The Egyptian Security Sector
Between the
questions of the revolution
and their answers
*
A report on developments in the security sector in Egypt during
2013
*
Published : 22 january 2014
Col. Dr. Mohamed Mahfouz
Coordinator, National Initiative for Police Reform (A
Police for the Egyptian People)
and Assistant Coordinator, Honourable Officers
Coalition
*
An
introductory paper for the conference on
“Transforming
the Arab security sector in the transitional period: working for change”
in Amman, Jordan,
22nd - 23rd January 2014
*
Contents
Introduction
Section One: Policies and legislation
1. Policies and legislation in the period
before 2013
2. Policies and legislation during 2013
Section Two: The redefinition of
relationships between public actors in society
1. The Supreme Council of the Armed
Forces
2. Political Islam
3. Terrorist groups
4. Police coalitions
(a)
The
“Officers, but Honourable” Coalition (now the Honourable Officers Coalition)
(b)
The
General Police Officers Coalition (now the General Police Officers’ Club)
(c)
The
General Police Agents and Personnel Coalition (now the General Policemen’s
Club)
(d)
The
Bearded Police Officers’ Coalition
5. State and Revolutionary institutions
Section Three: Obstacles on the road
to reform
General review
Conclusion
*****
Introduction
The year 2013
seems ideally suited to a report on the development of the security sector in Egypt from the
perspectives of policy, legislation, and the redefinition of relationships
between public actors and society. In the first half of the year, the rule of
the Muslim Brotherhood gave birth to a campaign of proselytising; in the
second, the Brotherhood fell and power was transferred to a civilian movement
following a popular revolution, with the help of the Egyptian Armed Forces.
Between the first
and second halves of the year, therefore, events and transformations can be
analysed and contrasted in their various interactions and interrelations. Of
course, this period cannot be taken in isolation from the months preceding it,
to which it is closely connected, a period whose natural beginning is the 30th
June 2012, with the accession of the Muslim Brotherhood to the Presidency
of Egypt. Nor can these events be viewed without taking into account all the
upheavals that have occurred on the Egyptian stage, beginning from the date of
the first outbreak of revolution on 25th January 2011.
The following is a
presentation of developments in the Egyptian security sector during 2013 and
before, taking in policies, legislation, and the redefinition of relationships
between public actors and society, as well as an examination of the obstacles
that lie in the way of reforming this sector and the cycle of development in
its numerous institutions.
Section One: Policies and legislation
1. Policies and legislation before 2013
Examining the
period between the “Revolution of the 25th” and the start of 2013, one may note
a number of developments - albeit limited in number and scope - in the Egyptian
security sector, which comprises five institutions: the Interior Ministry,
General Intelligence, the Supervisory Authority, the Central Accounting
Authority, and the Illegal Gains Authority. These developments have occurred
within a context of frequent disturbances that have seen the appointment of
four Prime Ministers, four Interior Ministers, and new heads of department for
General Intelligence, the Supervisory Authority, and Illegal Gains. Legislative
authority has also been redistributed during this period, remaining for
approximately one year in the hands of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces;
transferred for less than six months to the People’s Council, controlled by the
Brotherhood majority and their Islamist allies; then transferred a second time,
for a period of several months, to President Mohamed Morsi. Meanwhile,
executive authority remained for a year and a half under the control of the
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, before being transferred on 30th
June 2012 to the President of the Republic.
It is noteworthy,
however, that the origin of the political and legislative developments which
affected the Egyptian security sector during this period lies with the Supreme
Council of the Armed Forces, while the legislative authority, controlled by the
Islamist movement, was powerless to make any legislative intervention in this
area; and the President, a member of that same movement, contented himself with
a change of leadership to ensure loyalty to the new regime, without any
accompanying change of policy. Even the Constitution of 2012, which could have
been considered a foundational legislative document upon which to construct a
sound process for reform in the security sector, contained no clear or explicit
provisions that even remotely hinted at or encouraged such reform.
The developments
in the Egyptian security sector during this period were as follows:
A. Abolishing the State Security
Investigations Division, and establishing the National Security Division[1]
On 15th
March 2011, Mansour el-Essawy, the Interior Minister, issued resolution no.
445/2011 (valid), regarding the creation of the National Security Division and
the abolition of State Security Investigations[2].
Although this resolution may outwardly appear to be a qualitative shift, and a
step on the path to reform within the Interior Ministry, it becomes clear upon
objective examination that it is nothing more than a change of name, with no
bearing on the institution itself. This is due to the fact that no law was
brought in to clarify the principles according to which this Division should
operate, or ways of monitoring its performance. Added to this is the fact that
most of the crimes still investigated by this organisation fall under Section
Two, Book Two of the Penal Code, pertaining to “Crimes and felonies harmful to
the State from within”, and the text of the law in this section contains many
overly-flexible phrases and vague formulations criminalising various acts,
leading to a broad punitive framework that permits the creation of a state of
fear, and the arbitrary use and interpretation of the law.
B. Depriving the Interior Ministry of its
electoral powers, and limiting them to the guaranteeing of elections
Article 39 of the
constitutional declaration issued on 30th March 2011 stipulated that
the Supreme Electoral Commission should be given the power to supervise all
aspects of the election process, from voter registration to the announcement of
the results. On 20th May 2011, the constitutional text was
implemented through the promulgation of law no. 46/2011 as an amendment to the
Law on the Exercise of Political Rights 73/1956, limiting the Interior
Ministry’s relationship to the election process to the guaranteeing of
elections only, and charging the Supreme Electoral Commission with the
supervision of all stages of elections and referenda.
C. Publishing a Code of Conduct for
Police Work[3]
On 22nd
October 2011, the Interior Ministry announced the publication of a Code of
Conduct for Police Work. The reader of this document is struck by the
prevalence of slogans and stylised phrases, but the most eye-catching part is
the regulation in Part Four that reads: “All members of the police body are
bound by the rules on military discipline as stipulated in the Police Law.” In
reality, the Police Law is entirely devoid of references to any “rules on
military discipline”, meaning that the Code of Conduct for Police Work, in
contravening the Police Law, is itself the first to violate the rules of good
conduct, conferring military characteristics on policemen and officers in spite
of their membership in a civilian organisation. This is to say nothing of the
fact that the publication of this Code of Conduct by the Interior Ministry, an
organ of the executive, robs it of any worth: codes of conduct or ethical
covenants are not issued, drawn up, or announced from within the circles of
power, but only by the self-organising bodies that represent a particular
profession.
D. Ending the State of Emergency
On 31st
May 2012, the State of Emergency was cancelled, pursuant to public resolution
126/2010, the first article of which stipulated that this State of Emergency
should last for a period of two years beginning on 1st June 2010 and
ending on 31st May 2012, to make way for an unprecedented period that
would see the Egyptian security sector return to work within the provisions of
the Criminal Procedural Law, a far cry from the exceptional measures that were
the result of the constant declaration of States of Emergency.
E. Amending the Police Law
On 20th
June 2012, the Military Council issued, following the transfer to it of
legislative authority and the dissolution of the People’s Assembly by a ruling
of the Supreme Constitutional
Court, a resolution on law no. 25/2012 amending
several provisions of the Police Law[4].
The amendments
included the introduction of a new rank, “officer of honour”, awarded to police
officers after attaining the rank of “officer of distinction”; as well as the
abolition of the military courts to which police personnel had been subject in
all professional matters, and their replacement with disciplinary courts; the
approval of a new timetable for raising police salaries; and the removal of the
provision making the President of the Republic the ultimate head of the police
force[5].
Although these
amendments were aimed at improving the working conditions of the police, which
is one of the prerequisites for a serious process of restructuring and
reorganisation within the Interior Ministry, modifying the Police Law to
address only the issue of working conditions while ignoring all the other
elements required for a comprehensive reorganisation leads to the conclusion
that these amendments were merely privileges directed at police officers and
personnel for the sake of renewing and securing their loyalty to the regime.
