers from one region to another is considered to be one of the main reasons for the low number of volunteers for police service. Moreover, officers who have been transferred to a governorate in which they are not resident go about their work with the attitude that they are extraneous to the region, and have no interest in maintaining its security.

Therefore, we advocate the serious study of a localised policing system which is controlled executively by the local governor, and technically and administratively by the Interior Ministry; guarantees the appointment of police officers in the same governorate in which they are resident; ensures residential stability and fosters a sense of personal interest in police officers, which encourages them to maintain security in their home regions; but which also provides for all necessary training and precautionary measures to ensure that local police personnel do not unduly favour family or friends who live in the same area.

4. Abolishing the secondment of Armed Forces conscripts to the Interior Ministry

We advocate the abolition of the system whereby conscripts in the Armed Forces are seconded to the apparatus of the Interior Ministry, and the limiting of personnel in the Ministry to affiliation by appointment only. Second-tier personnel in the Interior Ministry should be limited to police personnel who have voluntarily chosen to enter the security profession. The present system has led to the militarisation of the police, in contravention of the Constitution, the conventions of the International Labour Organization, and the principles of human rights.

To implement this, the following measures must be taken:

Abolish the Minister of Defence’s Decree 31/1971 which considers the Interior Ministry one of the institutions in which military service may be carried out
Abolish Article 2, paragraph (b) of the Military and National Service Law, which permits the secondment of Armed Forces conscripts to the Interior Ministry to perform the military service.

5. Rapid Response and Riot Control

We advocate the replacement of the Central Security and Security Forces Divisions with Riot Control and Rapid Response units. These should be distributed in a decentralised manner, i.e. attached to the office of every police department in the Republic, and consist of highly-trained police personnel. The basic mission of these units should be to accompany local police in apprehending dangerous persons; conducting searches of premises frequented by criminals as well as places in which narcotics are traded, grown, or produced; and breaking up major disturbances. A team from each unit should be selected to combat incidents of unrest, and its personnel trained to secure gatherings and demonstrations, not prevent or blockade them. The licence of these teams to use force should be limited through amendments to the laws and statutes governing the use of force, particularly those concerned with the use of firearms. The use of force shall be a last resort in cases of extreme necessity only, and proportionate with the severity of the risk posed.

6. Separation of the National Security Division from the Interior Ministry

The National Security Division should be separated from the Interior Ministry, as past evidence shows that the mission of the Ministry is compromised by the continued presence of this organisation within it. It continues to give priority to political over public security, and hence to employ most of the Ministry’s capabilities in safeguarding the security of the regime, rather than that of citizens. Consequently, and in view of the fact that the mission of this organisation falls under the rubric of preserving Egyptian national security, it could be established as a separate entity, or annexed to the apparatus that deals specifically with national security. The festering of this organisation within the Interior Ministry has led in the past - and will lead in the future, if permitted to continue - to:

its domination of all other departments in the Ministry, and their manipulation to serve its national security vision, even at the expense of the security of citizens, which is the basic mission of the Ministry
a lack of clarity concerning the limits of its authority and the related responsibility.
a lack of direct parliamentary oversight
a lack of clarity concerning the monetary resources allotted to it, and the difficulty of overseeing these.

The removal of the State Security apparatus from the Interior Ministry will protect the Ministry - and its basic mission - from its increasing strength and audacity, while permitting cooperation between the two bodies, when required, through officially documented communication; each having legally defined limits, and each being accountable for its performance and the communications, information, and measures issuing from it.

7. Changing the nature of the Department of Elections in the Interior Ministry

We suggest that the name of this department be changed to “the Department of Polls and Elections Security” to bring it into compliance with the Constitution, so that it coordinates with the Supreme Electoral Committee (and then the National Electoral Commission) regarding the requirements for guaranteeing the electoral process at electoral headquarters and polling stations through the police force, provided that these forces are subject to oversight by the presiding judges.

8. Dealing with the over-expansion of the Interior Ministry

A characteristic feature of the Interior Ministry’s early history, since the days of the first Egyptian cabinet (that of Nubar Pasha in 1878, which consisted of only eight ministries, including the Interior Ministry) is that, as society and the state developed and became more complex, tasks and functions that had been performed by departments within the Interior Ministry were spun off and established as independent ministries. Examples are the Ministries of Agriculture (1913), Transportation (1919), Health (1936, originally the Public Health Administration within the Interior Ministry), and Village and Municipal Affairs (1952), which began as the Department of Municipalities and Provinces in the Interior Ministry, and later developed into the Ministry of Local Development.

Subsequently, however, this process of natural development was halted, and as the police state became more entrenched, the Interior Ministry began to extend its reach over many other state institutions, which led to an over-expansion of its functions, the depletion of its resources, and had a detrimental impact on its ability to carry out its basic security mission.

Therefore, in the framework of returning to the natural developmental course of the Interior Ministry prior to the era of the police state, its organisational structure must be refashioned to counteract this over-expansion, and to re-direct its human and financial resources to serve public security , while tasks and functions not related to security should be spun off. There are two suggestions: either the Ministry should be divided into two – one for Security and one for other Domestic Affairs, or the non-security functions should be distributed out to other relevant ministries, for example:

The organisation of the public “Hajj pilgrimage” (could be assigned to the Ministry of Endowments;
The Civil Status Organization (could be assigned to the Ministry of Justice);
Issuing work-abroad permits (could be assigned to the Ministry of Manpower);
The Passports, Immigration, and Nationality Administration (could be assigned to the Foreign Ministry);
The Traffic Department (Vehicle and Driving Licence sections and Technical Examination Committees could be assigned to regional executive bodies, with the role of the Interior Ministry being limited to organising the traffic system and enforcing traffic law on public roads);
The Prison Authority (could be assigned to the Ministry of Justice, so that the arresting authority is separated from penal institutions, and the post of prison director can be filled by legal experts from outside the police force. A Prison Security specialisation should be established in police colleges and institutes, and police officers holding this specialisation would be appointed by the Ministry of Justice to secure prisons, courts, and public prosecutor’s offices. All non-security functions within prisons should be performed by the Ministry of Justice, rather than the police. The Minister of Justice should have the same technical and administrative jurisdiction as the Interior Minister over police officers attached to the Ministry of Justice, and these officers shall be subject to the Police and Prisons Laws in the course of their duties. A department for medical oversight of detention centres and prison hospitals should be set up, and assigned to the Ministry of Health).

The system and the departments of specialized police should be reviewed, with the goal of maximizing security in all fields and areas, while at the same time achieving occupational justice among police officers.

9. Reducing the role of the police in granting licences and permits for public activities

We recommend that the interference of the security forces in professional and popular activities be radically reduced. To give just a few examples: the police must be prevented from intervening in the areas of media and culture; police authorisation of employment in government institutions must be abolished, as well as interference in their activities; and requesting security clearance for anything not explicitly stipulated by law should be criminalised.

10. Police colleges and institutes

We advocate radical adjustments to the system of police colleges and institutes, to promote the civilian and service-based nature of the force, improve its capabilities, and strip it of any military or paramilitary character it has acquired:

It is pointless for the course of study in police colleges to last four years, allowing students to acquire a Bachelor of Law degree, when there are numerous colleges of law all over the country. Consequently, we suggest modifying the system of education in police colleges to restrict admission to law college graduates, and not holders of the general high-school diploma. Accordingly the curriculum would be limited to disciplines, training, and skills relevant to police and security work, during one or more academic years divided into two stages: one for basic training, the other for specialised training (traffic - secret police - regular police - civil defence, etc.). Each officer graduates with a specialisation in the field in which they will work throughout the duration of their service, which will build up a cumulative body of experience in the various security specialisations. Professional development courses should be organised after the start of employment, with advancement conditional upon passing them.
It is no longer acceptable to have only one police college in Cairo, accepting students from all over Egypt. We recommend that a number of local police colleges be established at the regional or governorate level to take on the task of graduating police personnel. This will meet the security needs of each region or governorate, and studies can focus on the skills appropriate to local security needs.
To preserve the civilian nature of the police, we advocate the abolition of the system of mandatory residence in police colleges, to make them similar to any other college, which students attend to pursue their studies while living in their homes or in halls of residence along with students of other institutions. This is in contrast to the situation today: the transformation of the police college into a barracks, which is in large measure responsible for their isolation from society. If the nature of military service on bases and at the battle-front requires that students in Armed Forces military colleges be separated from civilian society, the nature of police work demands the opposite: a policeman’s workplace is society, not a battle-front.
All articles of the law that entail the militarisation of police colleges must be abolished, opening the way to a civilian education for police officers. This means firstly the abolition of Article 14 of the Police Academy Law, which stipulates that “students of the police college shall be subject to military law... their discipline and prosecution will be the responsibility of a military court”. Moreover, the phrase “military training” should be removed from Articles 20 and 25 of the Police Academy Law.
There should be a guarantee of non-discrimination in admitting students to police colleges, achieved by the abolition of “family background” checks, and referring to the personal criminal record alone, as well as the cancellation of any unconstitutional and discriminatory policy or measure that unfairly hinders or empowers specific groups in gaining admission to these colleges. The goal is a better representation of social groups within the police, making the police force more closely resemble the society it serves.