F. Judicial policing authority for the
members of the Central Investigations Authority
On 10th
October 2012, Justice Ministerial Decree no. 8937/2012 was issued, conferring
on technical members of the Central Investigations Authority the status of
agents of the judicial police in relation to documents under investigation or
confiscated property, as well as the power of arrest over suspects caught in
the act of committing crimes that constitute resistance or insult to those in
power whenever these occur within their jurisdiction, in the course of carrying
out their duties or because of them.
G. Issuing the 2012 Constitution[6]
On 26th
October 2012 the Constitution was issued, containing no provisions that might
have brought about a substantive shift in favour of development within the
Egyptian security sector, with the exception of the provision in Article 204
concerning the formation of a national anti-corruption agency (which did not
see the light of day for six months after the release of the Constitution); a
token reference in Article 205 to the Central Investigations Authority; and the
provision in Article 202 stipulating that the consent of the Shura Council must
be obtained for the President’s appointments to the heads of the oversight
authorities, and that those heads cannot be dismissed without the agreement of
a majority of the Shura Council’s members. However, the reality of the
political climate at that time - the overlap between the “secret organisation”
and the state, and the lack of attention paid to the principle of the
separation of powers, the result of a parliamentary majority composed entirely
of yes-men - meant that these provisions were nothing more than ink on paper,
with no bearing on reality whatsoever.
This is confirmed
by the Constitution’s other articles, such as Article 199 on the police, which
includes no stipulations that accord with the goals of the Revolution that
first began on National Police Day 2011; as well as by methods used in attempts
to get around Article 55, dealing with the right to vote and stand in
elections: when on 25th May 2013, the Supreme Constitutional Court
made use of its prior constitutional oversight of the Law on the Exercise of
Political Rights, returning it to the Shura Council on account of its violating
Article 1 of the Constitution in prohibiting members of the police and the
Armed Forces from voting in elections, the authorities sought to circumvent the
Court’s ruling by issuing a law banning these personnel from exercising that
right for a period of between five and ten years, for reasons of national
security. The same thing occurred in the case of Article 52, concerning the
freedom to establish unions: the Interior Ministry got around this by insisting
on the sufficiency of elections for personnel associations, a complete and
unconstitutional denial of the right to establish unions.
2. Policies and legislation during 2013
Year 2013 can be
divided into two periods, the first part being the second half of President Mohamed
Morsi’s first and only year in office: the early part of that year saw the
appointment of the fifth Interior Minister, and the transfer of legislative
authority to the Shura Council controlled by the Brotherhood majority and their
Islamist allies, according to the provisions of the 2012 Constitution. However,
this Council, like its predecessor (the People’s Council), failed to issue a
single piece of legislation relating to the reform of the security sector in Egypt. The
policies of the President and his government, too, were concerned solely with
buying the loyalties of the police force, in the service of the new regime’s
own purposes.
The second part of
this year, meanwhile, begins with the mass public demonstrations on and after
30th June in response to the Tamarrod campaign, which called
for the withdrawal of support from President Mohamed Morsi and the holding of
early elections; an intervention by the Armed Forces in order to remove the
President and abrogate the 2012 Constitution; the appointment of the head of
the Supreme Constitutional Court as the country’s interim President; the
dissolution of the Shura Council; and the appointment of new heads of
Intelligence, the Supervisory Authority, and Illegal Gains.
The developments
in the security sector, during this period of two eras or regimes, were as
follows:
A. Declaring a State of Emergency
in the cities along the Suez Canal
On 27th
January 2013, a State of Emergency and curfew were imposed on the cities along
the Suez Canal, on account of the bloody events outside Port Said prison that
claimed the lives of 46 citizens, shortly after the referral to the mufti of
death sentences given to 21 suspects in the killing of 74 supporters of Al Ahly
football club in the Stade Port Said on 1st February 2012.
B. Responding to the needs of police
personnel: arms, occupational rights, health- and social care
On 16th
February 2013, the Interior Ministry approved the provision of funds necessary
for 100,000 pistols with which to arm police personnel, so that they may carry
out their duties in combating highly dangerous criminal elements. This followed
a series of strikes, protests, and demonstrations on the part of policemen
demanding proper equipment and an improvement in working conditions as well as
in health- and social care, prompting the Interior Ministry to issue circular
no. 10/2013, which contained responses to nineteen of these demands[7].
C. The Public Prosecutor requests that
citizens carry out arrests
On 13th
March 2013, the Public Prosecutor called on citizens to exercise their right of
citizen’s arrest, as provided for in Article 37 of the Criminal Process Law[8],
indicating a lack of confidence in the police’s performance of their role in
confronting the growing number of protests by numerous social groups and
revolutionary movements. Question marks surrounded the reason why the Public
Prosecutor was engaging in an activity not covered by its duties, namely, the
raising of legal awareness.
D. President Mohamed Morsi courts the
police
On 15th
March 2013, President Mohamed Morsi visited the Presidency of the Central
Security Forces at the Central Security Training Camp, in an attempt to assuage
the anger of police officers and conscripts resulting from reports in media and
political circles that the Muslim Brotherhood was attempting to
'Brotherhoodise' the Interior Ministry, as well as the regime’s placement of
the police in renewed confrontation with the people. The President gave a
speech from inside the camp, broadcast live on television, in which he said: “This
is our third transition: the first, of which the police were a part, was the
transition of October 1973; the second, of which the police were also at the
very heart, was the transition of 25th January 2011; and God -
praised and exalted be He - has so willed it that 25th January is
also the National Day of the Police, and a monument to the sacrifices made by
the police against colonialism and against the occupier...”[9]
E. Holding elections for the Police
Officers’ and Policemen’s Clubs
During March 2013,
the Interior Ministry issued circular no. 370/2013, regarding the holding of
elections for the General Police Officers’ Club and branch clubs in the various
governorates. The elections were held on the 23rd and 24th
April 2013[10].
As a result of increased pressure from policemen below the rank of officer, the
Interior Ministry issued a similar decision regarding elections to the General
Policemen’s Club and its branches, as well as the Club for civilian personnel
within the Ministry[11].
It is noteworthy that the initially high standard of the demand - calling for
the establishment of a union for the police - should eventually be reduced to
merely calling for the holding of elections for police clubs. Some people have
attempted to justify this capitulation or display of powerlessness by pointing
to the experience of the Judges’ Club of Egypt, which plays a significant role
in defending the rights of judges. However, the reality of the situation
permits no comparison between the working conditions of judges and those of
police personnel: according to the letter of the Constitution, judges are
independent and cannot be dismissed, so an elected club may be perfectly
adequate for carrying out their wishes, but police employees form part of the
executive authority, and consequently are not independent and can be dismissed.
A constitutionally-protected labour organisation - and not an elected club - is
the only entity capable of defending the rights of police personnel and
organising their activities.
F. Removing powers of detention, arrest,
and investigation from the Emergency Law
On 2nd
June 2013, the Supreme
Constitutional Court ruled Article 3, Section 1 of
the Emergency Law unconstitutional, stripping that law completely of the power
of detention, as well as the powers of arrest or investigation beyond the
guidelines specified in the Criminal Process Law. Thus, the Egyptian Interior
Ministry and all elements of the security sector too were completely deprived
of the power of detention, and the powers of arrest and investigation beyond
the guidelines specified in the Criminal Process Law[12].
G. Establishing the Ministry of
Transitional Justice and National Reconciliation
On 16th
July 2013, the formation of the Transitional Government was announced, under
the leadership of Dr. Hazem al-Beblawi; this government included for the first
time a new ministry under the name of the Ministry of Transitional Justice and
National Reconciliation.