11. Working conditions of the police

We recommend a package of reforms guaranteeing an improvement in the training, qualification, and working facilities of the police, as well as the occupational conditions and salaries of all police officers and employees, including:

Revision of the pay structure and system of incentives for police officers, offering them dignity, justice, and a standard of living appropriate to the work of a police officer, and ensuring that police operations are kept free of factors that might incite political or financial corruption. The main element of this would be the redistribution of wealth throughout the force by placing a cap on salaries and raising low wages significantly, unifying pay grades by rank and precedence, and removing discrimination within pay grades between different departments (except for objective differences in the nature of the work).
Establishing a union to defend the rights of police employees in disputes with the Interior Ministry, which would further the cause of the security process as a whole. This is done in the belief that an officer or employee who has the support of a union in defending their rights will not feel compelled to implement any directives that contravene the Constitution or the law, in the knowledge that they will not be left to oppose the Ministry alone in case of interrogation or pressure; to say nothing of the difficulty of achieving gradual amendments to the Police Law, in accordance with the needs of police personnel, other than through a union that defends their rights and organises their activities. All social groups without exception are guaranteed the right to establish trade unions by Article 52 of the Constitution, the text of which states that “the freedom to establish trade unions, syndicates, and co-operatives is guaranteed. They shall have legal personality and be founded on a democratic basis, and shall go about their activities freely, participating in the service of society, increasing the efficiency of their members, and defending their rights. The authorities may not dissolve them or their boards of directors without a court order”.
Voting by police officers in elections: Given the Supreme Constitutional Court’s pending review of case no. 235/31JY filed by Col. Dr. Muhammad Mahfouz and cassation attorney Mr. Hossam Mahfouz, demanding that the ban on police officers voting in elections be ruled unconstitutional, the members of this Initiative are of the opinion that this matter should be left to the judgement of the Supreme Constitutional Court in order not to cast doubt on the demand for this right, in view of the current tense relationship between the police and the people.
Amendments to Articles 19 and 71 of the Police Law, under which the “promotion by selection” system was put in place. This set the duration of service in the rank of colonel at two years, with the possibility of one or more extensions or of termination, and service in the ranks of brigadier-general and major-general at one year, with the same possibilities of renewal or termination; anyone not selected is sent into retirement. Officers who are appointed as Assistant or First Assistant to the Minister of the Interior serve until the age of 60. This system of “promotion by selection” is a sword held at the throats of officers, forcing them to comply with directives - no matter how arbitrary or illegal - or face early retirement, which would mean asking police officers in their mid-forties to begin entirely new careers. Therefore, service in the police must be extended to the age of 60, in line with other state careers, to provide job security and stability, which would then be reflected in the force’s work.
Establishing the principle of non-discrimination in the health and social services provided to police personnel, regardless of rank, while working to ensure a high level of service is provided to all.
We urge police officers and personnel to draft a new code of ethics for the Police Department as soon as their right to self-organise is signed into law.

12. Increasing police efficiency and adopting modern service technologies

We recommend improving the efficiency of the police by adopting advanced scientific methods of evidence gathering, analysis, and crime scene processing, and providing the appropriate technological means and training. The violations and excesses of the police prior to the revolution can in part be explained by inadequate training, and a lack of knowledge on the part of many officers regarding non-repressive means of performing their duties. We also recommend that police departments are modernised to better fit the dignity of those working there, and boost their pride in their professional affiliation. Modern technological equipment should be provided, to increase the efficiency of office work and ensure oversight of police service level - the most pressing example is equipping police vehicles, traffic police vehicles, fixed and mobile checkpoints, public areas and detention facilities in police departments with security cameras, to ensure both the protection and oversight of police personnel, as well as the equipment of all departments with computers for writing and note taking, etc. We further recommend that conferences, experience-sharing, and site visits be arranged with foreign security forces, and that officers submit reports so that the fullest benefit can be derived from these engagements. Foreign visits should be restricted to young officers up to the rank of major.