H. Declaring
a National State of Emergency
On
14th August 2013, the Acting President of the Republic - following
the approval of the Cabinet - issued a resolution declaring a state of
emergency in all parts of the Republic for a period of one month, and the
imposition of a curfew at night, following acts of violence which broke out as
police were dispersing the occupations of Rabia Square and al-Nahda Square. On
12th September 2013, the State of Emergency was extended for two additional
months, ending on 14th November 2013.*
I. Issuing a law
regulating the right to protests
On
24th November, Acting President Adly Mansour issued a resolution on
Law no. 107/2013, concerning the regulation of the right to public gatherings,
marches, and peaceful demonstrations[13].
Articles
12 and 13 of this Law contained new rules of engagement for the break-up of
demonstrations. This brought about the cancellation of Article 102, Section 3
of the Police Law, which permitted the break-up, through the use of weapons, of
demonstrations that pose a threat to public safety[14].
The
law contained a number of gradual steps that must be followed in order to
disperse illegal demonstrations, namely: issuing a verbal warning to disperse;
using water cannons; using tear gas; using batons; using warning shots; using
noise or smoke grenades; using rubber cartridges; and using non-rubber
cartridges. The main addition resulting from the creation of this law is the
introduction of broad and progressive rules of engagement, as opposed to the
general rules on the use of weaponry laid out in Article 102 of the Police Law,
granting the Interior Minister the right to regulate procedures by ministerial
decree. The law also acknowledged the right to a “public pulpit” in Article 15,
through each governorate’s designation of an area in which public gatherings,
marches, and peaceful demonstrations to express a view without posing a threat
to the authorities are permitted.
J. Finishing the
drafting of the 2014 Constitution[15]
On
2nd December 2013, the Committee of Fifty concluded their process of
making amendments to the 2012 Constitution. On 14th December, Acting
President Adly Mansour issued a decree designating the 14th and 15th
of January 2014 as days for a referendum on the Constitution and an examination
of its text. It became clear that although the 2014 Constitution introduced
Article 241 obliging the Council of Deputies to bring in a law on transitional
justice guaranteeing national truth, justice, and reconciliation, and the
compensation of victims according to international standards - which heralds,
however belatedly, the possibility of taking the first steps in a process of
reforming the security sector, particularly given the presence of the Ministry
of Transitional Justice in the current Cabinet - the remaining articles of the
Constitution relating to the security sector are responding to growing fears
resulting from the sharp religious and political polarisation in society: it
limits the rights of police personnel and members of the Supervisory Authority
and General Intelligence to vote in elections and form unions, since Article 76
on the formation of unions prohibits elements of the regime from establishing
such organisations, closing the door to the creation of unions for personnel
working in the security sector.
Furthermore,
Article 87 on candidacy and voting in elections permits exemption from this
duty in certain cases specified by law, granting constitutional legitimacy to
the final paragraph of Article 1 of the Law on the Exercise of Political Rights
which exempts personnel in the police and Armed Forces from voting in
elections.
Two
articles in the new Constitution are dedicated to the police: Article 206 is
broad and traditional in its description of the role of the police within
society, while Article 207 gives constitutional status to the Supreme Police
Council and provides for its cooperation with the Interior Minister, as well as
requiring consent to be sought from the Council on proposed laws concerning the
police.
Responding
to the danger posed by armed terrorist groups, Article 237 on confronting
terrorism was introduced, containing provisions on the law’s regulation of
rules and procedures for the fight against terrorism.
The
National Anti-Corruption Commission brought in by the 2012 Constitution was
abolished, and Article 218 lays out the state’s commitment to fighting
corruption by means of a national strategy overseen by the regulatory
authorities.
Article
215 further states that both the Central Investigations Department and the
Supervisory Authority are considered part of the regulatory authorities, and
Article 219 limits the role of the Central Investigations Department to
overseeing the public finances of the State and legal persons, as well as
reviewing the implementation of the State budget and independent budgets.
K. The Cabinet
declares the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist group*
The
suicide bombing in front of the Dakahlya Security Directorate building in the
early hours of 24th December 2012 brought about the deaths of
sixteen martyrs and the injury of over one hundred and thirty people, most of them
policemen and the remainder civilians; the Director of Security was seriously
injured in the incident and two bureau directors were themselves martyred. The
explosion also led to the partial destruction of the Security Directorate and
neighbouring buildings. Following this incident, on 25th December
2013, the Cabinet issued a resolution declaring the Muslim Brotherhood a
terrorist group and organisation following Article 86 of the Penal Code**, with all the consequences this
entails, the most important of them being: passing the sentences legally
prescribed for terrorist offences on anyone who participates in the activities
of the Brotherhood or its organisation, or who promotes them in speech, in
writing, or in any other manner, and on anyone who funds its activities;
passing legally-prescribed sentences on anyone who joins either the Brotherhood
or its organisation or who continues to be a member of either following the
publication of this announcement; notifying other Arab states which are party
to the 1998 Agreement on Combating Terrorism of this resolution; and charging
the police and armed forces with the defence of public institutions, on
condition that the police assume the task of defending universities and
protecting students from the group’s terrorist activities.
The
reality is that this belated resolution could engender legal problems if it is
not transformed into a comprehensive anti-terror law, as there may be attempts
to strike it down before the courts of the State Assembly. It is necessary
therefore to make use of the experiences of developed nations in the fight
against terror, by passing a law that allows the construction of a list of
terrorist organisations, and a list of states and organisations that sponsor
it, and that permits the security forces to take measures to thwart terrorist
acts before they occur. Although Article 86 of the Penal Code defines
“terrorist crime” and specifies appropriate penalties, this punitive framework
does not correspond to the investigatory and evidence-gathering process
appropriate to the special nature of this crime, basing the policy that governs
the fight against terrorism on a reaction to crimes that occur, rather than
pre-emptive confrontation to stop terrorist acts before they happen.
Section Two: Redefining relationships between actors
in society
The
distinguishing feature of 2013 was its union of two “eras” or regimes, with a
popular revolution between them, justified and motivated by the melting-down of
all of society’s actors in a continuous process of redefining their
relationships towards each other and towards society, starting from the
assumption that the rules which governed those relationships had become
confused and dysfunctional under the pressure of the revolutionary act and
needed to be rearranged according to the new balance of power.
In
the following paragraphs we shall review this process of redefining
relationships among a number of actors in society, and its effects on
relationships in the security sector in detail or more generally.
1. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
The
Military Council lacked the political or moral will - during the year in which
it held both legislative and executive authority, or the additional half-year
in which it held only executive authority - to acknowledge the necessity of
reorganising and restructuring the security sector in Egypt. The
Council, being one of the pillars of the old regime, took a sycophantic
approach to the Revolution of 25th January, anxiously insisting that
the revolutionaries rebuild and reorganise all the institutions upon which the
former regime depended in maintaining its hold on power; at the heart of which,
of course, were the security and military institutions themselves. Thus, the
Military Council kept the security sector as it was to protect it from the
hormones of change which, had they taken hold, would have spread to the other
institutions, with the military establishment first among them.
The
presidential term of Mohamed Morsi, which lasted for one year, led to a redefinition
of the relationship between the military and security establishments, as they
both found themselves fighting in the same trench to preserve the institutions
of the State from being subverted in the interests of the Muslim Brotherhood to
which the President belonged, or those of the rest of the Islamist movement,
chief among them the Salafists. With the outbreak of the Revolution of 30th
June 2013, in which the two institutions fought in the same trench as the
majority of the people, the fear was once again confirmed that any radical
changes in the security establishment or the security sector would necessarily
extend to the military establishment, which lives in fear of a foreign
conspiracy to break up the Egyptian army following the collapse suffered by the
Iraqi army, and the splintering that has weakened the Syrian army. This fear
will remain a scarecrow that contributes to the increased resistance on the
part of the military establishment to any radical changes that may affect the
security sector in Egypt,
seeing it as a partner who must be depended on now and in the near future to
overcome likely regional dangers.