Part Two: Transparency, oversight, and accountability

In order to maintain a disciplined relationship between the police and the people, and to make it truly “a police for the Egyptian people”, the police must be overseen by and made accountable to the people, through the organs of state that represent the people’s legislative and judicial authority, as well as by civil society and local organisations. This oversight must include:

Oversight of police performance, and accountability for its shortcomings;
Oversight of its commitment to the law, and accountability for violations;
Financial oversight, including the public exposure of the police budget, and oversight of how it is spent.

In this context, we advocate the following measures:

1. Security status indexes

The preparation and adoption of a set of “security status indexes” that offer an objective numerical evaluation of the security situation both by geographical area (for example, by region or governorate) and by category (types of crime and different security fields).

It will also be necessary to organise and adopt a national mechanism for objectively and regularly (at least once per month) measuring and evaluating the elements of these indexes, for which the Interior Ministry will need to collaborate with the statistics and information authorities (the Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics, and the Information and Decision Support Centre), civil society organisations, and other relevant bodies.

These indexes should be published monthly, and considered the chief indicator of the standard of police performance.

2. Publicly-accessible telephone hotlines

We request that the Interior Minister publicly announce the numbers of telephone lines that will receive reports (emergency calls, reports of offences, complaints against the police, etc.), and guarantee the efficiency and functionality of these lines by:

Ensuring a sufficient number of lines to serve all governorates;
Ensuring a sufficient number of personnel to receive calls;
Implementing a system to review all calls, periodically reviewing these recordings, and comparing them with actions taken in response;
Preserving these recordings and refering to them in case of complaints by citizens regarding slow or inadequate responses, and availing them to oversight and judicial authorities.

3. Holding security officials accountable for errors or security failures within their jurisdiction

We request that the Public Prosecutor implement Article 22 of the Criminal Process Law and Article 124 of the Penal Code in any instance of security failure where there is a suspicion of professional error or negligence by a police officer, at the police station or department in whose jurisdiction the incident occurred.

We also request that the Interior Minister implement effective rules and mechanisms to investigate and hold to account those responsible for security in any area where a security failure has occurred.

4. Judicial oversight of police actions

We request that the Public Prosecutor - in the context of implementing Article 22 of the Criminal Process Law - should expedite frequent inspections of police operations and detention facilities. We also request that he orders the confiscation of any torture implements discovered during these inspections, and publicly announce the fact.

We further request that he establishes a simple and publicly announced communication channel to receive citizens’ reports and complaints of police violations. These reports must be given serious consideration, and the burden of proof must not lie with the person who makes the complaint.

5. Public oversight of police actions

We request that the Interior Minister allow representatives of civil society organisations (the Lawyers’ Syndicate, the Medical Syndicate, Human rights and legal support organisations, registered local NGO’s, etc.) to enter police headquarters at any time without prior notification, to inspect detention facilities and the condition of detainees, and to receive any information they request.
We call on relevant civil society organisations to dedicate channels of communication for reporting violations committed by police officers.
We call on all citizens to notify the Public Prosecutor in the event of police negligence or misconduct, so that the latter can investigate and hold accountable those responsible in accordance with Article 124 of the Penal Code and Article 22 of the Criminal Process Law.

6. Establishing a national commission for prevention of torture and cruel or degrading treatment

A National Commission for the Prevention of Torture should be established, consisting of judicial and legal specialists, human rights and criminal law experts, medical professionals (including psychiatrists and forensic specialists), representatives of civil society organisations, and social workers. The Commission may not include any employee of the criminal justice system (including the judiciary, the police, and the prison service) or any member of the executive.

It should be formed by order of the Prime Minister and its members approved by the Human Rights Committee of the Parliament, after consultation with human rights organisations, victim rehabilitation centres, and relevant specialists. The Parliament shall decide the term of membership of the Commission, which shall not exceed 5 years.

The National Commission for the Prevention of Torture should have an independent budget determined by the Parliament and renewed annually according to the Commission’s plan. The Commission determines standards and regulations for its work, but in all cases the composition of the inspection teams that will visit detention facilities should reflect the functional diversity of the Commission.

The Commission sets out a the public policies to combat all forms of torture and degrading treatment against Egyptian citizens. It cooperates with the the Parliament and other authorities to monitor the police force, and is authorised to do the following:

Carry out periodic inspections, both announced and unannounced, of police departments and detention facilities belonging to either the security apparatus or the executive. It shall have the right to interview any officers or detainees it chooses, in privacy and without witnesses, and make reports or recommendations regarding conditions in the above-mentioned places. The Commission should conduct an independent analysis of the detention system, and work to remove any possibility of misconduct or malpractice;
Make recommendations to the appropriate authorities with the aim of improving the treatment and conditions of detainees, and preventing torture and cruel or degrading treatment. It should assist these authorities in implementing its recommendations and improving the detention system;
Submit quarterly reports to the Human Rights Committee at the Parliament on those detention facilities that have been inspected, containing recommendations that have been presented to the executive, and secondary reports on the status of implementation of those recommendations;
Visit any building or location where there is a suspicion of illegal detention of individuals;
Receive reports from human rights organisations or from citizens concerning torture, or treatment that is inhumane or degrading;
Submit recommendations for legislative amendments to ensure the prevention of torture or inhumane treatment;
The Commission has the authority to obtain all information necessary for its work, including prison records, schedules, and data, in addition to medical and disciplinary records.

7. Establishing an independent committee to investigate deaths and serious injuries by the police

One of the basic elements of police oversight in democratic countries is the existence of an independent body to investigate cases of death or serious injury of citizens during police operations. This committee consists of members who are not affiliated to either the judicial, executive, or legislative authorities, experts in criminal law, forensic medicine, and forensics. Its function is to investigate cases of death or serious injury that occur in the context of combating crime, in police custody, in chases involving police vehicles, in cases where live rounds have been fired, in confrontations involving the use of fists or batons, and in raids on suspected crime scenes or places known to be frequented by criminals, as well as in detention centres, police stations, and other areas supervised by the police. The goal of these investigations is to determine the legality of the use of force in cases that have led to death or serious injury. The committee does not only investigate where there is the suspicion of criminality, but rather in every case of death or serious injury that occurs in the context of interactions with the police. This is to ensure adherence to the law in police operations, and the use of force only where necessary and proportionate.

Powers of the Committee: The Interior Ministry’s inspection department has to conduct an internal investigation in all cases where live rounds have been used during police operations, whether or not they resulted in injury or death. This is a routine procedure in all democratic police forces, where the use of live ammunition by police is considered an exceptional case. Cases of death or serious injury resulting from police use of force generally - and not only from live ammunition - are investigated by the independent committee in cooperation with the Public Prosecutor. On this basis, the police must refer any case of death or injury resulting from a police operation to the independent committee, as well as any case of death in custody, whether or not there is a suspicion of torture or mistreatment. The committee conducts a preliminary investigation, then decides if there are sufficient grounds for broadening the inquiry. In this case, it can begin to investigate on its own or turn the matter over to the Public prosecutor. The Committee’s powers also include hearing complaints from citizens regarding cases of death or serious injury, and investigating them if the above definition and criteria are met.

The Committee must be given full investigative powers, i.e. the right of criminal investigators to gather evidence, in addition to the right to investigate. The Independent Committee may either perform the investigation itself and refer it to the Public Prosecutor after concluding its own investigation (as the Public Prosecutor is the only body authorised to lay charges if required), or investigate in cooperation with the Public Prosecutor from the outset.

The steps that the Committee can take include issuing a preliminary report that is submitted to the Interior Ministry before publication to give it an opportunity to respond, then publishing the final report; presenting recommendations to the departments concerned within the police or the prisons authority regarding ways to prevent similar incidents from occurring in the future. The Committee may turn the matter over in its entirety to the Public Prosecutor, if criminal acts are proved to have occurred, and presenting the full case file to the Prosecutor in its capacity as the indicting authority, to take the necessary steps. If an administrative breach is found to have occurred, the Committee should refer the matter to the administrative department concerned, or to the relevant disciplinary council within the Interior Ministry.