2. Political
Islam
The
coming of the Islamist movement to power in Egypt within the executive and
legislative authorities presented it with a true test of its ability or desire
to carry out due reforms within the security sector. The movement’s sycophantic
policies and non-existent legislation confirmed the extent of its lack of
political and moral will to carry out any reforms in the security forces;
starting from its intellectual point of reference, the attempt to reshape the
identity of society according to extreme and radical Islamising policies that
conflict with the moderate nature of the Egyptian situation, which guaranteed a
confrontation with the majority of society, and seeking to impose those
policies either through oppressive use of the security apparatus, or through a
reliance on the terror practised by the armed groups that form part of this
movement.
Therefore,
the Islamist movement initially cooperated with the police, including the
oppressive creed and methods it had inherited, seeing it as the ideal force
with which to implement its goal of oppressing the people in preparation for
the Islamisation of society; but the involvement of the police in new
confrontations with the people, while the ashes of the previous series (after
28th January 2011) were still hot, led first to unrest and then
rebellion within the ranks of the police, which the Islamist movement
interpreted as evidence of a continued loyalty to the previous regime that
would require the force’s subversion, splintering, and weakening.
Hence,
it is clear that the redefinition of the relationship between the Islamist
movement and the security sector in Egypt, in the light of the terrorist acts
directed against the institutions and personnel of the security forces by armed
groups affiliated with that movement, can best be described - now and in the
future - as one of “strategic hostility”, a rupture in the mentality of that
movement that makes it unlikely to accept the idea of carrying out any reforms
to the police force, preferring instead to purge and damage it through
subversion and splintering, in preparation for constructing a new force from
loyal elements in the event of a return to power, after the pattern of the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard.
3. Terrorist
groups
The
security climate following the collapse of the police on 28th
January 2011 was permissive to an unprecedented degree, leaving the door wide
open to a flourishing of trade through the tunnels along the border region
between Egypt and Gaza, through which both people and goods could pass in both
directions under the nose of the state. Then the Libyan revolution, and its
military ramifications, led to the birth of a busy trade in heavy weaponry
which found an ideal playing-field in the absence of policing and the
stockpiling of arms; all it needed was players. Ironically, it was the Military
Council who were the first to furnish those players from the prison supply
through a series of unexpected and incomprehensible amnesties, raising a series
of questions that may remain unanswered.
The
series of amnesties began on 1st March 2011, less than three weeks
after the fall of the Mubarak regime, when the Supreme Council of the Armed
Forces issued a decree releasing the Brotherhood leader Khairat al-Shater on
health grounds, alongside another Brotherhood leader, the businessman Hassan
Malik, the two of them having served almost four and a quarter years of their seven-year
sentence for military crimes in case no. 2/2007, known in the media as the
“al-Azhar militias” case.
On
11th March 2011, the Military Council issued a decree releasing
Abbud al-Zumar and his cousin Tariq al-Zumar, who were serving a heavy prison
sentence, following their conviction by the Supreme Military Court and the
“emergency” State Security Criminal Court in the assassination of the late
president Sadat. The term of the sentence handed down on Abbud al-Zumar was 65
years, and on Tariq al-Zumar 47 years.
On
17th March 2011, 60 political prisoners were released, among them
Muhammad al-Zawahiri, sentenced to death in absentia; he is the brother
of Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the al-Qaida second-in-command.
On
2nd November 2011, the Military Council granted an amnesty to 334
people who had been sentenced by absolute decree of the military judiciary; the
decree was published with no names on the Military Council’s Facebook page, no.
77 of the Council’s communications to the people[16].
President
Mohamed Morsi, unsurprisingly, continued the series of amnesties in order to
populate the field with players, issuing over the course of his term
presidential decrees granting amnesty to 755 prisoners, among them eight
members of the Muslim Brotherhood leadership who were suspects in the
“International Muslim Brotherhood Organisation” case, and 55 members of
al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah and Islamic Jihad, of whom three had been convicted of
the assassination of the late President of Egypt Anwar Sadat.
The
presidential amnesties also included 16 prisoners who had been arrested between
2010 and 2012 on suspicion of smuggling heavy weaponry from Libya into the
Sinai.[17]
A
situation riddled with security holes; the ready availability of weaponry; the
release of extremist leaders; the large number of gaps in security along
borders with regimes or political movements belonging to the Islamist tendency
to the east, south, and west; as well as political and financial support from
Turkey and Qatar for the International Muslim Brotherhood Organisation; all
these indicate that the redefinition of the relationship between terrorist
groups and actors in society has taken a course which shows those groups to be
engaging in terrorism on behalf of others, to the benefit of the Islamist movement’s
political wings, in order to dissolve the political structure, cripple the
state, and sow discord among the governing institutions, leading to the
neutralisation or marginalisation of those institutions, and opening the way
for upstarts with guns, funding, and power to reorder that structure and render
it utterly subservient.
The
confrontation between the police and terrorist groups in the Egyptian context
will not be resolved any time soon, but rather will drag on for years; perhaps
not in the same bloody fashion as in Iraq, but most probably in an interrupted
and discontinuous manner, like a virus that flares up and recedes, to burden
the state and obstruct its work - but it will not, God willing, cause it to
fall.
4. Police
coalitions
It
is perhaps too early to be completely sure which groups or individuals were
responsible for the idea of forming police coalitions, which emerged onto the
scene in the weeks following the Revolution of 25th January. The
spontaneous urge to self-organise in times of crisis is a natural human
instinct that cannot be ignored for the sake of conspiracy theory. However, the
concerted effort to exploit this instinct by an apparatus with power,
expertise, and training may not be entirely free of behind-the-scenes activity,
and this cannot be ignored either.
The
reality is that the Egyptian police, which had been suffering from severe
occupational difficulties prior to the Revolution of 25th January as
a result of the forced militarisation of its modus operandi, its
alienation from international norms on working hours, and its acceptance of
military justice for its personnel, was completely overcome at the first sign
of revolution and lost all professional discipline, leading to its collapse.
The police leadership, which had previously ruled with an iron fist, ceased to
be obeyed, and anyone who is not obeyed has no effective authority.
During
this period, a number of police coalitions emerged, the most important of them
in terms of longevity and influence being the four we shall explore in greater
detail below.
A. The “Officers,
but Honourable” Coalition (now the Honourable Officers Coalition)[18]
This
coalition came into existence in Tahrir
Square; on the 1st February 2011, to be
precise, when its founder Col. Muhammad Abdulrahman Yusuf, officer in the
Dakhalya Security Directorate, announced its creation during his time in the
Square. The pivotal idea on which the Coalition has been based since its
founding has been the question of how to rebuild and restructure the Egyptian Interior
Ministry and police force, responding to the aims of the Revolution of 25th
January, which chose the annual National Police Day celebrations to confront
the police state, in which the security forces worked hand-in-hand with the
regime.
The
Coalition’s interest in popularising the idea of a project to reorganise and
reconstruct the Interior took precedence over any concern for the structure of
the Coalition or the number of its members, starting from the belief that any
essential change to the structure of the police in Egypt is a matter that
requires political will at the very top of the pyramid of authority. Readiness
to promote and embark on this project in an atmosphere of revolution,
therefore, may be a matter of exerting pressure on that political will in order
to make it submit to the direction of popular will.
The
Coalition set up its page on the social networking site Facebook on 7th
March 2011, and began by writing about its project to reorganise and
restructure the Interior Ministry; then on 7th May 2011, it
presented a paper detailing its vision under the title “Reorganising the
Interior Ministry”[19]
at the First Egypt Conference (“The People Defend Their Revolution”) organised
by the Egyptian National Council under the leadership of the revolutionary
activist Dr. Mamduh Hamza.
The
value of this conference was that a number of human rights organisations were
brought into the project as a result of the paper: the Egyptian Human Rights
Organisation, the Egyptian Personal Rights Initiative, the Hisham Mubarak Law
Centre, as well as a number of independent figures in the Revolution. A serious
and fruitful workshop was held, and on 24th October 2011, the
National Police Reconstruction Initiative (“A Police for the Egyptian People”)
was announced during a press conference at the Leadership and Management
Development Centre.[20]
Copies
of the Initiative were sent to all relevant parties, including the Military
Council, the People’s Assembly, the Shura Council, the Prime Minister’s office,
the Interior Ministry, the Ministry of Justice, governmental research centres,
etc.