Part Three: Changing the public image of the police

We recommend that practical steps are taken to alter the image of the police in society, such steps should follow the achievement of clear progress along all the axes mentioned above, and and shall help to create a new image for the police, emphasizing their respect for human rights and the rule of law. The following are several examples of what this programme might consist of:

Changing the name of the Interior Ministry, which is linked in citizens’ minds with subservience to the regime and with repressive practices. We suggest that the new name should be “the Ministry of Internal Security”.
Renovating police departments and stations according to a new design, whereby glass is used for internal divisions and partitions, rather than blank walls and closed-off rooms, in an open plan that clearly shows what is going on inside. This provides a measure of physical transparency that will be reflected in the minds of citizens, reinforcing their feelings of confidence and security.
Changing the uniform of police officers, which is linked in people’s minds with repressive practices. A simple design should be used, with blue trousers, a light-blue shirt and blue jumper. The uniform should be designed so that technological accessories can be carried easily, and the badge displaying the officer’s identity should hang on the shirt pocket or the sweater, so that citizens can identify a police officer without having to ask.

Section Three

Legislative Amendments

It is clear from the above presentation of proposals for restructuring the police that many of them require amendments to laws currently in force, as well as the introduction of several others. In the current section we present the main features of the required legislative amendments and additions.

1. Amendments to laws relating to police operations

An amendment to the legal definition of torture, broadening it to include more kinds of deliberate physical and psychological harm inflicted on detainees and bringing it into line with the definition of torture in international laws and conventions.
Significant amendments to Volume Two, chapter two of the Penal Code on domestic felonies and misdemeanours harmful to the government, and all other articles dealing with the same topic, as they contain flexible legal formulations and vague criminal terminology leading to a broad punitive framework, which creates a climate of fear and grants police officers the assurance of broad, easily abused powers in confronting citizens.
Striking down Article 2, paragraph (b) of the Military and National Service Law allowing the secondment of Armed Forces conscripts to the Interior Ministry to perform their mandatory military service.
Cancelling the Minister of Defence’s Decree 31/1981 which considers the Interior Ministry one of the organisations “of military nature” in which military service may be performed.

2. Transitional legislation that should be issued

Legislation establishing the revolutionary transitional justice system, including the Accountability and Justice Commission, the Martyrs, Wounded, and Victims Compensation Commission, and the Revolutionary Criminal Court, implementing the proposals set out in Section One, part one of this Initiative.
Legislation establishing the independent Vetting Committee for police officers. The law should determine the number of committee members and the mechanism and criteria for selecting them, as well as its powers, jurisdiction, and sources of funding. This will allow it to carry out its mission in accordance with the points set out in Section One, part two of this Initiative.

3. Legislation to establish the new oversight committees

Legislation establishing the National Commission for the Prevention of Torture and Cruel or Degrading Treatment. The law should determine the organisational structure of the Commission and its administrative board, the mechanism and criteria for selecting its members, and the term of membership, as well as its powers, jurisdiction, and sources of funding. This will allow it to carry out its mission in accordance with the goals and vision set out in Section Two, part two, paragraph 6 of this Initiative.
Legislation establishing the independent committee to investigate cases of death or serious injury by the police, according to the goals and vision set out in Section Two, part two, paragraph 7 of this Initiative.

4. Issuing a new Police Law

A new Police Law must be developed (replacing Law 109/1971), in accordance with the new vision set out in this Initiative, and consistent with the other legislative additions and amendments introduced in the preceding paragraphs of this section. The following are some of the main features that the new Police Law must contain:

Affirming the civilian - not military or paramilitary - nature of the police.
Defining the functional description of the police’s role within society, and introducing measures to prevent the police from overstepping that role (in accordance with the goals and vision detailed in Section Two, part one, paragraph 1 of this Initiative).
Establishing a legal basis for the decentralisation of the police (in accordance with the goals and vision detailed in Section Two, part one, paragraph 3 of this Initiative).
Affirming the right of police officers and civilian employees of the police to form unions that defend their occupational rights, take care of their social and medical affairs, uphold professional standards, and develop codes of conduct to support them.
Establishing guidelines for the (geographical or occupational) transfer of personnel within the police, as well as termination of their service, to ensure efficiency and occupational justice, prevent discrimination through favouritism or patronage, and prevent the use of transfers as a means of reward or veiled punishment.
Establishing clear guidelines on the use of force and weaponry by police officers. These should stipulate that police personnel may - in accordance with the principle of proportionality to the threat posed - use force or weaponry to the extent necessary to gain control over those who are suspected of or charged with crimes, convicted fugitives, disobedient prisoners, or prisoners and detainees who are attempting to flee. They should also stipulate that no police personnel may be absolved of responsibility if they employ force or weaponry without justification, in a manner disproportionate to the degree of danger or that exceeds the level necessary to gain control over lawbreakers, or if police officers overstep legal boundaries in defending themselves or others.
Detailing and affirming the rights of citizens who are stopped, searched, or detained.

5. Implementing a new Police Academy Law

A new Police Academy Law (replacing Law 91/1975) should be developed, that conforms to the new vision for the qualification and training of police officers (in accordance with the points detailed in Section Two, part one, paragraph 10 of this proposal). This law must contain an affirmation of the civilian nature of study in police colleges and institutes.

Appendix

Constitutional and legal texts referred to in this Initiative

Article 52 of the Constitution

The freedom to establish trade unions, syndicates, and co-operatives is guaranteed. They shall have legal personality and be founded on a democratic basis, and conduct their activities freely, participating in the service of society, increasing the efficiency of their members, and defending their rights. The authorities may not dissolve them or their boards of directors without a court order.

Article 199 of the Constitution

The police is a statutory civil body whose ultimate head is the President of the Republic. They perform their duty in the service of the people, and their loyalty is to the Constitution and the law. They maintain order, security, and public morality, and execute the provisions of the law; they guarantee citizens’ security, and defend their dignity, rights, and freedoms. All of this is done in a manner regulated by law, and in such a way that allows members of the police force to perform their duties.

Police Law 109/1971 and amendments

Article 1:

The police is a statutory civil body within the Ministry of the Interior. It performs its functions under the leadership and direction of the Interior Minister, who issues directives regulating all their affairs and the structure of their operations.

Article 5:

The Supreme Police Council cooperates with the Interior Minister in setting the Ministry’s general policy and courses of action, and developing its apparatus and modus operandi to ensure that its mission is fulfilled in the best possible manner. It pays particular attention to the affairs of members of the police force, as set out in this law, as well as to issues presented by the Interior Minister or suggested by one of the Council members. The Council’s resolutions are effective from the date of their approval by the Minister, and are considered approved fifteen days after their referral to the Minister unless written objection is received. If the Minister objects in writing to all or part of the resolution, the parts subject to objection are returned to the Council for review within a period determined by him. If the Council insists on its resolution, the Minister issues a decision on the matter and this decision is final.

Article 47, paragraph 2:

“No officer is exempted from punishment for carrying out an order from his superior, unless he proves that the offence was committed in the course of implementing an order issued by a superior who was nevertheless warned of the offence. In this case responsibility shall lie with the one who issued the order.”

Article 53:

The Minister, Assistant Minister, or Director of an Authority (within their jurisdiction) has the right to suspend officers from duty as a precautionary measure, if required for the benefit of an ongoing investigation. Suspension of an officer at or above the rank of major-general must be by order of the Minister or an Assistant Minister. The term of suspension may not exceed one month unless the officer is charged with committing a felony or misdemeanour that damages security or brings disrepute; in this case suspension may not exceed three months and may not be extended other than by order of the disciplinary council.

Article 54:

Any officer subject to precautionary detention or imprisoned as a result of a judicial ruling is suspended from duty by law for the duration of his confinement.

Article 62:

Disciplinary procedures for officers at or above the rank of major-general shall be conducted by the Supreme Disciplinary Council. The decision of this Council is final, and the penalties it may impose are the following: warning, official censure, forced retirement, or dismissal from duty with the loss of up to one-quarter of the pension.

Article 63:

Referral to the Supreme Disciplinary Council shall be by order of the Interior Minister...

Article 67:

The Minister of the Interior may – after consulting with the Supreme Council of the Police - place the officer in reserve...

…
If this is proved to be necessary for the public good.

This does not apply to the rank of major-general.”

Article 71:

An officer’s service is terminated for either of the following reasons:

Reaching the age of retirement (60 years);
If the officer has held the rank of colonel for two years, or the rank of brigadier-general or major-general for one year, unless their service is extended or they are sent into retirement in accordance with Article 19 of this law. Generals who are promoted to the rank of Assistant or First Assistant to the Interior Minister , from among those who have attained promotion to the prerequisite financial level, serve until the age of sixty;
Inability to serve on health grounds, determined by the relevant medical authority at the request of the officer or the Ministry. An officer may not be dismissed on health grounds before their annual leave and sick leave allowances are exhausted, unless they themselves request early retirement without waiting for the expiry of their allotted leave. The Supreme Police Council may adjust their pension or end-of-service benefit in accordance with either article 70/1 or 76/2 & 3, whichever is more beneficial for the officer;
Resignation;
Dismissal or forced retirement by disciplinary order;
Loss of citizenship;
Dismissal by the President of the Republic, in cases specified by the relevant law;
Being convicted of a crime listed in the Penal Code, or similar crimes listed in particular laws, or an offence that harms security or brings disrepute and is punishable by imprisonment;
Death.