Requests
for discussion with members of the Defence and National Security Committee in
the People’s Assembly, the office of the Political Affairs Adviser to the
President of the Republic, and the Consultant Minister for Justice Ahmed Makki
were also met.
The
Initiative also received attention from the United States Institute of Peace,
which used it as the basis for a study published on the Institute’s website on
1st October 2012 entitled “The Politics of Security Sector Reform in
Egypt”, considering it “the most comprehensive of the initiatives” and saying
that it “raised the level of the discussion around security sector reform”.[21]
The
Shura Council’s Human Rights Committee also took an interest in the Initiative,
dedicating a whole section to it under the heading of “Proposed social
initiatives and solutions” in its report of 8th November 2012,
entitled “Strategies for Developing Security Performance following the
Revolution of 25th January”.[22]
The
members of the Initiative made a commitment to develop it in response to
changes to the security situation in Egypt; the fourth edition of the
Initiative contained additions relating to transitional justice programmes as a
working guide for the Ministry of Transitional Justice which was established
following the Revolution of 30th June 2013.
On
13th July 2013, the members of the “Police for the Egyptian People”
Initiative requested a meeting with Dr. Hazem al-Beblawi, the Prime Minister
tasked with the formation of the interim government; the meeting revolved
around a presentation of the Initiative’s ideas for the reorganisation of the
Interior Ministry, as well as the need to begin implementing transitional
justice programmes that allow the uncovering of facts and compensation of
victims.[23]
The
Coalition changed its name following the Revolution of 30th June,
becoming the Honourable Officers Coalition, without the word “but”, in
recognition of the patriotic role played by all Egyptian police personnel during
the events of that revolution.
The
Coalition believes that the Egyptian Revolution will not be able to satisfy the
aims of Egyptian citizens unless the first steps towards change are targeted at
reform of the Egyptian police, which has belatedly sided with the people, but
which still lacks much that would make it a modern, professional police force
with a modern foundation, structure, and methods that would prevent it from
once again becoming ensnared in an alliance with the regime.
B. The General
Police Officers’ Coalition (now the General Police Officers’ Club)[24]
The
formation of the General Police Officers’ Coalition, which emerged from a
general meeting at the Police Officers’ Club in Nasser City,
was announced on 4th March 2011. It became clear that the Coalition,
which from its inception held its meetings in important police locations under
the supervision of high-ranking figures in the Interior Ministry, was not
independent to the degree required of such organisations. Of course, it is not
possible to probe the intentions of the officers who founded the Coalition in
order to assess the extent of their independence, but one can be sure that the
majority of them aspired to create an independent entity to represent police
officers, away from any interference by the Interior Ministry, but that
Ministry’s experience in penetrating organisations and subverting some of their
elements may have allowed it to put a foot in the Coalition’s door. Moreover,
weak administrative control of officers following the Revolution of 25th
January has led the Ministry to try and replace administrative authority with
moral authority, by making a show of allowing officers to represent themselves
while using this façade to achieve its own goals, which necessarily conflict
with the choices of a broad section of officers.
A
click of the button on an Internet search for “General Police Officers’
Coalition” may help clear up the conflicting positions that lead the Coalition
to convene shared conferences[25],
or to allow its views to accord with those of the Ministry to such an extent
that it was dissolved on 24th May 2011 on account of its success in
“achieving a sufficient number of the aims it had hoped for, and [its] work to
extend bridges of trust to the different civil society organisations and the
revolutionaries of 25th January, rebuilding confidence between the
people and the police.”[26]
This position was then reversed when the Interior Minister suspended the
Coalition’s press spokesman and another of its officers for inciting police
personnel to rebel against the Ministry[27],
and again when the Coalition became trusted partners of the government, to the
extent that on 26th November 2011 Prime Minister Kamal al-Ganzouri
met with members of the Coalition and charged them with nominating a new
Interior Minister to replace Major General Mansour Issawy.[28]
Relations between the Coalition and the Ministry once again grew frosty when
the latter made accusations of a conspiracy to rig the elections for the Police
Officers’ Club, which replaced the Coalition as soon as the results were
announced on 26th April 2012.[29]
The
reality is that the Coalition’s muddled and dubious history, which raises
questions as to whether it is really independent enough to honestly represent
officers, or is just another of the Ministry’s tools to control them, can be
summarised as showing that it always operated in the belief that the Interior
Ministry alone can carry out the necessary process of restructuring itself,
without any partners, and that in consequence it saw any intervention by civil
society or human rights organisations to evaluate or appraise this process as
an attack on Egyptian national security.
On
the other hand, this Coalition did provide a unifying voice for various
tendencies within the body of officers, something which became clearly apparent
during the general meeting of the Police Officers’ Club (the Coalition’s
successor) on 15th June 2013, when it was announced that no party or
political headquarters would receive police guards, and that there would be no
opposition to peaceful demonstrations during the events of 30th
June, and calls were repeatedly issued to society at large to bring the rule of
the Brotherhood leader to an end.[30]
But
the future of the coalition that became a club, having aspired to be a union,
still vacillates between independence from and dependence on the Interior
Ministry. This is perhaps confirmed by the statements published on the Facebook
page of the General Police Officers’ Club on 17th June 2013, among
which were the following:
“As
a result of the obstinate refusal on the part of some elements within the
Ministry to cooperate with the Club as an elected body representing all
officers; the obstinacy of some of those with whom we were working to draw up
the constitution of the Club, which we have now finished; the express refusal
of much of the leadership to acknowledge the idea of the Club at all; and the
fact that all of the Club’s demands on behalf of the Ministry and the body of
officers have been met with delays and procrastination, leading to feelings of
disappointment in view of the many legal and disciplinary channels we have
tried; we make no secret of the fact that there are those who would benefit
from the destruction of elected clubs and the expulsion of ourselves and our
colleagues, and we have arrived at the question “what's the club for, exactly?”[31]
In
sum, it appears that the Police Officers’ Club, the successor to the General
Coalition, was penetrated by the Interior Ministry in its earliest stages,
clearly making it an enticing morsel to the extent that it has ended up issuing
this sort of statement, and showing that entities which are not born
independent will be weaker in their future confrontations with subterfuge.
C. The General
Policemen’s Coalition (now the General Policemen’s Club)
The
formation of the General Policemen’s Coalition was announced during March 2011,
and its Facebook page appeared on 22nd March 2011. The relative
strength of this Coalition indicates a high degree of influence, far higher than
that of the General Police Officers’ Coalition, by virtue of the number of
policemen - some 380,000 - compared to the number of police officers, which
does not exceed 40,000.
The
Coalition has been able to muster policemen together in order to express their
occupational demands through strikes, demonstrations, occupations, chaining up
police departments, disrupting operations at ports and airports, and of course
gathering in front of the Ministry and hanging a sign on the entrance reading Closed
for cleaning, as well as protesting to members of the leadership, in a few
cases going as far as verbal or physical assault.
In
truth, the same features that accompanied the establishment of the Officers’
Coalition were also evident from the moment of the creation of the Policemen’s
Coalition. One might say that the Ministry’s power to infiltrate the
Policemen’s Coalition was even greater, beginning by exploiting the limited
income of most policemen to subvert some of its elements and using them to
penetrate the Coalition, influence its direction, or at the very least to try
and take control of it.
Although
the Coalition has fulfilled some of the occupational goals set out in Law
25/2012 issued on 20th June 2012, hopes of establishing a union to
defend the rights of policemen and regulate their activities have foundered as
a result of the Ministry’s power to infiltrate the Coalition and reduce it to
merely a club, for which elections could not be agreed before the step of
announcing elections for the Officers’ Club had been taken at the beginning of
April 2013, motivating policemen to ask that they be treated in the same way.
The notion of establishing a union was abandoned in a rush to succeed with this
club.
Even
circular no. 10/2013 concerned with responding to the occupational, healthcare,
and social demands of policemen, which was issued in February 2013, remains for
the most part nothing more than ink on paper, with none of its provisions
having been implemented in reality according to clear and precise procedures
that would make it a guaranteed right, rather than simply a grant that can be
concealed from policemen who are not ill.
In
fact, the General Policemen’s Coalition was generally Revolutionary in its
make-up, much more so than the General Officers’ Union,
perhaps by virtue of its influential membership numbers, and also perhaps of
the fact that policemen had no occupational privileges or high-ranking
positions to lose compared with police officers. As a consequence, their
movements were freer and unencumbered by the dread of losing particular perks.
In
spite of all that, the Coalition, for all its strength, has not been able to
exert pressure on the Interior Ministry, which succeeded in passing a phrase in
Article 76 of the 2014 Constitution granting constitutional legitimacy to the
refusal to allow the establishment of unions in government institutions, to the
extent that on 1st December 2013, the Coalition called on the
families of policemen to vote “no” to the Constitution.*
D. The Bearded
Officers’ Coalition
The
issue of “bearded police officers” first came into the spotlight at the
beginning of 2012, when a number of these officers were referred to the
Disciplinary Council for growing their beards in contravention of police
disciplinary rules on cleanliness. Although the Disciplinary Council was due to
hold its first session on 22nd April 2012, the Interior Ministry
took the decision before that date to refer the officers elsewhere before that
date as a precaution in the public interest, leading it to bring a total of 26
lawsuits before the State Council’s Courts of Administrative Justice, which in
a number of cases ruled that the Ministry had acted unjustly in referring the
officers before the publication of Disciplinary Council findings. The officers
themselves, however, deceived the public by asserting that these rulings
granted them the right to return to work still wearing their beards, in spite
of the fact that the rulings did not touch on the original matter, but rather
were limited to the question of the validity of precautionary referral in
tandem with referral to the Disciplinary Council.
Meanwhile,
a page was created on Facebook on 4th February 2012 entitled “I am a
bearded police officer”[32].
Another page named “Bearded army and police officers of Egypt” was
created on 15th February 2012.
While
this issue was brewing, the Interior Ministry had sought a fatwa from the
Egyptian Ifta Court on 14th February 2012, on the question of
whether a government body like the police was justified in requiring police
officers or personnel not to wear beards, as this conflicts with governmental
standards of living, as well as the necessity of requiring them to abide by
orders issued by their superiors in accordance with the law. The Ifta
Court confirmed that it had for hundreds of years been the custom of those
serving in the police and army to shave their beards, and that whoever wished
to enter a police college had to respect the choices of the police
administration in this matter, on account of the jurisprudential value of
custom. The choice of the police administration here was “permitted” according
to Islamic law because it is a matter over which there is a difference of
opinion, and anyone who changes his opinion is free to move to an authority
other than the police. On this basis, the Ministry issued circular no. 3 on 25th
February 2012, stating the following:
“In
order that the Ministry can ensure its employees maintain the standards of
hygiene and appearance required by police work, officers and personnel are
obliged to conform to decisions and rulings issued in this matter and take care
over their personal appearance, by cutting their hair and shaving their beards
in keeping with standards of official dress, thereby preserving hygiene and
neatness, as well as the respect of the public for the police force.”[33]
In
spite of this, the issue of bearded officers received a great deal of public
attention, as a result of constant and increasingly forceful attempts to push
the story to centre-stage: the Coalition held public conferences in the
governorates of Suez, Ismailiyyah, Port Said, Qalyubia, Faiyum, Qena, Minya,
Asyut, Kafr el-Sheikh, and Sohag, as well as demonstrations in front of the
President’s al-Ittihadiyah Palace and the Abidine Palace and a sit-in outside
the offices of the Interior Ministry that began on 26th February
2013 and continued for more than one hundred days[34].
On
25th May 2013, the Presidency’s Administrative Court in the State
Council issued its ruling in a lawsuit brought by twelve bearded officers, in
which it upheld the Interior Ministry’s decision to refer the officers as a
precaution in the public interest, basing itself on a fatwa from the Egyptian Ifta
Court on the matter, and decided that the precautionary referral did not in
this case constitute a disciplinary action, and that it could therefore be
combined with any other disciplinary action[35].
On
29th July 2013, the Interior Ministry’s media department published
on Facebook news of the return of four of the bearded officers to work after having
shaved off their beards; this was confirmed by the Bearded Officers’ Coalition[36].
In
fact, the issue of bearded policemen and officers is the subject of fierce
contention between the Salafist movement and the Muslim Brotherhood, in terms
of the attempt to control the Egyptian
State termed “the
Islamist project”.
Consequently,
one might call bearded policemen and officers a Salafist “Trojan Horse”, which
the movement wishes to introduce into the body of the Interior Ministry to
spread Salafist ideas among the ranks of the police and establish a Salafist
front within the police force to compete with the Muslim Brotherhood for
control, in preparation for extending it to the other parts of the security
apparatus and the armed forces[37].
There
need be no contradiction between affirming the right of policemen and officers
to conduct their personal lives in any way that does not conflict with the
nature of their work, and the necessity of rejecting attempts to deceive public
opinion and convey the impression that beards are symbols of the good character
of the policemen who wear them, when the facts indicate that there are many
irreligious acts often committed by beard-wearers. As a result, a belief in
personal freedoms and their defence need not prevent us from casting doubt on
the motives of the Bearded Police Officers’ Coalition, starting with the
considerable support it receives from the Salafist movement, affording it the
opportunity to hold numerous public conferences in many Egyptian provinces, in
spite of the fact that the question of growing a beard in emulation of the
Prophet (peace be upon him) has been addressed by both the Azhar and the Ifta
Court, which both agree that growing a beard is neither an act of belief (aqida)
nor of worship (ibada) but is instead one of the customs that are left
to the freedom of the individual, making it a matter of politics rather than
religion.
The
policy of shuffling paper to conceal the true political aims behind the issue
of bearded policemen and officers, part of the public and private struggle
between the Salafist movement and the Muslim Brotherhood for control of the
institutions of the Egyptian State, including the police, confirms the
importance of confronting these attempts to infiltrate State institutions and twist
their loyalties towards rival political groups, leading to their break-up or
collapse, or to transform them into sectarian militias that neglect the
national interest and prefer instead to serve narrow sectarian or
party-political goals.
ـ
ـ ـ ـ ـ ـ ـ ـ ـ
It
is clear from the redefinition of relationships between police coalitions and
other actors in society that the freedom of movement afforded to regime
elements by the Revolution was far from collaborative; it provided an
opportunity to form pressure groups and allowed light to be shone on many dark
spots in the Egyptian security sector, particularly the police, on account of
its numerical strength and distribution throughout all parts of the country.
One cannot be sure of exactly how spontaneous and unprompted by government
interference the establishment of most of these coalitions were, nor can it be
ignored that most of them have by their very existence provided the Interior
Ministry with moral control to compensate for the weakening of its administrative
control following the Revolution; nevertheless, they have constituted a chronic
headache for this stubborn Ministry, which had grown used to dysfunctional
working principles based on yeasaying and merely “following orders”, and they
have been able to force it to accept new working relationships of which
negotiation is one of the constituent elements, and whose new modus operandi
may well be rivalry between the highest authorities and the broader base.
However,
it could also be said that those police coalitions which wagered on the
possibility that change could be effected by the base through applying pressure
at the top have achieved institutional goals that contribute to an improvement
in working conditions, but that they will not be able to put an end to the
chronic festering problems and negative aspects that have distorted policing
and placed it in the service of power, influence, or money; whereas the police
coalition that bet on the necessity of confronting the root of the disease
through the construction of a programme guaranteeing reorganisation and
restructuring within the police force, although it has suffered through a
galling lack of political will on the part of government after government and
regime after regime, will persevere in its quest to build a modern and
professional police force until its projects and programs are implemented,
challenging political apathy, governmental idiocy, and the vested interests of
those in power.