Article 78:

Intermediate rank policemen are appointed from the body of graduates of police institutes; these are established by order of the Interior Minister, who sets their executive regulations, and determines their course of study and the compensation awarded to students, after consultation with the Supreme Police Council. Students of these institutes are subject to military law.

Article 87 bis:

Police delegates are appointed from the body of graduates from specialised police institutes; these are established by order of the Interior Minister, who determines the internal regulations of these institutes after consultation with the Supreme Police Council, including the curriculum and admission criteria. Students shall be selected from among holders of the Certificate of Basic Education (formerly the General Preparatory Certificate) or equivalent qualification. The Minister shall also determine the level of compensation received by students during the course of their studies.

The period of study in these institutes shall be considered a period of military service, and no one shall benefit from this law who has not completed a total of thirteen years in education and service.

Students are subject to military law during the course of their studies.

Criminal Process Law 150/1950

Article 22:

Law enforcement personnel shall be under the authority and supervision of the Public Prosecutor. The Public Prosecutor may request that the relevant parties investigate anyone who commits an offence or error in the course of their duties, or may bring disciplinary action against them. This does not conflict with initiating criminal proceedings.

Penal Code 58/1937

Article 124:

If three or more public employees abandon their work, even through resignation, or deliberately refuse to carry out their duties as part of an agreement or in furtherance of a common goal, they shall each be punished with a term of imprisonment of no less than three months and no more than a year, and with a fine of no more than 100 pounds. The maximum penalty may be doubled for any abandonment or refusal which might place human life, health, or security in danger, or cause public disruption or disturbance, or harm to the public good. Any public employee who abandons or refuses work in an attempt to hinder or disrupt the workflow shall be punished with a term of imprisonment of no more than six months, or a fine that does not exceed 500 pounds. The maximum penalty may be doubled for any abandonment or disturbance which might place human life, health, or security in danger, or cause public disruption or disturbance, or harm to the public good.

Article 126:

Any public employee who tortures, or orders the torture of, a suspect to force a confession shall be punished with a term of imprisonment or hard labour of between three and ten years. If the victim dies, the person responsible shall be punished according to the penalty for murder.

Police Academy Law 91/1975

Article 14:

Students of police colleges shall be subject to military law within the provisions of this law, and their discipline and prosecution will be the responsibility of a military court formed annually by order of the President of the Academy. The role of prosecutor shall be filled by an officer chosen annually by the President of the Academy.

Students may choose an officer of the Academy to defend them before the court. The court’s rulings shall be approved by the President of the Academy.

The internal charter shall determine the disciplinary measures that can be taken against students of the Academy and the authorities that can enforce them.

Article 20:

Successful graduation from the police academy requires passing the examinations in legal subjects in accordance with the charter of the Faculty of Law referred to in Article 16 of this law, as well as passing the examinations in police subjects and military and athletic training referred to in the second paragraph of Article 16 of this law, in accordance with the internal charter of the Academy, and on condition that they achieve at least 50% of the full mark in police subjects.

Article 25:

The period of study in this department (the Specialist Officers Department) shall be one academic year, and the curriculum shall include police subjects as well as military and athletic training, as determined by the internal charter.

Military and National Service Law 127/1980

Article 2:

Military and national service comprises:

Compulsory practical military service, performed by males in the following institutions:

The various branches of the Armed Forces;
The police, and governmental entities or departments of a military character, determined by Presidential decree. Those referred to in point 1 of Article 4 may not complete their service in these institutions except for holders of the Intermediate Certificate or equivalent foreign qualification, who may serve in the police by order of the Minister of Defence, following a request from the Interior Minister, not to exceed 10% of the number of conscripts in the Interior Ministry , and only after the requirements of the Armed Forces for this category have been met.

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دكتور محمد محفوظ

10 يونيو 2013

The National Initiative for Police Reform Working Group