5. State and
Revolutionary institutions
Blockade of the Supreme Constitutional Court, Blockade of the Judges’ Club, Blockade of Media City,
Assault on the al-Azhar sheikhs, Attack on Saint Mark’s Cathedral, the
“seat of the Papacy”, in Abbassia, Assassination of Egyptian soldiers,
Police in new confrontations with the people...
These
were some of the broad headlines referring to events that occupied the
spotlight in 2013 and before, during the term of President Mohamed Morsi. All
these events opened cracks between the Presidency, the Muslim Brotherhood, and
the Islamist movement on the one hand, and State authorities and institutions
on the other. These institutions began to feel they were being targeted and
infiltrated or undermined by the Presidency and the government, or threatened
with invasion, arson, and destruction by the President’s allies and political
followers.
As
for the people, the Revolution - which rapidly sobered up from the intoxication
of having its first elected civilian president following the shock of the
dictatorial constitutional declaration on 21st November 2012 - had
to create its own institutions, establishing the National Salvation Front as an
umbrella organisation for the civilian movement on 22nd November
2012, offering a political reaction, in defence of the goals of the revolution,
to the paranoia of the Islamist movement.
But
the persistent acts of violence committed by the militias and allies of the
authorities: blockading the Constitutional Court on 2nd December
2012, breaking up the occupation of al-Ittihadiyyah on 5th December
2012, then blockading the Media City from 7th to 24th
December 2012 - all this indicated that the Revolution should establish another
institution to react to this organised and savage violence; this time using not
politics but the same weapon: violence.
Thus,
on 25th January 2013, the second anniversary of the outbreak of
revolution, the Black Bloc group appeared, masked and clad in black,
threatening the Islamist movement with its own tools: weapons.
However,
the indifference to bloodshed that pushed the public prosecutor on 13th
March 2013 to call on citizens to exercise their right to perform arrests as
stipulated in Article 37 of the Criminal Process Law; the attempt by allies of
the President to assault the sheikhs of al-Azhar on 3rd April 2013;
the attack on Saint Mark’s Orthodox Cathedral, the seat of the papacy, in
Abbassia on 7th April 2013; then the “million march” on 19th
April 2013 to demand the purification of the judiciary; all this roused the
Revolution to establish an institution that would not react politically or
through force of arms, but instead would use political action fortified
by the will of the people. Before long, there appeared in the heart of the
Square on 26th April 2013 a popular campaign to withdraw support
from President Morsi, the Tamarrod campaign.
This
campaign was based on a simple idea, the collection of signatures from citizens
on a form in which they agreed to become members of an Egyptian popular
collective for the withdrawal of support from the President. This institution
of a peaceful, popular revolution spread like wildfire, taking hold of official
party-political and State institutions. The sight of policemen and officers
being continuously filmed by the media as they signed the Tamarrod form
demonstrated a redefinition of the relationship between the security sector and
revolutionary actors in society. The circulation of the forms in the offices of
official State institutions, too, was a kind of redefinition of the
relationship between these institutions and the Revolutionary forces.
The
Tamarrod campaign was a revolutionary group that embraced the majority
of people opposed to the rule of political Islam, and around which all the
State institutions who sensed danger then gathered: the military, the police,
the judiciary, the media, cultural institutions, al-Azhar, and the Church all
rallied around the majority of the people openly on 30th June 2013,
a year to the day after the President’s rule began.
*
Section Three: Obstacles on the path to reform
Although
the Egyptian Revolution contributed to a redefinition of the relationships
among actors in society, and their relationship to society itself, there remain
various stumbling-blocks on the path that could present obstacle to reform in
the security sector.
Four
of the issues which have surfaced, and which could hinder or prevent any steps
towards a process of rebuilding the security sector that is accepted by the
authorities and by the people, are the following:
1. Heightened
internal resistance to institutional reform within the police establishment, as
a result of fears over fragmentation and disunity at work
Veiled
internal resistance constitutes one of the most serious phenomena confronting
any institutional reform process, and contributing to a rise in the level of
this internal resistance are fears brought about by the attempts of the former
regime to disrupt the police force and subvert it in the service of the
Brotherhood’s own political ends, or those of the Salafist movement to do the
same, as well as attempts to fragment or bring down institutions under the
influence of the armed terrorist wings of Islamist movements.
Regrettably, the
security leadership - seeking to avoid its responsibilities or halt reform -
has translated these fears into the language of “chronic margins”, increasing
the degree of veiled internal resistance to any change within the security
establishment, even if demanded by society, under the phobia-like justification
of defending national security or the ruling institutions.
2. Lack of interest
in police reform on the part of societal administration as a result of despair
and disappointment, and acceptance of the logic of security accompanied by
repression and humiliation as better than the total absence of security
The
security vacuum following 25th January 2011, resulting from a
failure of police discipline as an automatic reaction to the collapse of the
“fear barrier” among citizens; from the inability of the police to work in any
climate other than one of disrespect for human rights and the rule of law; and
from the outbreak of bloody armed confrontations in neighbouring countries that
resulted in an influx of weapons on the streets, all led to a frightening
decline in security, and in this state the public were faced with a dilemma:
either accept a long-term absence of security, or submit to its quick return
accompanied by the same incidents of repression and humiliation as before.
The
continued decline in policing leads therefore to reluctance on the part of the
societal administration, which is generally supportive of security reform,
stemming from growing feelings of despair and disappointment, and this in turn
leads to a pressing need for security which takes precedence over police
performance and the extent of its commitment to human rights and the rule of
law.
3. Dilemma of
police reform in the light of sacrifices made by police to combat terrorism
The
Islamist movement relied, during its term in power, on the movements of its
armed wings to sow terror within society and its institutions, as well as among
political opponents. This led to a wave of terrorist incidents, which grew in
severity with the collapse of the Islamist project under the marching of the
citizenry in the Egyptian street; the police were thrown into wild confrontation
with these terrorist groups and obliged to make tremendous sacrifices,
represented by the growing column of martyrs that even now shows no sign of
reaching an end. Unfortunately, this bitter confrontation with terrorism
brought to the surface a number of mistaken justifications for delaying the
issue of police reorganisation at that time, so as not to hinder the efforts
and sacrifices made in the confrontation with terrorism.
In
light of this dilemma, arising from the heavy burden of sacrifices made by the
police in the fight against terror, it becomes difficult to promote a number of
essential principles that acknowledge the construction of a police force
according to standards that adhere to human rights and the rule of law to be
the most significant first step towards success in any current or future
confrontation with terrorism; in that such a confrontation should not embrace
any illegal practices or measures that might lead to lasting animosity between
the police and any of the factions accused of supporting terrorism, incubating
generations of terrorists. It is important therefore to legislate for any
confrontation with terrorist groups, or states and organisations that sponsor
terror, through a comprehensive anti-terror law that would represent a legitimate
tool in this confrontation.
4. The double bias
– siding with the public, and “establishment fanaticism”
The
experience of the Egyptian revolution presents us with a clear model against
which this double bias may be explained. For while the police took the side of
the citizenry during the “rectifying wave” of the 25th January
revolution on 30th June 2013 and steered it to victory over the
regime, leading to the formation of new bridges of trust between society and
the police that could have been capitalised upon to move towards the creation
of a modern, professional police force, responding to the values and challenges
of the age, the mentality of “establishment fanaticism”, in a negative sense,
treated this newly-acquired confidence either as an invitation to drop the
subject of reorganising and restructuring the police, or to single out the
police force as bearing sole responsibility for reforming the security
apparatus without any participation from society.
The
plague of “establishment fanaticism” has therefore led to an inability to make
good use of the confidence gained by the police as a result of their support
for the people, and the waste of an opportunity to begin the process of
reforming the security apparatus at the lowest possible cost. It has led also
to the security establishment’s turning in upon itself and engaging with
society as a kind of faction concerned primarily with preserving its
interests and the interests of its members, rather than as a state apparatus
owned by the people and charged with carrying out specific functions within the
framework of a strict commitment to the law.
*
General Review
The
Arab Spring in Egypt
led not only to a blossoming of flowers, but also to the emergence of a number
of evil forces from their lairs.
The
country awaited a fierce summer that would scorch everyone with the fires of
revolution, and expose faces leprously scarred by extremism and fundamentalism,
while those more moderate would grow as tanned as the soil of Egypt herself.
Though
the prison doors swing shut on two Presidents, tens of ministers, and hundreds
of regime supporters ground beneath the boot-heels of the people, Egypt is as it
was: its institutions have not changed, nor have its leaders, and the mood of
most of its people has changed dramatically.
Egypt never knew the agricultural feudal system in its European guise,
but rather that of the Mamluks and Ottomans; Egyptian bureaucratic feudalism,
however, was entirely of its own making. For many centuries, since even the
time of King Menes of Upper and Lower Egypt,
state institutions were grounded in the land, and although they always served
the ruler, they were stronger by virtue of their longevity: rulers are
fleeting, while institutions endure. They took on their own culture and
traditions, and loyalty was always and only to the culture and traditions of
these institutions.
The
term deep state in its positive sense alone applies to the Egyptian State and its institutions, for the
ancient origins of this State allowed the institutions to extend, entwine, and
deepen their own roots.
On
the other hand, the term institutional culture in its negative sense is
the right one to describe the resistance encountered by any attempt at reform
in Egypt.
If
we apply this vision to the Egyptian security sector, three years in the life
of the Revolution have honed the state’s ability to effect change in this
sector only in the interests of those who work in it. One of the contradictions
over the weeks and months of the Revolution is that those who benefited most
from it in terms of wages, salaries, and occupational rights were those who
work in the security sector, particularly the police. The revolution of the
people against the government on National Police Day 2011 has failed to grant
the state the determination to carry out any reforms to its security forces,
while the revolution of police personnel for the sake of rights of which they
had long been deprived obliged the state to spread its arms and rummage in its
pockets.
Even
the judiciary, one of the institutions of the state, has not succeeded in
proving its suspicion - in the vast majority of cases - that the police had
murdered demonstrators. “Since 2011, the courts have convicted or sent to
prison no more than three low-ranking policemen. Three years after the removal
of Mubarak, only two police officers are serving prison sentences for the
killing of no fewer than 846 demonstrators in January 2011. One policeman is
serving a prison term of three years for opening fire on demonstrators during
the Muhammad Mahmoud protests in November 2011.”[38]
This
issue also affects the fact-finding committees which have been set up by three
different regimes. The first was established in February 2011 by Commander
Ahmed Shafik, the last head of government in the Mubarak era, and two delegates
were appointed to investigate the killing of protesters in January 2011. The
Committee published a summary of its findings and recommendations in April
2011, disclosing that it was the police force which had carried out the
killings, and calling for reforms in the security sector, but it never
published the full report. The second committee was set up by President Mohamed
Morsi in July 2012 to investigate violence against demonstrators from January
2011 until June 2012; Morsi’s decree ordered all state bodies to comply with
the Committee’s requests for information and granted it the authority to review
the measures taken by the executive, the extent of its cooperation with the
judiciary, and any failings it discovered, as well as the power to cooperate
with the police, which had earlier refused access to key information. When the
Committee completed its report and presented it to Morsi at the end of December
2012, the President declined to publish it. However, in April 2012, the
newspaper el-Shorouk and the Guardian in Britain
published drafts of leaked chapters from the report concerned with the illegal
use of live rounds by police, and the torture of protesters detained by the
military[39].
Last
- but unfortunately by no means least - “Acting President Adly Mansour issued a
national decree on 22nd December 2013 ordering the formation of an
independent national information-gathering and fact-finding committee to
document and analyse the events of 30th June 2013 and subsequent incidents,
headed by Dr. Fuad Abd al-Mun‘im Riyadh, former international judge and
professor of law. The decree mandated that the Committee take over the
collection and processing of documents and evidence; holding meetings and
interviews; hearing from witnesses; conducting any discussions it finds
necessary; analysing and characterising the course of events, who was
responsible for them, and their effects if any; reviewing investigations which
have been carried out; and releasing findings, information, and evidence
pertaining to crimes that may have been committed in violation of the rights of
demonstrators and which have not previously been investigated. The decree
confirmed the role of state institutions and relevant bodies in cooperating
with the Committee and providing it with all pertinent information, data,
documents, and evidence that it requests in the course of carrying out the
tasks assigned to it.”[40]
The
truth is that it is not possible to bypass court rulings, as these are the
arbiters of truth; that is, the Egyptian police do not have the blood of
demonstrators on their hands until the contrary is demonstrated by the courts
in their rulings.
However,
it is also true that the principle of a fair trial requires that they must be
impartial, and the reliance of the courts on investigations by the police, who
of course are not going to convict themselves, is a perversion of the course of
justice. In cases such as this, where suspicion falls upon the police, an
independent body must carry out the investigation. Until this happens, the
truth is what the court says it is.
The
same applies to the fact-finding committees, whose conclusions remain a
reference for the public prosecutor, which may accept or reject their reports.
Thus the final say once again goes to (biased) investigations and reasoning.
In
spite of all that, the Egyptian police, which remains resistant to change in
confronting the executive, the legislature, or even the judiciary, all of a
sudden turned its back on the regime - of its own accord - and joined the
majority of the people on 30th June 2013.
Some
have seen this as a revolution in the outlook of the police, which has finally
sided with the people after a long alliance (or even entanglement) with the
regime. Others see it as a desire to go back to the previous regime, under
whose patronage the police might regain its lost influence.
Between
one of these things and the other, Egypt continues to live each day as
it comes.
The
allies of the former regime wish to dupe people into believing that it was the
Muslim Brotherhood which carried out the Revolution of 25th January.
The
Muslim Brotherhood wishes to dupe people into believing that the Revolution of
30th June was carried out by allies of the former regime.
Between
one and the other, the people are left searching for the goals of their
Revolution, whose loss they dread in a struggle between corrupt men and
terrorists.
Perhaps
administrative feudalism in a negative sense is responsible for all of Egypt’s chronic
catastrophes, but in a positive sense it is also responsible for the decision
by state institutions to side with the people in the confrontation with
political Islam. Thus the police force took the side of the people on 30th
June 2013, in what looked like an act of repentance for all its sins and
errors.
The
coming days alone will uncover whether this force is prepared to submit to
reform at its very heart, or continues to push the limits of resistance; the
coming days alone will show whether it sided with the people out of love for
the Revolution, or hatred for the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies.
*
Conclusion
After
three years of continuous revolution, Egypt’s moderate climate seems
clouded-over and threatened by violent storms.
Although
the issues of social justice and civil and political rights and
freedoms may be the most significant challenges to the successful building
of a democratic society, transitional justice and confronting
terrorism are the base on which this social construction must take place.
Hence,
if this base remains unstable, troubled, and volatile, issues such as rights,
freedoms, and social justice will be blown away by the wind, and it will not be
possible to gather up the pieces in a society in which criminals can escape
justice and weapons can be raised in the face of the state and society itself.
There
seems to be an awareness of the danger inherent in these issues, seen clearly
in the new constitution, whose articles refer to both transitional justice and
the fight against terror. But however important this awareness may be, it
remains an idea drifting in the void if it is not combined with the will to
act, and will never become a reality.
The
confrontation with terror must not obstruct transitional justice programmes
indefinitely, allowing criminals to walk free.
Transitional
justice programmes must not undermine efforts to combat terror, allowing
terrorists to triumph.
The
question of reform in the Egyptian security sector, therefore, remains very
much on the Revolutionary stage, awaiting an answer. If it stubbornly remains a
question, the answers which now lie shackled will soon lose their patience; and
the questions of the Revolution will not be able to hold back their answers for
long...
*****
References :
